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ABSTRACT 
Import Demand for l.Jheat: 
Japanese and Selec ted EEC Markets 
by 
Enayatollah Fakhrai, Doctor of Philosophy 
Utah State University, 1978 
Major Professor: Dr. Terrence F. Glover 
Department: Economics 
The grm.ving importance of trade internationally as well as for 
the United States (U.S.) spawned a body of literature concerning im-
port demand, expor t supply, and trade balance . Most of the empirical 
X 
work to date has employed estimates of commodity import demand functions 
Jerived from t:L"a.:iitional linear and log··line.s..r functional forms. These 
specifications of import demand impose separability restrictions on 
the consumer ' s choice between domestic and foreign goods, in addition 
to confining import demand elasticities to constant values. The 
policy recommendations made on the basis of the import demand elasti-
cities derived from these tradit ional models may be misleading. In 
this study, a more flexible model of import demand is employed. The 
model allows a more flexible characterization of the underlying pre-
ference structure for both domestic and imported commodities . Impor t 
demand functions are then derived from the underlying model which 
possess the properties of the flexible characterization of consumer 
preference. Wheat import data by major source of supply to selected 
EEC countries and Japan are used to estimate the parameters of the 
derived wheat import demand relationships. 
xi 
The results of the estimation and tests suggest that the use of 
the traditional restricted model may be suspect even though such models 
are easily used in the analysis of trade policy. The traditional model 
was rejected by use of a likelihood ratio test of model specifications 
for all import demand functions for the selected importing countries 
analyzed . This suggests that the associated import demand and income 
elasticities are not constant but variable (derived from each data 
point) in contrast to previous assumptions regarding the behavior or 
import demand and associated elasticities. The compensated own-price 
elasticities of import demand for U. S. wheat in the Netherlands and 
Japan were found to be generally inelastic, close to unitary elastic 
in the United Kingdom (U . K. ), and elastic in the Italian market during 
the time period studied. These estimated elasticities were then used 
to analyze the impa12t.s of s~] €!:cted trn.d~ pol_ic.iP.s such as export sub -
sid ies and taxes, tariff reductions and threshold price systems , quotas 
and price stabilization. 
(161 pages) 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Recently , there have been a considerable number of quantitative 
studies in the field of international trade. The major concern of most 
of these studies was to estimate import demand and export supply func -
tions and apply them to associated trade policy issues . The few 
attempts to construct an empirically tractable theory of import demand 
from micro-economic foundations have imposed rather stringent and 
arbitrary conditions on the underlying framework. Investigators have 
generally used a linear or log-linear functional form to empirically 
estimate import demand for a commodity and the related elasticities . 
This specification of import demand, apart from impos ing arbitrary 
separability on consumer ' s choice between domestic and foreign goods, 
constrains the demand eleasticities to be constant . These es timates 
would surely lead to rather r es trictive policy discussion. Clearly , 
th ese res t rictions ought to be justified empirically rather than assumed 
a priori . 
In this study , a model of import demand for a major agricultural 
co~~odity, wheat , is developed in which the valid i ty of the above men-
tioned restrictions is tes t ed . A more general underlying consumer 
choice framework is developed which sheds some light on the appropriate-
ness of previous studies and the restrictions imposed by them . In 
t urn , the devel opments of this study shed light on the approp r iateness 
of previous elasticity estimates and their use in trade-policy recommen-
dations . 
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The growing importance of trade, particularly trade in agricultural 
commodities for the U. S . , and the contribution that the agriculture 
sector relative to the nonagriculture sector is making to the U.S . 
balance of trade suggests the importance of trade policy issues and 
the need fo r information to give direction to policy decisions . The 
data in Table 1 s upport the view that agriculture is growing in import-
ance relative to the nonagriculture sector in its contribution to the 
U.S. trade balance. As these data indicate, the export coefficient1 
for agriculture doubled between 1950- 1953 and the 1970-1974 periods. 
However, the basic trends were already in evidence in 1971 and 1972 . 
The data for 1974 are influenced by the fact that exports were sustained 
in the face of a large production shortfall domestically. If that year 
is excluded , the expo r t coefficient for agriculture still increased by 
80 percent from 1950-1953 to 1970-1973. 
Interestingly enough, the export coefficient for the nonagricult-
ure sector increased only 25 percent in that same period, and on a 
much smaller basis. The import coefficient fo r agricultural products 
declined by almos t three percent between the two time periods , '"hile 
the import coefficient for the nonagriculture sector more than doubled. 
Other countries have become increasingly dependent on the U.S. 
as a source for grains . Given the present advantage point of the U. S., 
it is easy to overlook the fact that in the mid-l930s the U.S. was 
of min imal importance in world grain trade as indicated in Table 2. 
Latin America was by far the largest net exporter during that period. 
1Export and import coefficients refer to the fraction of output 
that is exported and t he fraction of domestic consumption that is 
imported, respectively. 
I. 
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Table 1. Import and export coeffic ient s by major sec tors of the 
economy of the U.S. a 
Export Coefficients Import Coefficients 
Pe r i od Agri culture Non- Ag Total Agriculture Non-Ag Total 
1950-53 18.68 4 . 08 5 . 00 25.29 2 . 27 3.69 
1955-57 26.39 4 . 29 5 . 24 26.38 2.48 3.51 
1958-61 26 . 93 3 . 80 4 . 72 23.62 2.72 3 . 57 
1962-65 32 .67 3.82 4.83 22.60 2.93 3 . 61 
1966··69 30.05 I, . 02 L. .83 22.37 3.83 4.40 
1970-73 33 . 73 4.60 5.59 21.25 5 .16 5. 71 
1970-74 38.38 5.13 6 . 28 22.00 5 . 87 6 . 43 
1970 42 . 74 5.07 6.08 21.61 5.15 5 . 75 
1971 30.05 4.29 5 . 07 24.26 4 . 76 5.31 
1972 32. 64 4.30 5 . 16 22.45 5.32 5 . 86 
1973 35 . 10 5.16 6.59 17.57 5.95 6.47 
1974 51.75 6.83 8.50 24.11 8.17 8.76 
~alues in percentage of sectur income. 
Source: U . S. Department of Commerce Bureau of the Census, Statistica l 
Abstrac t of the United Sta t es, Annual Editions 71-9 5, 1950-
1974 (Washington, D. C. ) . 
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Table 2 . Horld net import s 
l934-l974b. 
and exports of g rain a selec ted periods, 
Country or Reg ion Net Imports (-) or Net Exports 
1934-1938 1948-1952 1960-1962 1969-1971 1972-1973 
Un i t ed States 0 . 5 14.0 32.8 39.8 
Canada 4 . 8 6 . 6 9.7 14.8 
South Africa 0 . 3 0.0 2.1 2.5 
Oceania 2.8 3.7 6 . 6 10.6 
l.Jes t .e.ra Europe -23.8 -22.5 -25.6 -21.1. 
Japan -1.9 - 2.3 -5. 3 -14.4 
USSR and Eastern 
Europe 4 . 7 2.7 0.5 -3.6 
China - 1.0 -0. 4 - 3.6 -3.1 
Latin America 9.0 2 .1 0 . 8 3.2 
North Africa and 
Middle East 1.0 -0 . 1 -4 . 6 -9 . 2 
Asia 2.4 -3.3 -5.6 - 11.0 
8 Grain includes wheat, milled rice, corn, rye~ barley, oats, 
sorg hum, and millet. 
bMillions of annual av erage me tric ton. 
73 . 6 
14.8 
3.1 
8 . 9 
-21.0 
-18.5 
-14 .2 
-6.3 
-0.6 
-13 .7 
- 14.8 
Source : U. s· . Department of Commerce Bureau of the Census, Statistical 
Abstract of the United States, Annual Editions 56-94, 1934-
1973 (Hashington, D.C.) . 
U. S . Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Servic e, 
Foreign Agriculture Trade of the United States, various 
issues (Hashington, D.C.). 
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By the early 1970s, Latin America ' s position as net exporter had de-
clined while the USSR, Eastern Europe, North Africa, the Middle East, 
and Asia had all become large net importers . The U.S., on the other 
hand, had become by far the dominant source of grain exports supplying 
roughly 40 percent of the total . 
Although little recognized in contemporary discussion of trade 
problems , there has been a major shift in the contribution of agriculture 
to the U. S. trade balance. Throughout the 1930s, 1940s, and the decade 
of the 1950s, the U. S. imported more agricultural products than it 
exported. It was only in the 1960s that the agriculture crade baiance 
was positive . Table 3 documents the major change that has taken place 
in the content of U. S. trade for the period 1950-1975. 
In the 1970s, the U.S . current account became negative because of 
a continuing deficit in trade balance of nonagricultural products . Dur-
ing the same period, the surplus on the agricultural trade account in-
creased almost enough to offset the deficit in nonagricultural trade 
balance . The shift to more exports of agricultural products, particul-
ar ly grain, has implications for domestic grain prices and policies. 
Various policies have been suggested to control or enhance trade . Im-
port quotas, export control, export subsidies, and the 1 971 exchange 
rate devaluation are examples of such policies . 
The events described above, along with what some have termed a 
general "world food crisis" (Makie, 1976) that occurred during 1972-
1974, stimulated concern and criticism of U.S. food and trade policies 
as 'i.Jell as existing policies of other countries . Increased research 
emphasis on trade in agricu l tural commodities and policies which affect 
Table 3 . U.S . exports, imports, and trade balance: Totals, nonagricultural and agricultural, calendar 
year basis, selected years. 
Year Exports Imports Trade Balance 
Total Non-Ag Ag Total Non- Ag Ag Total Non-Ag Ag 
(million dollars) 
1950- 1952 13,357 9,909 3,448 10,102 5,545 4,557 3,254 4,363 - 1,109 
1960- 1962 20 , 853 15,890 4,963 15,308 ll' 513 3,794 5,546 4,377 1,169 
1970 42 , 590 35 , 351 7,259 39,756 33,986 5, 770 2,834 1,345 1 ,489 
1971 43,492 35,799 7,693 45,516 39,693 5,823 -2,024 -3,894 1,870 
1972 48,876 39 , 475 9,401 55,282 48,815 6,467 -6,406 - 9,340 2,934 
1973 70,246 52,566 17,680 69,024 60,615 8,419 1,222 -8,039 9,261 
1974 97,908 75,904 21,999 100,997 90,750 10,247 -3,084 -14,871 ll' 7 52 
1975 107,247 85 , 353 21,894 96,952 87,624 9,328 10,295 - 2,271 12,2568 
8 Estimated, February 1976. 
Source : Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Na tions, Trade Yearbook, Volume 4-29, 1950- 1975 
(Rome). 
"' 
trade resulted . The U.S. Department of Agriculture put more emphasis 
on projecting world trade and developing models to understand trade 
relationships such as trade balance, impo rt demand, and export supply 
(Schertz, 1974; The Farm Index, 1974; Economic Research Service, 1971, 
1974). Others also started to analyze particularly the world grain 
trade situation (Schmitz and Bawden, 1973; Johnson, 1973, 1975; Iowa 
State University, 1973). 
This emphasis has spawned a body of literature which addresses 
the problem of import demand and the forces which change imports, 
trade balance, export supply, trade shares, etc. The studies repre-
sented in the literature have used the traditional approach to 
conceptualize and estimate the demand for imports, Dm' to be a function 
of impor t prices, Pm, the price level of other goods, Py, and income Y: 
D 
m 
(P , P , Y) 
m y 
(1) 
The most commonly used forms have been the linear and log-linear forms 
as follows (Leamer and Stern, 1970): 
y p 
D a + b - + c pm + \1 (2) m p y y 
y p 
log D log a + b log p + log pm + log 11 (3) 
m y y 
These specifications are typical in the literature. For example, 
Schmitz and Bawden (1973) used a linear form to estimate demand and 
supply equations for wheat in various countries including Japan and 
EEC countries to predict 1980 wheat prices, production, consumpt i on, 
and trade flows . Ball and Marwah (1962) used linear form to estimate 
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a series of import demand functions for the U.S. based on quarterly 
data from 1948-1958 and found that U.S . imports are elastic both with 
respect to relative prices and output. Armington (1969), after using 
some assumptions to simplify import demand function for a commodity 
distinguished by the source of s upply, suggests the use of a constant 
elasticity of substitution (log-l i near) type of import demand model. 
The lir.ear and log- linear rr.odels of import demand have also been 
used in the derivation of relative export shares in particular import 
markets. Sirhan and Johnson (1971) employed a linear share equation 
in assessing the degree of competitiveness between the U.S. and oth er 
suppliers of cotton in the English and German markets . Richardson 
(1972) used a log-linear form to assess the impact of using C.I.F. 
unit values versus the F . O. B . unit values in estimating the elasticity 
of substitution betH2ea (1) CJ.S .-G:er!lla:>y; (2) U. S.-U.K., and (3) 
Germany-·U.K . exports in twelve importing countries. In further resea rch 
on the subject of import demand and elasticity of substitution, Richard-
son (1973) concluded that the log-linear model was adequate for esti-
mating the elastic ities of s ubstitution and import demand without making 
robust tests of the appropriateness of the model in representing the 
preference structure for imports . The impor t demand, export s upply , 
and related elas ticities have also been used to study the balance of 
trade by Floyd (1965), Houthakker and Magee (1969), and Sedjo (1971). 
Again , the linear and log-l inear models and accompanying restric tions 
were used. 
The use of linear or log-linear equations to estima_te import 
demand, export supply, and rela ted elasticities imply certain restric t ive 
implications about the underlying structures, and the magnitude of 
th e elasticities as suggested earlier. Furthermore, the traditional 
approach has been legitimately crit i cized by Orcutt (1950) as being 
too restrictive in its representation of preferences for imported 
commodities as well as i mpos ing other problems on the analysis of 
trade pa tterns. The magnitudes of the elasticities and the und e rly-
ing preference structu~es from which they are derived are relevant 
to policy questions . Ind eed , policies such as devaluation, quotas, 
and s ubsidies are misdirected if the assumption of underlying struc-
tures mi srepresen ts t he actual behavior of import (export) demand 
9 
and the suppl y of domestic and exported commodities . A r ecent debate 
on the e ffect s of th e 1971 currency devaluation on U.S . agricultural 
commodity exports between Schuh (1974), Kost (1976), and Fidas (19 76) 
is, in fac t ~ hingP..d on t:hP. us e of estimated import demand eleasticities 
derived from t he t raditiona l approach using the r estrictive l inear and 
log-linear models of import demand. Kos t (1976) and Fidas (197 6) ar gue 
that devaluation has not been a major force behind r e cent increases in 
agricultural e xports based on the assumption that the linear model is 
representative of demand and supply behav ior and that elasticities are 
not greater than one in absolute value . Schuh (1974), on the other 
hand, argues just the opposite posi tion but his arguments are s till 
based on the traditional log-linear and linear models. Of course, 
th e arguments described above are obviated i f the traditional r e present-
ation of import demand, trade share, and trade balance have been rnis-
specified. Such de bates are evide nce of problems that exist in current 
analysis of trade r ela tionships and suggest further work in analyzing 
10 
the structure of preference for, and production of commodities ne eds 
to be done. The aim of thi s research is to analyze the import demand 
side of the wheat trade market for selected countries. The suppl y side, 
although an importan t part of the operation of trade markets and 
policy formation , is not directly taken up in this study. 
Objectives 
The general objective of the study is to estimate the structure 
of preference underly i ng the demand for U.S. wheat in Japan, selected 
European Economic Community (EEC) markets, and the U. K. (now in t he 
EEC ), and to d e rive trade shares and related import-demand elasticities. 
To achieve this overall objective, the following specific objectives 
are delineated: 
1. Review the existing theory of utility and its relevance 
to import demand behavior. 
2 . Derive conceptual models of import demand for the 
selected markets . 
3 . Develop a flexibile form for import demand in order 
to make tes t s of the existence of cer t ain restrictions 
on preference structure and trade shares in the 
selecte d markets . 
4 . Use time series data to est i ma t e t he mode l s and 
derive information relevant t o policy analysis and 
the descrip t ion of the selec t e d markets i n which U.S . 
wheat i s t r aded. 
5 . Use the import demand and trade shares information 
to analyze the impacts of selected domestic and foreign 
U. S. wheat trade policies . 
Foreign Markets Analyzed in the Study 
To estimate the structure of preference, time series data for 
wheat being imported by major U.S . commercial markets from the U.S. 
and major competitors (Canada, Argentina, and Australia) are used. 
This commodity has ranked second in recent exports of the U.S. 
egricultural commodities (Table 4). 
ll 
The major important commercial markets for U.S. exports of wheat 
and flour are Japan and the European Economic Community (EEC) (Table 
5) . The relative importance of the EEC as a market for U.S. wheat 
and flour has been declining while that of Japan has remained stable. 
The percentage of total U. S. wheat and flour being exported to the 
EEC market has declined from 21 percent in 1956-1957 to 4 percent in 
1973- 1974, while this value for Japan has not changed substantially 
from 1956-1957 to 1973-1974. India, until 1967-1968, imported more 
wheat and flour from the U.S. than Japan, but this has taken place 
largely under noncommercial terms of U.S. Public Law 480, (P.L. 480) . 
Therefore , the EEC and Japan are the two commercial markets that are 
important for U.S. exports of wheat and flour . Since the current EEC 
has some original members of the customs union and some new members, 
we must look at some representative markets of that community . 
From the original members , the Netherlands and I t aly are selected on 
the basis of the magnitude of the wheat and flour they imported and 
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Table 4. Volume of U.S. agricu ltural exports. 
Commodity Fiscal Year 
1974 1975 1976 
(million metric tons) 
Feedgrains 43 .7 34.3 46.4 
lfueat and f lour 31.1 28 . 0 31.5 
Soybean 14.0 11.0 15.4 
Oilcake and meal 5.0 4 . 3 4.6 
Rice 1.6 2.2 1.5 
Cotton and linters 1.3 0.9 0.7 
Vegetab le oils 1.1 1.1 0.8 
Fresh f ruit 1.1 1.3 1.3 
Tobacco 0.3 0.3 0.3 
TOTAL a 100.3 84.5 103.5 
aTotal may not add due to rounding 
Source : United States Department of Ag riculture, Econom i c RP. search 
Service, Agricultural Outlook, A0- 14, September 1976 
(Washington, D.C . ). 
Table 5. u.s. exports of wheat and flour to major markets. 
Destination 
Belgium-Lux a 
France 
West Germany 
Italy 
Netherlands 
TOTAL EEC1 
Portugal 
Switzerland 
United Kingdom 
Yugoslavia 
Greece 
Brazil 
Chile 
Peru 
Venezuela 
Bolivia 
Saudi Arabia 
Turkey 
Formosa 
China M. L. 
India 
Indonesia 
Japan2 
Kcrea 
Pakistan 
Israel 
Philippines 
All others 
TOTAL U.S . 3 
export 
l as a percentage 
of 3 
2 as a percentage 
of 3 
8 Luxembourg. 
1956-1957 
482 . 1 
841.5 
963 . 8 
260 . 4 
581 . 5 
3129.3 
164.6 
232.6 
1082 . 8 
993 . 3 
514 .1 
378.0 
203 . 3 
119 . 2 
172 . 5 
114.6 
109.0 
596 .5 
204.0 
1812 . 8 
109 . 4 
1354.4 
427 .6 
607 .4 
286.2 
166.2 
2086.4 
14864.2 
21.05 
9.11 
Year 
1961-1962 1967-1968 
(1000 metric tons) 
160 . 5 131.6 
105.5 243 . 7 
386 . 3 323.1 
537 . 3 155.0 
693.8 469.3 
1829.9 1323 . 1 
281.5 
150.0 
494.4 250 . 0 
1058.5 284 . 9 
124 . 1 
1432 . 0 1309 . 6 
249.1 
206 .7 259.9 
299 . 6 596.2 
93.3 124.8 
68.8 154 . 6 
1400 . 0 39.0 
334 . 4 527.7 
2545.1 5629.1 
75 . 7 2.4 
1035.9 2228 . 3 
362 . 8 957.9 
719.8 2080.2 
268.4 307 . 5 
251.7 613.3 
6218 . 0 3803 . 2 
19499.7 20491.7 
9.38 6 . 46 
5.31 10.87 
13 
1973-1974 
85.9 
68 . 5 
160.3 
367.9 
554 . 4 
1237.0 
193 .0 
72.5 
268.4 
316.3 
160.0 
1476.0 
585.9 
492 . 5 
569.8 
96.2 
176.1 
330 . 4 
2993 . 9 
1620.9 
315.7 
3067.1 
1593 . 3 
545.1 
454 . 3 
389 . 2 
14245.0 
31198. 6 
3.96 
9.8 
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations , World 
Grain Trade Sta tistics, 1956-1974 (Rome) . 
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their demand for U. S. «heat and flour. Of the recent members, the 
U.K. is the biggest market for U.S. wheat and flour. 
U.S. share relat ive to major competi tors 
The U.S. has been the maj or supplier of wheat and flour to EEC 
and Japanese markets; however, the share of the U. S. has changed 
since 1956-1957. Table 6 presents the absolute quantity of whea t and 
flour imported by various EEC members under consideration, and also for 
Japan in selected periods. These data are used to calculate the U. S . 
share2 and the share of maj or competitors in difference markets 
(Table 7). The share of the U.S. has declined substantiall y i n the 
EEC markets but has remained rela t ively stable in the Japanese market. 
In 1956-1957, t he U. S . exported 50.7, 48.5, and 20.5 percent of the 
total wheat and flour imported by the Netherlands , Italy, and the U.K., 
respect i vely , while i n 1973- 1974 U.S. expor t s to these countries were 
36 . 3 , 11.9, 8.6 percent of the total impor t s , r espectively . Although 
the U. S . is a major exporter of whea t to these marke ts, its share is 
declining. France ' s share has increased from 0.6 , 0.0, and 0.5 percent 
in the Netherlands, Italy, and the U.K. to 59.7, 47.8, and 25 . 8 percent 
in the same period , respectively. However , other major compe titors 
have experienced approximately the same loss as th e U.S. France is 
a major producer of grains among EEC members and since 1962 has 
rec~ived major tarriff concessions. 
2This has been done by dividing quantity of imports from specific 
source by the total amount of imports of that commodity from all sources 
by a spec ific importer. 
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Table 6. Wheat and wheat flour imports by sources and destination . 
Sources Destination 
Netherlands Italy U.K . JaEan 
(1000 metric tons) 
1956- 1957 
Argentina 168.1 346 . 5 264 .5 0 .0 
Australia 0.0 2.1 828 . 3 93.0 
Canada 339 .8 90.6 2544.8 895.2 
u.s . 581.5 260.4 1088.8 1354.4 
France 7 . 0 0.0 24.5 0.0 
Total from all 114 7. 6 539.3 5010.6 2393 . 3 
sources 
1961-1962 
Argentina 239.6 53 . 0 355 .1 0.7 
Australia 5 . 1 234.6 717 . 5 427 . 2 
Canada 114 . 6 107.7 2352 . 8 1331.1 
u.s. 693.8 537 . 3 494.4 1035.9 
France 47.6 1.4 185.7 
Total from all 1360.3 935 . 9 4691.6 2773 . 2 
s ources 
1967-1968 
Argentina 43 . 8 408 . 0 42.8 0.0 
Australia 210 . 0 0.0 587.8 613.0 
Canada 138.1 236.9 1873 . 0 1096.8 
u.s. 469.1 155.0 250.1 2228 . 1 
France 
Total from all 941.0 941.0 4077.0 4028.0 
sources 
1973- 1974 
Argentina 7.6 363.1 0.0 32.5 
Aust ralia 0.0 0.0 0.2 427.6 
Canada 27.7 695.1 1191.4 1692.4 
u.s. 554 . 4 367 . 9 268 .4 3067.1 
France 910 .3 1476.6 802 .0 0.0 
Total from all 1526.0 3088 . 0 3ll4 .0 5353.0 
sources 
Source: Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations , 
World Grain Trade Statistics, 1956-1974 (Rome) . 
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Table 7. Share of major exporters in each market as a percentage of 
total import of wheat and wheat flour. 
Sources Destination 
Netherlands Ital;)' United Kingdom J al'an 
Ar gentina 
1956-1957 14.6 54.2 5.3 0 . 0 
1961-1962 17 . 6 5.7 7.6 0.03 
1967- 1968 4.7 43.4 1.0 0.0 
1973-1974 0.5 11 . 8 0.0 0.5 
Australia 
1956-1957 0.0 0.4 16.5 3.9 
1961-1962 0 . 4 25 . 1 15 . 8 15.4 
1967-1968 22.3 0.0 14.4 15 . 2 
1973-1974 0.0 0.0 0 . 0 8 . 0 
Canada 
1956-1957 29.6 16.8 50.8 37.4 
1961-1962 8.4 11.5 50.1 48.0 
1967-1968 14 . 7 25.2 45.9 27.2 
1973-1974 1.8 22.5 38 . 2 30 . 4 
United States 
1956-1957 50 . 7 48.3 20.5 56 . 6 
1961-1962 47.0 57 . 4 10.5 37 . 4 
1967- 1968 49.9 16.5 6.1 55 . 3 
1973-1974 36.3 11.9 8.6 57 . 3 
France 
1956-1957 0.6 0.0 0 . 5 0 . 0 
1961- 1962 3.5 0.15 4.0 0.0 
1967- 1968a 
1973- 1974 59 . 7 47.8 25 . 8 0.0 
aThere is no record for France in this year. 
Source : Food and Agricultural Organi zation of the United Nations , 
World Grain Trade Statistics, 1956-1974 (Rome) . 
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The situation in the Japanese market is different. This import 
market has shown much more apparent stability in the major compet itor's 
share than in the EEC markets. In 1956-1957, the U. S. supplied 56.6 
percent of total imports of wheat and flour in to this country, followed 
by Canada with a 37.4 percent share of the market. In 1973-1974, the 
share of the U.S. increased slightly to 57.3 percent, while the 
Canadian share declined to 30.4 percent . 
I f grain trade expansion is desired the U.S. faces some problems 
in pursuing that goal because of the restrictions of some of its 
present policies . \-/hat direction policies should take is a subject 
about which much controversy has recently been generated. The choice 
of policy direction and the effects of such policies depend on an 
understanding of the underlying trade relationships. The magnitude and 
proportions of these relationships have been a subject of considerable 
debate recently. 
Organization of the study 
In Chapter II, the theory of utility and its relevance to import-
demand behavior are reviewed, and empirical models of import demand 
and trad e shares are then derived from a flexible functional form 
representative of preference structure. In Chapter III, estimating 
equations are derived and proposed estimating techniques discussed. 
This chapter also addresses the relevant data to be used and discusses 
data problems. 
In Chapter IV, the estimated coefficients and tests for specific 
restrictions of the structure of preference, together with the estimates 
of various elasticities of impor t demand are presented . Finally, 
Chapter V is devoted to policy implications and conclusion. 
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CHAPTER II 
UTILITY THEORY OF DEMAND AND DERIVATION OF ELASTICITIES 
The utility function which describes consumer prefer ence struc-
ture is a f unction of all goods and services cons umed. Letting x1 , 
x2 , ... Xn represent all goods and services , the utility function can 
be expressed as: 
(4) 
The classical theory of consumer behavior s ugges t s that the 
individual behaves in such a way as to maximize his util i t y , s ubject 
to a b udge t const raint or income limit : 
n 
l: 
i=l 
P .X. ~ E for i 
1 1 
1, 2, .. . n (5) 
where the Pi are the market prices of the goods and services, E is the 
to tal i ncome of the individual and the Xi a r e as previously defined. 
The demand functions for Xi (i = 1, 2, ... n) can be derived fr om this 
maximization rule. Various r es trictions usually have been imposed on 
the utility structure which confine the demand function to a certain 
form, depending upon the r estric tions used. Some of these r es trictions 
are g iven below . 
Aggregation restr i c tion: This restriction suggests that reallo-
cation of the budget due to income and price changes respectively must 
n 
continue to exhaust total i ncome, l: 
i=l 
P .X . • 
1 1 
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Homogeneity: A functio n is said to be homogeneous of degree r, 
if multiplication of each of its arguments by a constant k will alter 
the value of the function by the propertion kr; that is, if: 
fo r (kX1 , ... kXn) in the domain of the function f. 
Symmetry restriction: The Hessian of the utility function is 
symmetric and so also is its inverse, which is proportional to the 
specific substitution effect. The specific substitution effect is 
a part of the subs titution effect in the Slutsky equation which is 
equal , \ u-1 , where.\ is marginal utility of money and U is the 
Hessian of the utility function (Brmm and Deaton, 1972) . 
Negativity restriction: The Hessian of the utility function is 
negative semidefinite . This is required for a demand function that 
has been derived from the utility maximization procedure to represent 
a maximum (rather than a minimum). 
Integerability: A demand function, could be drived from a utility 
function if the integerability condition is satisfied (Takayama, 1974). 
This condition is satisfied if the equation of the indifference curves 
d~ ~ 0 is int egrab le (where~ is utility). The integration will 
yield the equations of the corresponding utility surface (Baumel, 
1977) . 
To derive the demand functions from the utility function, some of 
these restrictions, or additional restrictions defined later, usually 
have been imposed on the s t ructur e of preference ; hence, a rigid 
specification of demand follows. The objective of this study is to 
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use a flexible model that al lows us to t est various restrictions on 
the preference structure that underlies the demand for U.S. and 
other selected country exports of wheat to se l ected EEC and Japanese 
markets. 
Theoretical Model 
Th e dis cussion of the preceeding section suggests that the demand 
for any commodity can be derived f rom the utility f unc tion, and will 
possess certain properties associa ted wi th the uti li t y func tion. The 
point that mus t be mentioned is that utility f unction in any country is 
an aggregate f un ction of all commodities consumed , whether they are 
produced domestical l y or imported, and is assumed to be representative 
of all consumers . The problem of deriving the demand function from 
the utility lnaxi,nizativn pro.:edu:-e in i rr.pcrti.ng countr y k = l , 2 . . . K 
and in time period t = 1, 2 .. . T is given b y : 
Max uk = uk (X kt x kt 
1 ' 2 ' (6) 
s·t 
n K kt kt l: l: p .. X .. s 
i=l j=l 1J 1] 
i = l , 2 .. . n is the number of co~nodities and j = l, 2 .. . K is the 
number o f supplier (all exporter plus one domestic) countries and 
X kt = (X kt 
i il 
kt kt Xik , . . . XiK ) . Note that domestic production of 
the ith commodity is Xikkt and the rest of ith commodity is imported. 
Ekt is exogeneously determined total expenditure on al l consumer pro-
ducts. That is, in country k, n commodities or commodity classes 
exist , but for any ith commodity class that product can be produced in 
the jth country and flow to the kth country, where X kt is the ith ij 
product in the jth country and consumed in the kth country, i.e., 
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X kt 
ik The above model causes some serious estimation problems because 
of an unmanageable number of explana tory price variables that may appear 
in each of the derived product demand equations . Also, it does not 
reflect the close associat ion between goods that may be in the same 
commod i ty group. 
Armington ' s (1969) remedy for th is problem is to introduce add i-
tional restrictions on the structure by the fol lowing assumptions : 
1. Preferences are weakly seaparabl e in the partition of 
all consumer products in to n commodity classification or as Armington 
(1969) put:s it:, . Marginal rate of s ub stitution between any two 
products of the same kind must be independent of the quantit ies of 
the products of all other kinds. " 
This assumption allmvs the utility function to be expressed in a 
form composed of specific satisfaction functions or commodity aggrega t ors 
which are weakly separable from each other (Armington, 1969; Blackorby 
et al., 1970). Therefore, the utility fu nction for t he importing 
country can be written as: 
X k (X kt 
n nk 
A k A k 
The aggregator X1 is weak l y separable from the aggregators x2 , 
A k 
X . 
n 
- kt 
xi 
kt . h d . d f th d Xik , lS t e omest1c pro uct ion o · the i comma ity and 
kt kt X.kt kt kt . 
= (Xil ' xi2 ' ··· 1 (k-1)' xi (k+l)' ··· xiK ) 18 the 
K-1 dimensional vector of imported products in the ith commodity 
class. Further, it it assumed that the consumer will alloca te his 
(7) 
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total income among categories of the commodities. The optimal expen-
~ k ~ kt 
diture on the Xi group is Ei · . This is the assumption of budget-
ability. 
2 . Preference ordering is budgetable if there exist functions, 
8k, k = 1 , 2 , . .. K with images, 
~ kt = 8 k Ei (P, E) (8) 
where P = [P 1 , P 2 . .• P PJ, E is exogenE:.uusly determined 
ture a nd ~-kt is optimal expenditure on the ith group. 
1 
totnl expendi-
The sufficient 
condition fo r this budgeting procedure to hold is that the utility 
function be continuous, strictly quasi-concave, nondecreasing, and 
str i ctly increasing in on e coordinate. There is no necessary require-
ment for the budgetability of the utility function (Blackerby et al., 
1975) . 
If the consumer a llocates his budget optimally among the n budget 
~ k ~ k 
categories (X1 , ... Xn ), it does not follow that the consumer is able 
to allocate the category expendit ures among components of the categories 
without solving the entire optimization problem. The consumer can 
optimally allocate category expenditure given luLra-category prices 
if preferences are strongly decentralized . Preferences are strongly 
decentralized if there exists i vector valued function ¢. k such that: 
1 
i l, 2, ... n (9) 
where P.k is the ith category price and ~.kt is optimal expenditure on 
1 1 
the ith category. The necessary and sufficient condition for strong 
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decentralization is weak separability of the sa tisfaction functions, 
(i.e . , assumption 1), (Blackorby et al. , 1975). 
The problem of maximizing equation 4 subject to equation 5 then 
decomposes into n maximization pr oblems (Strotz, 1957) as follows: 
A k 
Max X. 
l 
K k k A kt 
s•t L P t X t ~ E. 
ij ij l 
The demand for X. _kt can be derived as: 
l .J 
X. _kt 
lJ 
X. kt (~.kt, kt kt 
lJ l p il , p i2 , 
i 1, 2, ... n 
p kt) 
iK 
f l 2 P kt · d · · f 1' th comrnod1' ty and or i = , ... n. ik 1s omest1c pr1ce o 
(10) 
(11) 
P kt is the price of ith commodity being imported from jth country . 
ij 
This yields a sys tem of K equations of which K - l are import demands 
for the ith commodity and one is the demand for the same conunodity pro-
duced domestically. This theory of import demand is based on the 
assu..'"Tlp tion that the commodities in a specific satisfaction func tion 
(i.e., wheat from different sources of supp ly) are not perfect 
subs titut es for each other (Armington, 1969). This assumption is 
necessary to derive the import demand for a commodi t y in a country by 
the specific source of supply (e.g., Japanese demand for U.S. wheat). 
Suppose , however, we assume that there is perfect s ubst itution between 
the same commodity from different exporters and domestic production . 
In this case , import demand will be an excess demand function (Leamer 
and Ster n, 1970), and it is not possible to derive the import demand 
for a commod ity distinguished by its source of s upp l y in a given market . 
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By simplifying, equation 10 can be written as: 
Max U (12) 
n 
l: 
j=l 
p t X t ,;: Et 
j j 
where n = K and j = l, 2, K. Brown and Deaton (1972, p. 1160) 
explain that in order for inequality to be replaced by equali ty, the 
non-negativity constraint is ignored, and ptrfect divisibility is 
assumed; therefore, equation 12 can be written as : 
t t X t) (13) Max U u (Xl ' xz ' n 
n t X t Et s • t l: P. 
j=l J J 
At this point, the problem is to se l ect a functional form that allows 
the derivation of the preference structure underly1ng the 1mport demand 
for the U. S . and major competitor ' s exports of wheat to the various 
markets under consideration . There are several different kinds of 
demand functions that have been used in previous studies , e.g., the 
linear expend iture system ( Stone, 1954), the direct and indirect 
addilog systems (Houthakker, 1960), and the Rotterdmm system (Barton, 
1964; Theil, 1965, 1967). The latter system is consistent with utili ty 
maximization only if the utility function is linear logarithmic, and 
the former systems maintain direct or indirect add itivity (Jorgenson 
and Lau, 1975). In this study a model is employed which does not 
necessarily assume explicit additivity, homogeneity , or both, as a 
part of the hypothesis, but will allow tests for the existence of 
these restrictions . The utility f unction represenation used is the 
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indirect translog system which provides a local second order approximat-
ion to any utility function. 
Indirect translog utility function 
The maximization of the utility function Ut (X) subject to the 
budget constraint PtXt = Et, where Pt is a vector of prices and Xt is 
a vector of quantities and Et is exogeneously determined total expendi-
ture, yield a set of demand curves X0 = Xt (Et, Pt). Substitution 
of these demand equations back inLo the utility function yield the in-
direct form of the utility function vt. 
(14) 
The indirect utility function Vt can be represented in logarithmic 
form as: 
•... p~t) 
E 
(15) 
i = 1, 2, .. . n l.s the number of exporters plus one (domestic supply) 
p t 
in the import market under consideration and _i_ is the ratio of price 
Et 
of a specific commodity (i.e., wheat) purchased from the ith source 
of supply by an importer under consideration (e . g., Japan) to the 
total expenditure on that commodity class, Et The budget share for 
the jth supplier can be determined by application of the logarithmic 
form of Roy ' s Identity (Theil, 1975): 
__ (ll_nv_t_ ·/ 
olnP. t 
J 
(J 1, 2, . .. n) (16) 
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The indirect utility function can be approximated by a function quad-
ratic in logarithms of the ratio of prices to total expenditure as : 
a 
0 
n 
+ l: a.ln 
i 1 
t 
Pi 1 n n 
- + -l: l: 
Et 2 i j 
p t 
i B .. ln 
1J Et 
p t 
ln _j_ 
Et 
The derivatives of this function with respect to the logarithm of 
prices and income are: 
olnv t n 
+ l: a. 
dlnpj t J i 
To simplify the equation, 
n 
l: a. 
i 1 
P. t 
B .. ln 1 
J1 Et 
n n n 
l: a. + l: l: B .. 
1 j i J 1 
let , 
n 
a 
m' 
l: B . . 
J1 
(j 1, 2' . .. 
B 
mi 
From equation 16 the budget share can be expressed as: 
P . t n 
P. tx. t + l: B .. ln 
1 
a. 
J i J1 Et 
___.]__J_ 
Et t (j 1, 2' ... n P. 
+ l: B l n l a 
mi m i Et 
n) 
n) 
( 17) 
(18) 
(19) 
(20) 
The norl!laliza t ion am = 1 is requ i red for estimation , because the s har e 
equation is homogeneous o f degree zero in the parameters . Equat ion 20 
gives t he share of expenditure on the commodity under consideration 
from the jth suppl ier (W. t) by the consumer countr y. This model makes 
J 
it possible to tes t the validity of imposing the additivity, explicit 
addivity , homotheticity, homogeneity and linear logarithmic res tric -
tion on the utility s truc ture , while mainta in ing the aggregation, 
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symmetry, equality , monotonici t y , and quasi- convexi t y (negativity) 
restrictions . The aggregation, symmetry, homogeneity, and negativity 
restrictions have already been defined. The definition of add itivity, 
equality, monotonicity, and homotheticity are as follows: 
Additivity: The marginal utility of each of the goods is in-
dependent of the quantity consumed of all of the other goods (Brown 
and Deaton, 1972) . 
Equality : If the share equations are generated by utility 
maximization , the parameters Bmi (i = l, 2, ... n) appearing in the 
denominator of each share equation must be the same (Christensen , 
Jorgenson and Lau, 1975). 
Monotonicity: A function f (X) is said to be monotonically 
increasing (decreasing) if successive increases (decreases) in X 
always lead to successive increases (decreases) in f (X), (Chiang, 
1967) . 
Homotheticity: The utility function U is homothetic if we can 
write it in the form: 
where H is homogeneous function of n variables . 
Given the share equations, we can estimate the parameters of the 
indirect translog utility function and test the existence of homogeneity, 
explicit additivi ty, and the linear logarithmic utility function . 
Elasticities 
In the previous section, the model was int roduced and the reason 
for its selection over alternative forms was discussed. The model makes 
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it possible to derive share equation for each exporter in any market 
under consideration. The share equations can be used to derive the own-
price, cross price, and expenditure elasticities. Given the share equa-
tion 20 , the compensated own-price elasticities can be derived as: 
or 
t 
E .. 
JJ 
t 
E .• 
JJ 
dlnW. t 
-1+~ 
31nP . t 
J 
ClX t 
_j_ 
()p t 
j 
p t 
_j_ 
X t 
j 
B .. /W. t - B . 
-1 + JJ J IDJ 
p t 
l + L B .ln i 
i ID1 Et 
The compensated cross-price elasticities are given by: 
or 
t 
E •• ]1 
ClX . t P . t 
__,]_ 1 E, . Jl ClP. t X. t 
l J 
3 lnW. t B .. N. t - B . 
~ = __ Jc:l:__],__-..:m=l-
CllnP. t P . t 
1 
+ I B .1n 1 
m1 Et i 
(21) 
(22) 
Since the compensated cross-price elasticities are equal to the compen-
sated cross-share elasticities, the change in share of the j th country 
with respect to changes in the prices of the ith can be used as a 
measure of the degree of competitiveness between two exporters in a 
given import market . This interpretat ion of compensated cross- price 
elasticities is used in the final chapter to access the degree of 
competitiveness between various exporters and domestic suppliers of 
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wheat in a given market . Finally, the expenditure elasticities can 
be derived as: 
(23) 
or 
dlnW. t 
- 1:. B .. /W. t + L.B 
1 + ___l_ 1 + 1 1] J l mi t 
n1 Et dlnE t P. t 
1 + E B .ln 1 
i ffi1 Et 
Given the compensated own-price , compensated cross-price and expendi-
ture elasticities, the Slutsky equation can be used to find the own-
t 
price elasticities njj 
n .. 
JJ 
as: 
t 
The cross-price elasticities 
t 
nji 
t 
£ •• 
JJ 
flj i 
t 
£ • • 
]1 
I<. t 
J 
t 
njEt (24) 
t be found can .s.s: 
I<. t 
1 
t 
njEt (25) 
Further, the compensated cross-price elasticities are used to find 
the Allen Elasticity of Substitution (AES) as follows: 
t 
a .. ]1 
t 
£ .. 
-~1__ 
w t 
i 
(26) 
A positive value for a . . t reflects substitution between the jth and 
]1 
the ith commodity in time period t, while a negative value implies 
complementarity. 
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CHAPTER III 
ESTIMATION PROCEDURE 
In order to estimate the parame ters of the indirect translog 
utility func tion (ITUF), the parameters of the shar e equation (which 
are the same as the parame t ers of the utility f unc t i on) are estimated . 
The existence of the utility struc ture and associa t ed restrictions on 
tha t structure , if any exist , a r e subsequently tested. 
Estimation 
-----
The share e quations in general a r e expressed as: 
n P. t 
P. tx . t a. + l: B .. 
t J i=l Jl. w. _.1___j__ 
J _t i1 .c 
a + l: B 
m i=1 rni 
1n l. 
Et 
+ 
t ( 27) e. 
" 
t J 
1n i 
Et 
1, 2, T. Time period w. t = G. t or , 
J J 
( t e t) + e.t wher e si , j J 
j = 1, 2, n number of s uppl ier s ; 1, 2, n is number 
of commodities 3 , and e.t is an additive disturbnace term for the jth 
J 
share equation in time period t. The bud ge t constraint is: 
n 
l: 
j=1 
P. tx. t 
J J 
(28) 
One share equation can b e estima ted f r om the other n - 1 equations 
and the bud get constraint. 
t t 
be e s timated, or wl ' w2 ' 
The refore, only n - 1 equation needs to 
t 
w(n - 1)' 
3Whea t from diff erent sources considered as different commodities . 
w t 
l 
w t 
2 
wt 
n-1 
w l 
l 
w 3 
l 
w l 
2 
w 2 
2 
wl (n-1) 
w2 (n-1) 
WT (n-1) 
G l 
l 
G 2 
l 
G l 
2 
G 2 
2 
l (51 , l 52 , 
2 (51 , 2 s2 , 
l (Sl , l 52 , 
2 (Sl , 2 s2 , 
1 ' 1 G- tS1 , (n- 1) 
G2 2 (51 (n-1) , 
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5 l e ll l n , l + el 
5 2 e 2l 2 n , l + el 
5 1 
n , e ll 2 + e2. 
l 
5 2 
n , e 2l 2 + e2 
2 (29) 
s 1 5 1 1 1 e (n-1) l + e (n-1) 2 , n , 
2 2 2 2 
sz s e (n- 1) l + e n , (n-1) 
S T 
n , 
T ) + eT 
e (n - 11 (n- 1) 
Assume the shar e equations which are dependent on the same set of 
independen t variables have contemporaneously correlated dis trubances , 
l # 0 if (k I j and t = s) or (i = 0 otherwise and t s) 
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(30) 
Under this assumption , the variance-covariance matrix Q will be: 
0 2(n-l) 
L(n-1)1' 0 (n-1)2' ., a -(n-l)(n-1) 
0 i s the Kroneker product and I is (T x T) identify matrix. 
are contemporaneous covariances . Further assume : 
n T 
l: l: 
j=l t=l 
t 
e. 
J 
t t 
0 and E (Si ej ) 0 
(31) 
The a .. ' s 
] ~ 
and the e.t are normally di s tributed. The genera l form of the system 
J 
of nonlinear equations that need to be est imated is then given by: 
w t 
j e.t) + e.t J J (32) 
G. t is a vector of known functions of a number of exogenous variables, 
J 
sit' as well as ej t. 
Some further assumptions have to be made as follows: (1) 
the parameter vectors S .t lie in a compact set~ in P-dimensional 
J 
Euclidean space Rp ; ( 2) th e disturbance vectors e.t are stochastically 
J 
ind ependen t and identically distributed with zer o mean and positive 
definitie covariance matrix Q; and (3) the elements of G t are j 
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continuou s functions on $ and any vector 6 t (s) in $ which minimizes j 
the quadratic form: 
T n 
l: l: 
t=l j=l 
[ W.t- G t (S t 6 .t)] 16 X J j i • J (33) 
is called a minimum distance estimator (MDE) of 8. t (Phillips, 1976) 
J 
given the observations (W . t: 
J 
1, 2, . . . n, t = 1, 2, . . . T) and 
some positive definite matrix 6 . 
We can also estimate 6. t by the maximum likelihood estimation 
J 
(MLE) t echnique discussed by Nalinvaud (1970). The probability 
distribution of e .t is: 
J 
L -nT/2 I 1-T/2 1 T n ( 2rr) S"l exp (- 2 l: l: 
t=l j=l 
or 
lnL -nT T I I --2-- ln 2rr - 2 ln S"l 
The estimation task is to find the values of S"l and 6.t that will 
J 
(34) 
(35) 
maximize th e above function. This estimate has asymptotic properties 
which a r e not totally dependent on the normality of the er r ors. In 
cases where normality of errors is not certain, we can still apply 
this method, but in a modified form known as th e quasi-maximum likeli-
hood estimator (QML) . The iterative MDE which can be found by 
35 
replacing o with e.t* = W.t- G.t (S.t, e.t) from the previous 
J J J 1 J 
iteration, and the QML converge to similar estimates (Malinvaud, 
1966; Phillips, 1976). Given the equality of these two techniques 
for large samples , there is a possibility that the QML has a slight 
advantage in precision over the MDE in small samples (Malinvaud, 
1966). We used the MLE technique discussed by Malinvaud (1970) to 
estimate the model . Since t represents the number of observations, 
i.e., sample size , it is omitted from the share equations and 
utility function. The share equation th en becomes: 
n P. 
+ l: B .. ln 1 P.X. a. J ]1 E i=l w. --LJ. + e. (36) 
J E n P. J 
+ l: B ln 1 a 
m i=l mi E 
where, 1, 2, ... n . 
Restrictions 
The model can be estima ted without imposing any restrictions 
on the functions . In later stages, symmetry and equality restrictions 
have to be assumed in order to proceed to test for homotheticity, 
homogeniety, additivity, explicit addit ivity, and linear logarithmic 
utilit y . Therefore, symmetry and equality restrictions are assumed 
in advance, and subsequent tests of the other restrictions are made 
based on this assumption. The restrictions imposed, and those that 
will be tested, have meaning in t erms of the parameters of the share 
equations. The normalization rule: 
n 
l: 
i=l 
a. 
1 
a 
m 
l (37) 
is also used in order to be able to identify the parameters of the model. 
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1~e restrictions and their meaning in terms of the parameters 
of the model are as follows: 
1. Equality Restrictions: The parameters of the denominators 
for all share equations Wj, are equal. 
tions are n (n-2). 
The number of these restric-
2. Symmetry Restrictions: The 
P. 
l 
logarithm of the ITUF is twice 
differentiable in the logarithm of E' so the Hessian of this function 
is symmetric. This gives rise to a set of restrictions: 
B •• 
lJ 
B . . (i ;l j) 
Jl 
(38) 
In addition to these restrictions, there are indirect restrictions: 
8 (n-l)l 
(39) 
B(n-l)n Bm(n-1)- 8 l(n- l) - 8 2(n-l) - ·· · 8 (n-l)(n-l) 
1 The total number of these restrictions are (2) n (n- 1). We imposed 
the normalization rule am = 1 and the equality and symmetry restric-
tions in each step, and then imposed each specific restriction under 
investigation (additivity, etc.) and tested for its validity. 
3. Additivity Restrictions: Given equality and symmetry and 
the normalization am = 1, the additivity restrictions are: 
(40) 
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where~ is some constant , The total number of these restrictions is 
[t n (n-1)-1]. Additivity of the translog form requires the following 
explicit additivity restrictions. 
4. Explicit Additivity Restrictions: Given equality, symmetry, 
the normalization rule am = 1, plus additivity, a translog utility 
function is explicity additive under the further restrictions: 
Bij = 0 i I (41) 
There are% n (n-1) such restrictions. The translog approximation to 
an explicity addit ive utility f unction is explicity additive. 
5 . Homotheticity Restrictions: Given the equality , symmetry, 
and normalization am = l, the homotheticity restrictions take the form: 
B . 
ffil 
Tlie tut&l m...~.mber of these re:strictiuns ar e. (n - l). 
(42) 
6. Homogeneity Restrictions; Given the equality , sy"''llllletr y, 
and normalization a 
m 
l, plus homotheticity, the homogeneity restric-
tions are: 
0 (43) 
or equivalent , Bmi = 0. These are n such. restrictions, 
7. Linear Logarithmic Utility Restrictions: Given the norma-
l ization am = 1, and the equality, s 0~etry, additivity, and homo-
theticity restrictions, the translog utility function reduces to the 
linear logarithmic form under the additional restrictions: 
B .• 
lJ 
B . = 0 
llll 
1 The total number of these restrictions are 2 n (n-1) + n. 
(44) 
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8. Explicit Group Wise Separability Restrictions: Given the 
equality and symmetry res t rictions and the normalization am = l, 
the ith and jth commodity groups are expl icitly separable from each 
other when 
Test procedure 
B .. 
l.J 
0 for i # (45) 
Th e testing seq uence is as fo llows in Figure l. In each step , 
to test f or the validity of the restrictions, a maximum likelihood 
rat i o test stat istic A, where 
max L 
w 
max Ll"l 
is used . L i s the maximum likelihood value of the function with 
w 
equality and symmetry, plus the restrictions that a r e to be tested. 
Ll"l is the maximum likelihood value of the f unction with equality and 
symmetry restrictions only. 
For normally distributed di sturbances A becomes : 
A 
< ll:wi-T/ 2 ) 
(46) 
<IE>li -T12) 
ln A T ln IE I +.! ln ll:>ll 
- 2 w 2 
or 
- 2ln A T (ln IE I 
w 
- ln ll:$"11 ) (47) 
where Ew is the restric ted a nd El"l is t h e unr e s tricted (with equality 
and symmetry r estrictions only} estimator of variance- covariance matrix. 
Explicit Addivity 
Not Homotheticity 
Given Equality and Symmetry 
Figure l . Estimation procedure. 
HomogeneitY Not 
Additivity 
w 
"' 
The value - 2lnA is distributed asymptotically as Chi-Square with 
the degrees of freedom equal to the number of r estriction imposed 
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on the model. The estimated variance- covariance matrix is influenced 
by the estimated parameters and their estimated asymptotic standard 
errors . In turn, the above test is so influenced . Therefore, values 
of the test may be influenced by very large asymptotic variances and 
covariances which weaken the interpretation of the est i mated parameters 
and the test used to delineate the existence of certain restrictions 
on the utility structure . One has to interpret the test with some 
degrE:e of caution . Small values for the d.Sj1Itpto tic variances and 
convariances also influence the asymptotic variance-covariance matrix, 
and subsequent l y, the test used. However, in this case we tend to 
trust the estimates of the parameters if the variances are such that 
the standard errors are one-half or less than one-half of the value 
of the estimated parameters. 
Data considerations 
Estimation of share equation 36 requires time-series data on 
C. I.F. prices and expenditures for imported commodities and wholesale 
prices, and expenditure on domestic consumption of commodities being 
produced domestically. C.I.F. expenditure and quantity data are 
available for wheat. These data are used to find C. l . F. unit values 
as a proxy for C.I. F . prices . Data for domestic wholesale prices of 
wheat are not available, but there are time-series data for prices 
received by domestic producers and for quantities being produced 
domestically. These data are used as a proxy fo r domestic wholesale 
prices and domestic consumption of domestically produced whea t. What 
this does to our empirical function is not known, but we assume it 
does not change the functional relationships . The domestic prices 
and quantities are used to derive time-series data on domestic 
expenditure on domestically produced wheat. 
To estimate the parameters of the share equations and derive 
p . P .X. 
the elasticities of interest, time series data on E1 and~ in a 
on C.I.F. unit value 
P.X. 
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normalized form are needed. Time series data 
P. 
and expenditure are used to calculate E, E1 and ~ . The normali-
zation is done by dividing observations in all years by the middle-
year observatio:1. Normalization is required beca•..1se the model is 
derived by a Taylor series expansion around the point equal to 1. 
This normalization deflates the data . 
Subsequent share equation parameter estimates , which are repeated 
in Chapter IV, are not invariant to such data sca ling. Rescaling will 
change the parameter a. for each of the j share equations to a new 
n J 
parameter aj = aj + ~ Bji ln HJ, where HJ is a constant used to rescale 
1 
the data P . /E such that the new data are (P./E)* =H. P./E. If 
J J J J 
the normalization a* = l is made rathe r than a = l , estimates of 
m m 
the a~ and B .. are obtained as well as estimates of the shares. The 
J ]1 
estimated Bji and shares a r e invariant t o rescaling but the aj are 
not. It would be damaging to t he analysis if rescaling affected 
estimates of demand elasticities 9r the outcomes of hypotheses tests. 
However, recalling from equations 21, 22 and 26 of Chapter II that 
the demand elas ticities and the elasticities of substitution are 
functions of on l y the Bji' and the fitted shares the estimates obtained 
are ind ependent of the aj. The substitution elasticities , like the 
price and expenditur e elasticities are dependent on the bordered 
Hessian , which is independent of the estimated aj ' s. Hence, the 
elasticities and subsequent hypotheses tests are invariant to th e 
scaling used. 
The sources of data used are: 
1 . Statistical Office of the United Nations, Commodity 
Trade Statistics , Series D, Volume 2-24, 1952-1974 
New York. 
2. Food and Agricultural Organization of the United 
Nations , Production Yearbook, Volume 6-28 , 1952-
1974 (Rome). 
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Data for shares, prices , and expenditures on wheat by source of supply 
and consumer country are presented in Appendix A. These data are 
for all classes of wheat, because data for various classes of wheat 
such as soft wheat and hard wheat by sources of supply and consumer 
country are not available. Differentiated data might have helped in 
estimation and interpretation of the restrictions on the utility 
structure. 
CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS OF ESTIMATION 
The estimation procedure followed the order described earlier 
in Figure 1, Chapter III. First, restrictions defined fo r equality 
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and symmetry were imposed on the parameters of each system of e quations. 
Given the equality, symmetry, and normalization rule am = 1, the test 
was carried out for homotheticity and additivity. If additivity and 
homoth.eticity are both accepted, then explicit addjtivity and homo-
theticity, and also homogenei t y and additivity a r e tested. If we 
fail to reject these last t\-..'0 restrictions, then the test for the 
linear logar ithmic utility function is performed. If homotheticity 
is r ejected but we fail to reject additivity, the test for explicit 
additivity, not homotheticity is carried out. If the reverse occurs , 
the test for homogeneity, not additivity is performed. In the situa-
tion of both additivity and homotheticity being rejected, it is possi-
ble to test for explicit group wise separability which also will imply 
group wise separability. This testing procedure was carried out for 
each market unde r consideration. 
Results of the estimation for each mar ket and related tables 
are presented on a market- by- market basis. In each market the major 
competitors in terms of their share of the total wheat import of the 
respective import market are delineated. The share equation for the 
U.S. is equation l. Canada, Australia (or Argentina) and the domestic 
share equations are 2, 3, and 4, respectively. In the presentation 
of the estimated results for each market, the parameter s for the 
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relevant share e quation with associated asymptot i c standard error i n 
th e brackets under various restrictive assumptions are given first. 
Subsequently, the table of the test statistics used for testing restric-
tions in the market under consideration are presented. Finally, 
tables containing the estimated compensated own- and cross-price 
elasticities and expenditure elasticities are shown . The uncompensated 
own- and cross - price elasticities and AES are presented in Appendix B. 
Results for the U.K. market are presented first, followed by the 
Netherlands, Italian and Japanese markets. 
U.K. Market 
The major exporter of wheat to this market is Canada, followed 
by the U.S. and Australia. Therefore, these three exporters , together 
with the d ~.m: est i c su~ply of wheat, are c omp e tj tors in the U. K. wh eat 
market. Table 8 gives the estimated value of the coefficients for 
each share equation in this market under various restrictions. The 
value of the statistic - 2 ln A, for each set of share equations, with 
refe.rence to restrictions imposed and the degrees of freedom are 
presented in Table 9. These values have been tested against the 
relevant tabular chi-square values presented in Table 10. The level 
of significance assigned t o homotheticity, additivity, homogeneity, 
and explicit additivity is 0.01 . The sum of these levels of signifi-
cance is assumed to provide the level of significance for all these 
r estr ict ions imposed simul taneously. That is, the test for linear 
logarithmic utility function is assumed t o be a nested test. The 
test for group wise separability has been performed at the 0.01 
leve l of significance. 
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Table 8. Parameter estimates of share equations for wheat in the U.K. 
market 3 . 
Parameters 
al 
B11 
812 
813 
814 
a2 
822 
823 
8 24 
a 
3 
B 
33 
B 
34 
a4 
B 
44 
a 
Equality 
and 
Symmetry 
0.0716 
(0.0638) 
-0.0073 
(0.0084) 
-0.0753 
(0 . 0318) 
0 .0052 
(0.0093) 
-0.0004 
(0.0028) 
w2 
0.3o40 
(0.1030) 
-0 . 0255 
(0.0641) 
0.0020 
(0.0104) 
0.0105 
(0.0168) 
w3 
0.0796 
(0.0315) 
-0.0506 
(0.0431) 
0.0025 
(0. 0011) 
w4 
0.5348 
-0.0063 
(0.0048) 
Homothe t icity Additivity 
wl - u.s. share equation 
0.0715 0.0717 
(0. 0637) (0.0638) 
-0.0037 -0 . 0048 
(0.0029) (0.0039) 
-0.0004 -0.0002 
(0. 0068) (0.0065) 
0 . 0029 0.0001 
(0 . 0112) (0.0087) 
-0 . 0015 -0.0004 
(0.0039) (0.0028) 
- Canadian share equation 
0.3140 0.3140 
(0.1030) (0.1030) 
-0.0153 -0.0142 
(0. 0416) (0.0410) 
0. 0013 0.0003 
(0.0027) (0. 0016) 
0.0027 0 . 0017 
(0. 0068) (0. 0056) 
- Australian share equat ion 
0.0795 0.0795 
(010315) (0.0315) 
-0.0111 -0.0103 
(0 .0051) (0. 0049) 
0.0039 0.0004 
(0.0014) (0.0003) 
- Domestic share equation 
0.5348 0.5348 
-0.0068 - 0.0038 
(0. 0044) (0. 0021) 
Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses. 
Groups l, 3 
Separable 
From 2 and 4 
0 . 0715 
(0.0637) 
-0 . 0063 
(0 . 0069) 
0.0000 
0.0011 
(0. 0027) 
0.0000 
0.3142 
(0 . 1031) 
-0.0246 
(0.0601) 
0.0000 
0 . 0116 
(0. 0171) 
0.0793 
(0.0312) 
-0 .042 1 
(0. 0306) 
0.0000 
0 . 5350 
-0.0042 
(0.0024) 
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Table 9. Test statistics for the validity of different restrictions 
in the U.K. market . 
Restriction df - 2 ln A 
Homotheticity 3 33 . 496 
Additivity 5 13.099 
Gro up 1, 3 
separabl e 
from 2, 4 4 3.317 
Table 10. Critical values of x2 /degrees of freedom . 
Degrees of Level of Significance 
Freedom 0.05 0.025 0.01 0 . 005 
3 2.605 3.116 3 . 782 4.279 
4 2 . 372 2. 786 3 . 319 3 . 715 
5 2.214 2 . 566 3 .017 3.350 
2 . 100 2.408 2.802 3 . 091 
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From comparison of the test statistic in Table 9 with the rele-
vant chi-square values (X2 ) in Table 10, it is obvious that homothe ti-
city and additivity are rejected at the level of significance chosen; 
therefore, there is no need to test homogeneity and explicit additi-
vity. The next step is to perform all possible explicit group wise 
separability tests. These restrictions are tested at the 0.01 level 
of significance, and only those that have not been rejected are pre-
sented in Table 9 (i.e . , group wise separability of groups land 3 
from groups 2 and 4). Therefore, the only acceptable restriction on 
the structure of preference in the U.K. market, according to the test 
procedure, is the separability of the group (1, 3) from (2, 4), i.e., 
separability of the U.S.-Australia group from the Canada-domestic 
group in the U.K. import market . This allows the share equations to 
be expressed as follows : 
w l 
p l p 3 
0.0715 - 0.0063 ln E + 0 . 0011 ln E 
D 
p2 p4 
0 .3142 - 0.0246 ln E + 0.0116 1n E 
------------------------D 
p 1 p 3 
0.0793 + 0.0011 1n E- 0 .0421 1n E 
D 
P2 
0.5350 + 0.0116 1n E 
D 
p4 
0.0042 1n E 
(48) 
P1 P2 P3 P4 
where D = 1 - 0.0052 1n E- 0.0130 1n E - 0.0410 1n E + 0.0074 1n E" 
Equations 48, together with the equations of the uncompensated and 
compensated own- and cross - price elasticities, expenditure elasticities, 
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and the AES are used to find the estimated values of these elasticities 
for each year over the entire time period under consideration. Tables 
11, 12 and 13 give the magnitude of compensated own-price elasticities, 
expenditure elasticities, and compensated cross-price elasticities, 
respectively, for this market. 
Netherlands Market 
In this market the major exporters are the U.S., Canada, and 
Argentina, respectively. These three exporters, together with the 
domestic supply of wheat, are the four suppliers in this market. 
Table 14 gives the parameter values and Table 15 presents the values 
for -2 ln A and the degrees of freedom under various restrictions. 
The testing procedure and levels of significance used are exactly 
analogous to that for the U.K. market. Comparison of the values for 
-2 ln \ in Table 15 with the relevant x2 values in Table 10 indicate 
that homotheticity and also additivity restrictions are to be rejected 
at the 0.01 level of significance. 
From all possible explicit group wise separability tests, the 
only one that is not rejected at the 0.01 level is explicit group 
wise separability of groups (1, 2, 4) from (3), i.e., U.S., Canada, 
domestic from Argentina. This terminates the tests for the validity 
of imposing different restrictions on the structure of preference 
in this market. The share equations under the restrictions of 
explicit group wise separability of group (1, 2, 4) from (3) for 
this market are as follmvs: 
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Tab l e 11. Estimated compensated own-price e l as ticities f or wheat in 
the U.K. market, 1952-1974 . 8 
Year £11 £ 22 £ 33 £44 
1952 -1.08342 -1.06530 -1.51038 -1.00743 
1953 -1.08262 -1. 06486 -1.48691 -1.00739 
1954 -1.08088 -1.06501 -1.50687 - 1.00740 
1955 -1.08214 -1. 06507 - 1.48914 -1.00739 
1956 -1.08151 -1.06460 -1.4 4290 -1.007 32 
1957 -1. 08230 -1.06498 -1 .48073 -1.007 38 
1958 -1.08189 -1.06484 -1.48733 -1.00738 
1959 -1.08253 -1.06494 -1. 47632 -1.00738 
1960 -1.08214 -1.06490 -l. 46724 -1.00 736 
1961 -1.08302 -1.06523 -1. 49985 -1.00741 
1962 -1.08137 -1.06488 -1.45882 -1.00735 
1963 -1.08291 -1.06 529 - 1.48990 -1.00 740 
1964 - 1. 08234 -1.06525 -1. 47452 -1.00738 
1965 -1.08145 -1. 065 28 - 1.45513 -1.00735 
1966 -1. 08238 -1.06 555 -1.49237 -1.00741 
1967 -1.08249 -1. 06593 - 1.50216 -1.00742 
1968 -1.08372 -1. 06600 -1. 54338 -1.00747 
1969 -1.083 73 -1.065 75 -1. 5 3198 -1. U0"/46 
1970 -1.08126 -1.06456 -1.42524 -1.00730 
1971 -1.08054 -1.06401 -1.40332 -1.00725 
1972 -1.08094 -1.06429 -1.42375 -1.00729 
1973 -1.08033 -1.06389 -1. 38724 -1.00722 
1974 -1.08361 -1.06666 -1. 58782 -1.00753 
al, 2, 3 a nd 4 refers to the U. S., Cana da, Australia and domes-
tic, respectively . 
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Table 12. Estimated expenditure elasticities for wheat in the U.K. 
market, 1952-197". 
Year 
nlE n2E n3E 1')4E 
1952 1. 02118 0.798942 1. 48513 0 . 93418 
1953 1. 02076 0.98941 1. 46234 0 . 93442 
1954 1. 01926 0. 98 943 1. 48175 0. 93436 
1955 1.02035 0. 98952 1. 46450 0.93443 
1956 1. 02027 0.98968 1. 41958 0 . 93486 
1957 1. 02054 0.98953 1. 45652 0.93448 
1958 1. 02020 0.98744 1. 46275 0.93446 
1959 1. 02077 0.98954 1. 45205 0.93452 
1960 1. 02053 0.98960 1.1,4322 0.93461 
1961 1. 02095 0 . 98948 1. 47491 0. 93·<30 
1962 1. 01999 0.09068 1. 43505 0. 934 71 
1963 1. 02093 0. 98957 1. 46522 0.93437 
1964 1. 02059 0 . 98968 1. 45 028 0.93451 
1965 1. 02004 0.98987 1. 43145 0.93470 
1966 1. 02046 0 .98968 1. 46811 0. 93434 
1967 1. 02044 0 . 98977 1. 4 7713 0.93424 
1968 1. 02113 0.98951 1. 51720 0.93390 
1969 1. 02124 0.98947 1. 50611 0.93400 
1970 1. 02023 0.98982 1. 40242 0.93504 
1971 1. 01993 0 . 98781 1. 38115 0.93533 
1972 1. 02002 0.98973 1.40098 0 . 93509 
1973 1. 01996 0 . 98993 1. 36554 0.93555 
1974 1. 02069 0. 98953 1. 56039 0 . 93355 
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Table 13. Estimated compens ated cross-price elasticities for wheat 
in the U. K. market , 1952-1974 . 
Year (:12 (:13 (:14 (:21 (:31 E41 
1952 0 . 01305 0.05662 -0.00743 0 . 00522 0 . 0556 -0.00743 
1953 0.01298 0 . 05627 - 0 . 00739 0100519 0. 05463 - 0.00739 
1954 0. 01300 0 . 05603 - 0.00740 0 . 00520 0 . 05532 - 0 . 00740 
1955 0.01298 0.05619 -0.00739 0.00519 0.05480 - 0 . 00739 
1956 0.01286 0 . 05570 -0.00732 0 . 00515 0.05320 - 0 . 00732 
1957 0.01297 0.05617 -0.00738 0.00519 0.05452 - 0.00738 
1958 0.01297 0 . 05611 - 0.00738 0.00519 0.05471 -0.00738 
1959 0.01296 0105618 -0.00738 0.00518 0.05438 -0 . 00738 
1960 0. 01293 0.05603 -0.00736 0 . 00517 0 . 05406 -0.00736 
1961 0. 01302 0. 05646 -0.00741 0.00521 0.05519 -0.00741 
1962 0. 01291 0.05582 - 0 . 00735 0 . 00516 0.05376 -0.00735 
1963 0 . 01300 0.05638 -0 . 00740 0.00520 0.05487 -0.00740 
1964 0.01296 0.05616 - 0.00738 0.00519 0.05435 -0 . 00738 
1965 0.01291 0.05585 -0 . 00735 0 . 00517 0.05368 -0.00735 
1966 0 . 01301 0 . 05632 - 0.00741 0 . 00520 0 . 05498 - 0.00741 
1967 0 . 01304 0.05644 - 0 . 00742 0.00522 0 . 05532 -0.00742 
1968 0.01313 0.05694 - 0 . 00747 0.00525 0 . 05668 - 0.00747 
1969 0.01310 0.05685 - 0.00746 0 . 00524 0 . 05630 - 0.00746 
1970 0.01282 0 . 05551 - 0.00730 0 . 00513 0.05259 -0 . 00730 
1971 0.01274 0.05512 - 0 . 00725 0.00509 0.05176 - 0.00725 
1972 0.01280 0.05540 - 0.00729 0 . 00512 0.05250 - 0 . 00729 
1973 0.01268 0. 05491 -0.00722 0.00507 0. 05116 - 0.00722 
1974 o. 01322 0.05722 - 0.00753 0. 00529 0 . 05815 -0 . 00753 
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Table l3. Continued. 
Year E2 3 E24 E 32 E42 E34 E43 
1952 0. 04115 0 . 02952 0.04115 0.03473 -0.00743 0 . 04115 
1953 0.04094 0.02932 0.04094 0.03470 -0.00739 0.04094 
1954 0.04100 0. 02939 0.04100 0.03470 -0 .00740 0.04100 
1955 0.04095 0.02942 0.04095 0.03468 - 0.00739 0.04095 
1956 0.04057 0. 02920 0. 04057 0 .034 62 -0.00732 0.04057 
1957 0.04089 0.02937 0.04089 0.03468 -0.00738 0.04089 
1958 0 . 04091 0.02931 0 . 04091 0. 03469 -0.00738 0 . 04091 
1959 0. 04087 0 . 02936 0104087 0 . 03467 -0.00738 0.04087 
1960 0. 04079 0.02934 0. 04079 0. 034 65 -0.00736 0. 04079 
1961 0.04106 0.02949 0,04106 0.03470 -0 . 00741 0.04106 
1962 8. 04071 0.02938 0. 0407l 0. 03465 -0.00735 o. oeon 
1963 0.04100 0 . 02952 0.04100 0. 03468 -0. 00740 0. 04100 
1964 0. 04038 0 . 02950 0 . 04088 0.03466 -0 . 00738 0.04088 
1965 0. 04072 0.02952 0.04072 o. 031;61 -0.00735 0 . 04072 
1966 0. 04103 0.02964 0.04103 0.03468 -0 . 00741 0.04103 
1967 0 . 04113 0.02981 0. 04113 0. 03468 -0. 00742 0. 04113 
1968 0 . 04140 0.02984 0.04140 0.03474 - 0.00747 o. 04140 
1969 0 . 04132 0. 02972 0. 04132 0.()3474 - 0.00746 o. 04132 
1970 0. 04043 0.02919 0 . 04043 0.03458 -0.00730 0.04043 
1971 0 . 04017 0.02894 0.04017 0 . 03456 -0.00725 o. 04017 
1972 0. 04037 0.02906 0.04037 0.03459 -0.00729 0.04037 
1973 0 . 04000 0.02889 0.04000 0 . 03451 -0.007 22 0.04000 
1974 0. 04170 0.03014 0.04170 0.03480 -0.007 53 0. 04170 
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Table 14. Parameter est ima te of the share equations for wheat in the 
Nethe rlands market . a 
Equality Groups 1, 2, 4 
and Separable 
Parameters Symmetry Homotheticity Additivity From 3 
wl - u.s. share equation 
al 0. 2738 0.2740 0 .2740 0.2741 
(0.1063) (0.1064) (0.1064) (0 . 1064) 
Bu -0.0591 -0.0412 -0.0486 -0.048 3 
(0.0641) (0.0443) (0. 0537) (0.0535) 
B12 0.1556 0.0362 0. 0571 0.0572 (0.1431) (0. 0302) (G. 0493) (0.0493) 
Bu - 0.0017 0. 2469 0.0157 0.0000 
(0.0063) (0.8310) (0.0631) 
B14 -0 . 2031 -0. 2133 - 0.2032 -0.2142 (0.1303) (0.1434) (0.1303) (0.1338) 
w2 - Canadian share equation 
a2 0.1503 0.1503 0 . 1503 0.1501 
(0.0231) (0 . 0231) (0. 0231) (0. 0230) 
822 -0.2382 -0.1054 -0.1931 -0. 20ll (0.1002) (0.0868) (0 . 0912) (0.0938) 
823 0.0409 0.1762 0. 0086 0.0000 (0.0211) (0. 0869) (0.0041) 
824 -0.1883 -0.0913 -0.1114 -0.1121 (0.0645 ) (0.0398) (0. 0412) (0. 0416) 
w3 ·- Argentina share equation 
a3 0.0412 0.0412 0.0412 0.04ll (0.0318) (0. 0318) (0.0318) (0.0318 ) 
833 0.0164 0.0638 0. 1065 0.1065 (0.1482) (0.3503) (0 . 6310) (0. 6310) 
834 0. 0059 -0.4826 0.0306 0.0000 (0. 0833) (0.9873) (0.2328) 
w4 - Domestic s hare equation 
a4 0.5347 0.5345 0.5345 0.5347 
B 0.2229 0.1872 0.1877 0.2139 
44 (0 . 0605) (0 . 0302) (0. 0301) (0.0587) 
a Asmptotic standard errors are in parentheses . 
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Table 15. Test statistics for the validity of different restrictions 
in the Netherlands market. 
Restrictions df -2 ln A 
Homotheticity 3 24 .751 
Additivity 5 23.320 
Groups 1, 2, 4 
Separable 
from 3 3 3. 715 
pl p2 p4 
0.2741 - 0 .0483 ln E: + 0.0572 ln E: - 0.2142 ln E: 
D 
pl p2 p4 
0.1501 + 0 . 0572 ln E:- 0.2011 ln E:- 0.1121 ln E: 
D 
p3 
0.0411 + 0.1065 ln E 
w3 = n 
pl 
0 . 5347 - 0.2142 ln E 
D 
p2 p 4 
0.1121 ln E: + 0.2139 ln E: 
(49) 
where D = 1 = 0.2053 
pl 
0.2560 ln 
p2 
0 .1065 
p3 
0.1124 
p4 
ln- - -+ ln E: - ln E;· E E 
These share equations and equations 21 to 26 a re used t o find the 
relevant elasticit ies which are presented in Tables 16, 17, and 18. 
Italian Market 
This marke t is distinguishable for the previous markets because 
_the share of imports in the total wheat consump tion is minimal rela-
tive to the domestic s upp l y . Among the exporters, Argentina is the 
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Table l6o Estimated compensated own-price elasticities for wheat in 
the Netherlands market, 1953-1970oa 
Year E: ll E:22 E: 33 E:44 
1953 -Oo93669 -2030965 Oo 27426 -0087805 
1954 -00 94004 -20 08295 Oo85264 -0 0 88426 
1955 -Oo 93524 -20 40463 Oo79292 -Oo 87849 
1956 -Oo 94930 -1. 89132 1. 21414 - Oo88987 
1957 -Oo 95848 -1. 81457 1. 60460 -00 88080 
:!.958 -Oo96993 -2 o02284 1 0 14354 -Oo88725 
1959 -Oo 97764 -2049224 Oo73908 -0087985 
1960 -0 097026 -1.99349 1. 65895 -·Oo 88965 
1961 - 0 0 97091 -20 08377 1. 484 74 -Oo 88760 
1962 -0096039 -l. 82315 4032895 -Oo 89577 
1963 -0 o96684 -1.77967 6024805 -Oo 89649 
1964 -Oo96336 -1.73125 11.19358 -0089868 
1965 - 00 96 744 -1. 75568 -77 0 35753 -0 089934 
1966 -Oo 96692 -1.89557 9o 72677 -0 089509 
1967 -00 96666 -1. 84831 6 o 82025 -0089527 
1968 -Oo 97722 -1.80809 6o69082 -Oo89601 
1969 -Oo97490 -20 00628 4 042924 -Oo 89052 
1970 - 0o974 92 -1.66602 -180 5 9533 -0090205 
al, 2 , 3 and 4 re f er totheUoSo , Canada, Argentina, and 
domestic r espectively. 
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Table 17. Estimated expenditure elasticities for wheat in the 
Netherlands market, 1953-1970. 
Year 
nlE n2E n3E n4E 
1953 1.17 075 2 . 51387 -0.89663 0 . 76368 
1954 1.16451 2.23309 -1.44337 0. 76896 
1955 1.16304 2.63532 -1.41312 0. 74905 
1956 1.18355 1. 99556 -1.77880 0. 77675 
1957 1.21741 1. 89966 -2.16195 0 . 77316 
1958 1. 27891 2.16032 -1.71904 0. 74842 
1959 1. 33835 2. 74856 -1.35235 0. 71712 
1960 l. 27162 2.12598 - 2.22L:l7 0.7501,9 
1961 1. 28180 2.23833 -2 . 05844 0 . 74301 
1962 1. 20760 1. 91683 -4 . 86095 0. 77158 
1963 1.23244 1. 86238 -6.77688 0. 76920 
1964 1. 20970 1. 80350 -11.71070 o. 77737 
1965 1. 22466 1. 83544 76.84377 0. 77064 
1966 1. 23778 2.00817 -10.26221 0.75786 
1967 1. 23606 1. 94823 -7.35481 0.76223 
1968 1. 27828 1. 89795 - 7.22160 0.75963 
1969 1 . 28820 2.14335 -4.98803 0. 74177 
1970 1.24673 1. 724 70 18 .09538 0. 77609 
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Table 18. Estimated compensated cross-price elas ticities for wheat 
in the Netherlands marke t, 1953-1970 . 
Year E:l2 E: 13 E:l4 E:21 E:31 E:41 
1953 0.46654 - 0 . 11555 -0.58506 0 . 67425 - 0.11555 - 0 . 39366 
1954 0.44347 - 0.10966 - 0.44783 0. 59440 - 0 . 10966 -0.36174 
1955 0.46290 -0. 11513 -0.57556 0 . 70019 - 0.11513 - 0 . 36276 
1956 0.43123 -0.10482 -Q . 56065 0.52726 -0 . 10482 -0.34083 
1957 0 . 43574 -0 .10346 -0 .59120 0.52188 -0.10346 - 0.32349 
1958 0 . 46509 -0~10683 - 0 . 66723 0.56992 -0.10633 -0. 30094 
1959 0.50708 -1.11385 - 0.75394 0. 7217 5 -0.11385 -0.292 52 
1960 0.45479 -0.10455 -0.65159 0.55562 -0.104 55 -0.28824 
1961 0 . 46468 -0.10650 -0.66107 0.58638 - 0.10650 -0.28820 
1962 0. 41594 -0.09876 -0.56439 0.49203 -0.09876 -0.28609 
1963 0.42039 -0.09808 -0.58791 0.47789 - 0.09828 -0 . 27659 
1964 0.40651 -0.09600 - 0.55685 0.45868 -0.09600 -0.27696 
1965 0. 40841 -0.09587 - 0.57027 0 . 46400 - 0.09537 -0.25956 
1966 0. 42667 -0.09940 - 0.59814 0 . 51430 - 0.09940 -0 .26462 
1967 0.42559 -0. 09928 -0. 595 76 0.40043 - 0 . 09923 -0 .27175 
1968 0 . 43481 -0.09853 - 0.63734 0. 48716 -0. 09853 -0.26167 
1969 0. 45643 -0. 10373 -0166600 0. 55711 -0.10373 -0.26561 
1970 0 . 40527 - 0.09281 -0 . 58427 0 . 43181 -0 .09281 - 0.25123 
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Table 18. Continued . 
Year £ 23 £24 £32 £42 £34 £43 
1953 -0.11555 - 0.76292 -0.11555 0.00790 0.12195 - 0.11555 
1954 -0.10966 -0 . 62488 -0.10966 0 . 01424 0 . 11574 - 0.10966 
1955 -O .ll513 -0.81575 -0.11513 0.02331 0.12151 -0 .11513 
1956 -0.10482 - 0.52668 -0.10482 0.01601 0.11063 -0.10482 
1957 -0.10346 -0.43 351 -0. 10346 0.02226 0 . 10920 -0.10346 
1958 -0.10683 -0.60057 -0.10683 0.04030 0.11275 -0.10683 
1959 -0.11385 -0.86422 -0 . 11385 0.05769 0.12015 -0.11385 
1960 -0.10455 -0.58355 -0.10455 0. 04272 0 . 11035 -0.10455 
1961 -0.10650 -0.68444 -0.1065() 0.04635 0.11242 -0.10650 
1962 -0.09876 -0.48695 -0.09876 0.03312 0 . 10423 -0.09876 
1963 -0. 09808 -0.45252 -0.09808 0.03682 0.10351 -0.09808 
1964 -0.09600 -0 . 43494 -0.09600 0.03278 0.10131 -0. 09600 
1965 -0 . 09537 -0.44838 -0.09537 0.04073 0.10066 -0.09537 
1966 -0 .09940 -0.5 2750 -0.09940 0. 04554 0. 104 91 -0 . 09940 
1967 - 0.09923 -0.40111 -0.09923 0.04151 0.10473 -0.09923 
1968 -0.09853 -0.4784 9 -0. 09353 0.04548 0.10399 -0.09853 
1969 -0.10373 -0.59045 -0.10373 0. 05304 0.10948 -0.10373 
1970 -0.09281 -0 . 39767 -0.09281 0. 04035 0 . 09795 -0.09281 
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majo r supplier, followed by Canada and the U. S . Values of the para-
meters of the shar e equat ions under various restrictions are given in 
Table 19. Test statistic values , with relevant degrees of fre edom fo r 
different sets of restrictions, are presented in Table 20 . The same 
t es ting procedure has been followed as befor e . Homotheticity i s again 
r ejected ; however, we fail to rej ect addi tivity. Given additivity, 
the next test was for explicit addi tivity r estric t ions . The test 
f a iled to r eject these r estrictions at the 0.01 leve of signifi-
cane e. 
Thus, explicit addit ivi ty r estric tions are the only acceptabie 
res trictions to be imposed. Under these sets of restrictions, the 
share equa tions fo r the competitors in this market become : 
0.0158 - 0.0067 ln 
pl 
wl 
E 
;) 
0 . 0188 - 0.0105 
p2 
ln E 
w2 D (50) 
0.0201 + 0.0021 
p3 
1n E 
w3 D 
0 . 9453 + 0.0009 1n 
p4 
E 
w4 D 
pl p2 p3 p4 
where D = 1 - 0 . 0067 ln E - 0.0105 1n E + 0.0021 1n E + 0 . 0009 ln E:· 
Equations 31 to 26, along with e quations 50, are used to est imate 
the compensa ted and uncompe nsated own- and cross- price elas t i cities, 
expenditure elasticities a nd t h e AES for each year in t he time period 
under study for this market . Tables 21, 22 , and 23 giv e the values for 
these estimated elasticities . 
Table 19. Parameter estimates of share equations for whea t in the 
Italian market . a 
Parameters 
Equality 
and 
Symmetry 
0.0158 
(0.0067) 
-0.0310 
(0.0861) 
0.0518 
(0.0934) 
0.0031 
(0.0145) 
-0.0023 
(0.0168) 
Homotheticity Additivity 
wl - u.s. share equation 
0 . 0157 
(0.0069) 
-0 . 0112 
(0.0631) 
0.0068 
(0. 0163) 
0 . 0074 
(0.0231) 
-0 . 0026 
(0.0022) 
0.0158 
(0. 0067) 
-0.0112 
(0.0241) 
0 .0002 
(0.0038) 
0 . 0002 
(0.0104) 
-0.0149 
(0. 0087) 
w2 - Canadian share equation 
0.0181 
(0.0104) 
0 .0575 
(0. 0645) 
0.0031 
(0.0110) 
0.0104 
(0.0223) 
0. 0188 
(0.0104) 
-0.0169 
(0.0094) 
0.0009 
(0.0086) 
0.0097 
(0 . 0072) 
0.0188 
(0. 0104) 
-0.0131 
(0. 0063) 
0 . 0002 
(0. 0041) 
0.0105 
(0.0093) 
w
3 
- Argentina share equation 
0.0201 
(0. 0154) 
0 . 0029 
(0. 0018) 
-0 . 0207 
(0.0101) 
0.0202 
(0.0154) 
0.0023 
(0. 0211) 
-0.0104 
(0. 0080) 
0. 0201 
(0.0154) 
0.0021 
(0.0210) 
-0.0112 
(0.0086) 
W
4 
- Domestic share equation 
0. 9453 
0.0882 
(0 . 0773) 
0. 9453 
0 . 0398 
(0 . 0320) 
0. 9453 
0.0438 
(0. 0412) 
8 Asymptotic standard errors ar e in parentheses . 
Explicit 
Add i t ivity 
0.0158 
(0 . 0067) 
- 0.0067 
(0 . 0201) 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0188 
(0.0104) 
-0.0105 
(0.0051) 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0 . 0201 
(0. 0154) 
0. 0021 
(0 . 0210) 
0 . 0000 
0 . 9453 
0.0009 
(0.0006) 
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Table 20 . Test statistics for validity of different restrictions in 
the Italian market . 
Restrictions 
Homotheticity 
Additivity 
Explicit 
additivity 
df -2 ln >. 
3 47.695 
2.976 
6 2.793 
"' 
,... 
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Table 21. Estimated compensated own-price elasticities for wheat 
in the Italian market, l953-l974.a 
Yea r E: ll E:22 E:33 E:44 
1953 -l. 45186 -l. 52189 -0.89955 -l. 00090 
1954 -1.42285 -l. 58801 -0.90100 -l. 00090 
1955 -1.42740 - l. 51081 -0.89669 - l. 00090 
1956 -1.44563 -l. 61374 -0.89834 -l. 00090 
1957 -l. 51646 -l. 59486 -0.89914 -l. 00090 
1958 -l. 52443 -l. 51743 - 0.89980 - l. 00090 
1959 -l. 51654 -l. 55878 -0.89648 -l. 00090 
1960 -1.47404 - l. 61643 -0. 89918 -l. 00090 
1961 -l. 42045 -l. 52994 -0 . 89662 -l. 00090 
1962 -l. 42292 -l. 54227 -0. 81 781 -l. 00090 
1963 -1.47735 -l. 55163 -0.89790 -l. 00090 
1964 -1.41735 -l. 54801 -0. 89762 -l. 00090 
1965 -l. 40987 - l. 50494 -0. 89489 -l. 00090 
1966 -l. 43012 -l. 52314 -0.89591 -l. 00090 
1967 ··l. 42295 -l. 52594 -0.89637 -l. 00090 
1968 -l. 43483 - 1.52679 -0.89643 -1.00090 
1969 - l. 43343 -l. 51312 -0.89646 -1.00090 
1970 -l. 40767 -l. 48818 - 0 . 89516 -l. 00090 
1971 -1.39257 - l. 4 7085 -0.89428 - l. 00090 
1972 - l. 40178 - l. 48504 - 0.89438 - l. 00090 
1973 -l. 50018 - l. 59013 -0.89982 - l. 00090 
1974 - l. 62335 -1.78516 -0.90397 -l. 00091 
al , 2, 3 and 4 refer to the U. S . , Canada, Argentina and domes-
tic, respectively. 
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Table 22. Estimated expenditure elasticities for wheat in the 
Italian market, 1953-1974. 
Year T)lE n2E T)3E T14E 
1953 1. 44436 1. 51819 0.88325 0 . 98435 
1954 1. 4 7 534 1. 58430 0. 88465 0.98481 
1955 1. 41990 1. 50711 0.88040 0.98486 
1956 l. 43811 l. 61003 0.83199 0 . 98481 
1957 1. 50893 1. 59115 u. 83277 0 . 98479 
1958 1.51692 1. 51372 0.88347 0 . 98482 
1959 1. 50901 1. 55007 0 . 88012 0 . 98480 
1960 1. 46652 l. 61272 0.88283 0.98480 
1961 1. 41295 1. 52624 0.88032 0. 98435 
1962 1.41542 1.54457 0.83161 0.98484 
1963 1. 4 6983 1.54792 0.83157 0.98482 
1964 1. 40985 1. 54431 0.83132 0.98435 
1965 1. 40238 1.50124 0.87861 D. 98487 
1966 1. 42262 1. 51944 0. 87961 0.98485 
1967 1. 41545 1.52224 0.88007 0.98485 
1968 1.42733 1. 52309 0. 88013 0.98484 
1969 1. 42593 1. 50942 0 . 88016 0.98485 
1970 1. 40018 1. 4844 9 0. 87889 0 . 98488 
1971 1. 38509 1. 46717 0 . 87803 0. 98439 
1972 1. 39439 1. 48435 D.jl7812 0.98488 
1973 1. 49266 1. 58642 0.83346 0.98480 
1974 1. 61578 1. 78143 0.88751 o. 984 71 
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Table 23. Estimated compensated cross-price elasticities for wheat 
in the Italian market, 1953-1974. 
Year £12 £13 £14 £21 £31 £41 
1953 0.01050 -0.00215 -0.00090 0.000670 -0 . 00210 - 0.00090 
1954 0.01053 -0.00211 -0 . 00090 0.00672 - 0.00211 -0.00090 
1955 0.01049 -0 . 00210 -0.00090 0.00670 -0 . 00210 -0.00090 
1956 0 . 01053 -0 . 00211 -0.00090 0.00672 -0.00211 -0.00090 
1957 0.01054 - 0.00211 -0 . 00090 010067 3 -0.00211 -0.00090 
1958 0.01052 -0.00210 -0.00090 0. 00671 - 0.00210 - 0 . 00090 
1959 0.01054 -0.00211 -0.00090 0.00672 -0.00211 -0.00090 
1960 0.01054 -0.00211 -0.00090 0.00672 -0 . 00211 - 0.00090 
1961 0.01050 -0.00210 -0.00090 o, 00670 -0.00210 -0 . 00090 
1962 0. 01050 -0.00210 -0.00090 0.00670 -0.00210 -0.00090 
1963 0.01050 -0.00210 -0 . 00090 0. 00671 -0.00210 -0.00090 
196L, 0. 01050 -0.00210 -0.00090 0.00670 -0 . 00210 -0.00090 
1965 0. 01049 -0 . 00210 -0 . 00090 0 . 00669 -0.00210 -0.00090 
1966 0.01050 -0.00210 -0.00090 0.00670 -0.00210 -0.00090 
1967 0 . 01050 -0 . 00210 -0 . 00090 0.00670 -0.00210 -0 . 00090 
1968 0.01050 -0.00210 -0.00090 0.00670 -0.00210 - 0.00090 
1969 0.01050 -0.00210 -0 . 00090 0.00670 -0.00210 -0 . 00090 
1970 0.01048 -0.00210 - 0.00090 0.00669 - 0.00210 -0.00090 
1971 0.01047 - 0.00209 -0.00090 0 . 00668 -0.00209 -0.00090 
1972 0.01048 -0.00210 - 0 . 00090 0.00668 - 0.00210 -0 . 00090 
1973 0 . 01054 - 0.00211 -0 . 00090 0.00672 - 0.00211 -0.00090 
1974 0.01060 - 0.00212 - 0.00091 0.00677 - 0.0021 2 - 0 . 00090 
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Table 23 . Continued. 
Year e; 23 e; 24 e; 32 e; 42 e; 34 e;43 
1953 - 0.00210 -0.00090 - 0.00210 0.01050 - 0.00090 -0.00210 
1954 - 0.00211 -0.00090 -0.00211 0.01053 -0.00090 - 0.00211 
1955 -0 . 00210 -0.00090 -0.00210 0.01049 -0.00090 -0 . 00210 
1956 -0.00211 -0.00090 -0.00211 0.01053 -0.00090 - 0 .00211 
195 7 -0.00211 -0.00090 -0.00211 0 .01054 -0 . 00090 -0.00211 
1958 -0.00210 -0 . 00090 -0.00210 0.01052 -0.00090 -0.00210 
195 9 - 0 .00211 -0 . 00090 -0.00211 0.01054 -0.00090 -0.00211 
1960 -0.00211 -0.00090 -0.00211 0.01054 ·-0. 00090 -0.00211 
1961 -0.00 210 -0.00090 -0.00210 0.01050 -0.00090 - 0.00210 
1962 -0.00210 -0.00090 -0.00210 0.01050 -0.00090 -0.00210 
1963 -0.00210 -0.00090 -0.00210 0.01052 -0.00090 -0.00210 
1964 -0.00210 -0.00090 -0 . 00210 0.01050 -0 . 00090 - 0.00210 
1965 - 0 . 00210 -0. 00090 -0.00210 0.01049 -0.00090 -0.00210 
1966 -0.00210 -0.00090 -0.00210 0 . 01050 -0.00090 -0.00210 
1967 -0.00210 - 0 . 00090 -0 . 00210 0.01050 -0.00090 -0.00210 
1968 -0.00210 -0 . 00090 -0 . 00210 0.01050 -0. 00090 -0.00210 
1969 - 0 . 00210 -0.00090 -0.00210 0.01050 -0.00090 -0.00210 
1970 -0.00210 -0.00090 - 0.00210 0 . 01048 -0.00090 -0.00210 
1971 - 0.00209 - 0.00090 -0.00209 0.01047 - 0.00090 -0.00209 
1972 -0.00210 - 0. 00090 -0.00210 0.01048 -0.00090 -0.00210 
1973 - 0.00211 -0 . 00090 - 0.00211 0 . 01054 - 0 . 00090 -0.00211 
1974 -0.00212 -0.000 91 -0.00212 0.01060 -0.00091 -0.00212 
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Japanese Market 
The most importan t exporter of wheat to the Japanese market is 
the U.S., followed by Canada and Australia. Table 24 presents the 
values of the parameters of the shar e equations under various restric-
tions , while the relevant test statist ic s and degrees of freedom are 
presented in Tab le 25. Comparison of the test statistics for homothe-
ticity and additivity with the x2 values of Table 10 sugges t the rejec-
tion of homotheticity and additivity, g iv en t he test criteria; there-
fore , all possible explicit separability tests were made. 
The test of explicity group wise separability fails only to re-
ject explicit group wise separability of groups (l, 3 and 4) from (2) 
(i . e., U.S., Australia, and domestic from Canada) at the 0.01 level of 
signif icance with three degrees of freedom . Under these restrictions , 
the share equatons are as follows: 
pl p3 p4 
0.3197 + 0.2607 ln E: + 0.2230 ln E: + 0 . 2600 ln E: 
D 
0.2379 + 0.0038 ln 
p2 
E 
wz D (51) 
0 . 0937 + 0.2230 ln 
pl 
0.1038 ln 
p3 
0 . 1055 
p4 
-+ E:+ 1n E: 
w3 
E 
D 
0 . 3487 + 0.2600 
pl 
0.1055 
p3 
- 0.1504 
p4 
1n E: + 1n E: 1n E: 
w4 D 
p1 p2 p3 p4 
where D = 1 + 0.7437 1n £: + 0.0038 1n E: + 0.4323 1n £: + 0.2151 1n £:· 
Again, che relevant elasticities of interest are derived from these 
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Table 24. Paramter estimates of share equations for wheat in the 
Japanese market. 8 
Equali t y Groups 1, 3, 4 
and Separable 
Pa rameters Symmetry Homothet icity Additivity From 2 
w 
1 
- u.s. shar e equation 
al 0 . 3198 0 . 3198 0.3198 0.3197 (0.1915) (0.1915) (0.1915) (0.1915) 
Bll 0.3504 o. 2130 0. 2607 0.2607 
0 . 3504 0. 2130 0.2607 0. 2607 
(0. 2491) (0.1353) (0.1706) (0.1603) 
B12 -0 . 1155 -0 .3436 -0.3103 0.0000 
(0. 8623) (0. 9463) (0.9031) 
B13 0.9332 0.0811 0.1218 0.2230 
(0. 9061) (0. 3301) (0.1005) (0.1705) 
B14 0.6454 0. 04 95 0. 4559 0.2600 
(0.4167) (0.0321) (0.2416) (0 . 1403) 
w2 - Canadian share equation 
a2 0.2379 0.2378 0. 2377 0.2379 (0.1043) (0.1042) (0.1042) (0.1043) 
B22 0.0035 - 0 . 0018 0 . 0034 0.0038 
(0.0102) (0. 0057) (0. 0111) (0. 0083) 
B23 0.0083 -0. 1308 -0. 0905 0.0000 
(0.0824) (0. 3956) (0. 9713) 
B24 -0.2162 0. 2146 -0.3388 0.0000 
(0 . 1777) (0 . 1723) (0 . 1605) 
w3 - Australian share equation 
a3 0.0930 0.0930 0.0933 0.0937 
(0.0438) (0. 0438) (0.0438) (0. 0437) 
B33 0.8914 0.1005 0.2305 0 . 1038 (0.2536) (0.0654) (0.0916) (0 . 0382) 
B34 0 . 255 2 -0.3124 0.1330 0.1055 
(0.5231) (0 . 5420) (0.3103) (0.1031) 
wl, Domestic share equation 
a4 0. 3492 0. 3492 0. 3492 0.3487 
B -0.1532 -0.3116 -0.1406 -0.1504 
44 (0. 0671) (0 . 1261) (0.0661) (0.0653) 
aAsymptotic s tandard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 25 . Test statistics for validity of different restrictions in 
the Japanese market. 
Restrictions df -2 ln A 
Homotheticity 3 262 . 888 
Additivity 5 87.821 
Groups 1, 3, 4 
separable 
from 2 3 2.882 
latter estimated share equations and are presented for each year in 
Tables 26 , 27, and 28. 
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Table 26. Estimated compensated own-price elasticities for wheat in 
the Japanese market, 1954-1974.a 
Year Ell E:22 E: 33 E:4 4 
1954 -1.0094 -0. 98672 -0. 83897 -0.9225 7 
1955 -1.00437 -0.98686 -0. 79975 -0.92185 
1956 -1.00885 - 0.98682 -0. 81297 - 0 .9 2131 
1957 -1.01214 -0.98677 - 0 . 82743 - 0.91921 
1958 -1.02393 -0.98674 -0. 83383 -0 .91319 
1959 -1.00201 -0.98706 -0.75110 -0.91278 
1960 -0.97021 -0. 98741 -0.60339 -0. 91363 
1961 -0.92 271 -0.9877 7 -0 .36 344 -0.91724 
1962 - 0.96423 -0. 987 55 -0 . 53371 -0.90976 
1963 -1. 04103 -0.98688 -0.81643 -0. 89396 
1964 -0.92825 -0.98783 -0.32451 - 0 .912 55 
1965 -0.91608 -0.98817 -0.02489 - 0 . 89942 
1966 -0. 96300 -0.98794 -0 . 28597 -0. 88 982 
1967 -0.93169 -0.98814 -0 . 09421 -0.89338 
1968 -0.96562 -0.98815 -0.12344 -0. 87598 
1969 -1.02556 -0.98784 -0. 42958 -0 .85571 
1970 - 1.05003 -0.98769 -0. 55175 - 0.84199 
1971 - 1.08546 -0.98778 -0.54632 - 0.79622 
1972 -1.11103 ··0. 98755 -0.67059 -0.77315 
1973 - 1.01331 -0.98774 - 0.50622 - 0 . 86618 
1974 - 0 . 84765 -0.98785 -0.18144 -0. 94152 
* 1 , 2' 3 and 4 refer to the U.S . , Canada, Australia and domes-
tic, r espectively. 
70 
Table 27. Estimat ed expenditure elasticities for wheat in the 
Japanese market, 1954-1974. 
Year nlE n2E n3E n4E 
1954 0.52801 1. 94456 0.05012 1.50061 
1955 0.48555 1. 99558 -0.12806 1. 53414 
1956 0.50812 1. 976 79 -0.06753 1. 52013 
1957 0.52330 1. 9656 7 -0.00407 1. 50824 
1958 0. 56074 1 . 95832 0.02470 1. 49093 
1959 0.43702 2.07 577 -0.35399 1. 57063 
1960 0.27458 2. 21347 -1.00919 1.66679 
1961 0 . 06453 2 . 35652 -2.35652 1. 77225 
1962 0.22902 2.26817 -1. 31529 1. 69641 
1963 0 . 58352 2.00827 -0 .06227 1. 48598 
1964 0.06866 2.37893 -2.21876 1. 77804 
1965 -0.03454 2.51041 -3.50481 1. 84142 
1966 0 . 14442 2. 42377 - 2.39231 1. 76245 
1967 0 . 01616 2.49850 -3.21267 1. 82095 
1968 0.11002 2.50416 -3.09258 1. 78736 
1969 0.34255 2.38605 -1.78326 1. 66 703 
1970 0. 44265 2.32790 -1.25752 1. 59919 
1971 0.52256 2.36850 -1.29194 1. 53371 
1972 0. 64202 2.27924 -0.74846 1. 42549 
1973 0.32767 2. 34751 -1.45287 1. 66197 
1974 -0.16566 2.38739 - 2.81708 1. 842 91 
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Table 28 . Est i mated compensated cross-p~ice e las ticities fo r wheat 
in the J apanese market, 1954-19 74 . 
Year £12 £13 £14 £ 21 £31 £41 
1954 -0.00262 0.13186 0.3526 -0. 51207 0. 68778 0. 40772 
1955 -0.00276 0. 14408 0.37750 -0. 53923 0.79020 0.42100 
1956 -0. 00270 0 . 13750 0. 36593 -0.52925 0.75510 0.41811 
1957 -0.00267 0 . 13306 0.35845 - 0.52333 0. 72008 0.42076 
1958 -0.00265 0.12191 0. 34393 -0.51942 0 . 70373 0.43396 
1959 -0.00297 0 .15782 0. 41013 -0. 58 204 0.92326 0.46148 
1960 -0.00335 0 . 20515 0.49 384 -0.65547 l. 28961 0.49049 
1961 -0 .00374 0. 26669 0.5952 3 -0.73175 l. 85 603 0. 51389 
1962 -0.00350 0.21826 0.52045 -0.68464 1. 45877 0.51238 
1963 ·-0 . 002 79 0. :!.1458 0. 34572 -0.5460.1 0.75887 0. 49261 
1964 -0 . 00380 0. 2652 3 0.59816 -0 . 74370 l. 94764 0.53053 
1965 --0.00416 0.29485 0.65993 -0 . 81318 2.63812 0 . 592 58 
1966 -0.003 92 0.24206 0.58044 -0.76761 2. 0464 0 0.5 9667 
1967 - 0.00413 0 . 27976 0.63988 -0. 80746 2.48497 0. 60477 
1968 -0.00414 0.25157 0.60818 -0. 81048 2.42418 0.64893 
1969 -0.00332 0.18303 0.50380 -0 .74750 l. 72445 0.67222 
1970 -0.00366 0 . 15360 0. 45744 -0.71649 l. 44127 0 . 69289 
1971 -0.00377 0.12923 0. 43744 -0 . 73815 l. 46740 0.81487 
1972 -0.00353 0. 09431 0.37824 - 0 . 69056 1.16866 0 . 85156 
1973 -0.00371 0.18788 0.50147 - 0.72695 l. 5460 9 0. 63769 
1974 -0.00382 0.33540 0 . 68173 -0.74821 2.25802 0.46104 
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Table 28. Continued. 
Year £23 £24 £32 £42 £34 £43 
1954 0 . 29766 - 0.14311 - 0.29766 - 0.00262 0.31810 - 0.07212 
1955 -0.3134 7 -0.15597 -0.31347 -0.00276 0.36617 -0.07935 
1956 -0.30764 -0.15307 - 0.30764 -0.00270 0. 34971 -0.07588 
1957 -0.30420 - 0.15136 -0.30420 -0.00267 0.33322 - 0.07205 
1958 -0.30193 -0.15023 - 0 . 30193 -0 .00265 0 . 32554 -0.06488 
1959 -0.33833 -0. 16834 -0.33833 -0.00297 0. 42851 -0.08277 
1960 -0 . 38101 -0.18958 -0.38101 -0 . 00335 0. 60078 -0.10506 
1961 -0.42535 -0.21164 -0 . 42535 -0.00374 0 . 86767 -0.13095 
1962 -0.39797 -0.19502 -0.39797 -0.00350 0.68040 -0.10971 
1963 -0.31741 -0.15793 -0. 31741 -0 .00279 0.35125 -0.05 344 
1964 -0.43230 -0. 21510 -0.4 3230 - 0.00380 0. 91083 -0. 12975 
1965 -0.47305 -0 . 23538 -0.47305 -0.00416 1. 23650 -0.13509 
1966 -0.44620 -0.22202 -0.44620 -0.00392 0. 85722 -0.11400 
1967 -0. 46 936 -0.23354 - 0 . 46936 -0.00413 1. 16413 -0 .12920 
1968 -0.47112 -0 .23441 -0. 47112 -0.00414 1.13534 -0.11268 
1969 -0.43451 - 0.21620 - 0 . 43451 -0.00 382 0.80519 -0 .074 01 
1970 - 0.41649 -0.20723 -0.41649 -0.00366 0 . 67166 -0 .05124 
1971 -0.42907 -0.21349 -0. 42907 -0.00377 0. 68371 -0.01170 
1972 -0.40141 - 0 . 19973 -0.40141 -0.00353 0 . 54306 0. 02517 
1973 -0.42256 - 0 .21026 - 0.42256 -0 . 00371 0.7211 0 -0.0784 9 
1974 -0 . 43492 -0.21640 -0. 43492 -0. 00382 1. 05761 -0.16004 
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CHAPTER V 
IMPLICATION AND POLICY SUGGESTIONS 
The major objective of this study has been to test the structure 
of preference underlying the import demand for U.S . wheat and other 
major wheat export competitors, and to test the appropriateness of 
the traditional representations of import demand. A further objective 
was to u se an appropriate model to derive relevant elasticities of 
demand in each i:nport market, and use tr..ese elasticities to interpret 
the general dir ec tion of impac t of various policies that exis t, or 
that may be used , in international wheat markets. The result of 
estimating and testing a more flexible characterization of the demand 
for imports in selected import markets suggests the traditional linear 
and log-linear representations may be questionable, at l east when used 
in the analysis of import demand for wheat in these selected markets. 
Since the parameter estima tes only possess asymptotic properties, 
the likelihood ratio test V.TaS used to P..mpirjcally test the exis tence 
of various restrictions on the preference structure underlying the 
derived import demand functions . The test, of course, is influenced 
by the estimator for the variance-covariance matrices of both the 
restricted and least restricted models and, hence, is dependent on 
the strength of the estimates of the parameters and asymptotic stan-
dard errors. An asymptotic test of the significance of each coefficient 
for each of the estimated import demand models is unavailable, bu t 
a crude criterion of comparing each coefficient with its asymptotic 
standard error can be used to assess the strength of the empirical 
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estimates. Using that criterion we conc lud e that our results for mos t 
of the mode l s are not as strong and conclusive as desired. That is, 
sever a l of the asymptotic errors are large r ela tive to the estimat ed 
coefficients. This warning applies particularly to the estimates of 
the share eq uations for the U.K . and Japanese marke t s . Therefore, 
the r esults of this study do not show conclusive evidence that the 
log- linear model mis r epresen t s the underlying utility s tructure from 
which the import demand fo r wheat is derived, but s ufficient evidence 
is present t o ques tion t he a pr iori assumption of the log-linear 
characterization and its accompanying restrictive properties. 
The hornotheticity and homogeneity restrictions were rejected in 
all four markets , while additivity and explicit add itivity restrictions 
were rejected in three ou t of four markets (i.e., U.K., Netherlands, 
.Japan). Moreover , the linear-logarithmic model (homogeneity and 
explicit additivity) was rejected in all four markets . The only restric-
tions that were not rejected using the testing procedure were explicit 
group wise separability of group 1, 3 (U . S. and Austr a lia) from 2, 4 
(Canada a nd domestic) in the U.K . marke t, l, 2, 4 (U.S ., Canada and 
domestic) from 3 (Argentina) in the Ne therlands market 1, 3, 4 (U . S., 
Australia and domestic) from 2 (Canada) in the Japanese market and 
explicit additivity restrictions in the I tal ina import market . Given 
these f ind ings the policy suggestions, based on the trad itional 
models and th e elastici ties derived therefrom, c annot be acce pted in 
their entirety without some degree o f sceptic ism. That is, there is 
no apparent basis for assuming the explicit additive and homogenous 
model a priori , and then using s uch a model in the analysis of 
trade policy. 
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The compensated own-price elasticity of import demand (Ejj) for 
wheat from some competitors in some of the markets are fairly stable 
over the years of the time series data (e.g. , Ejj for U.S. wheat in the 
U.K. a nd the Netherlands markets) . The reason for this behavior of the 
Ejj can be investigated using equation 21 . From this equation it is 
obvious that the only elements which vary from year to year are W.t and 
p t J 
ln ~- in the denominator of equation 21 which, in turn, is the denomi-
Et 
nator of W.t . The parameters are constant from year to year (since we 
J 
do not use a random coefficient model), thus £j j can vary for different 
years only if W.t varies from year to year. 7herefore, it t ecorue& clear 
J 
that if the predicted share (i.e ., W.t) does not vary greatly for differ-] 
en t years; it will result in a relatively stable £jj series over the 
years in a given market for the jth wheat import . The model used pro-
vides for a different e lasticity to be computed for each price and 
share observation, although these computed elasticities may not vary 
widely, as in this case, particularly for the U.K. and Japanese markets 
analyzed. 
Given the above cautions regarding the model used, and the 
estimates obtained , it is possible to derive the relevant elasticities 
which provide the important information about import demand behavior . 
These elasticities have been claculated u sing the estimates obtained, 
and only provide reasonable information about import demand behavior 
insofar as the estimates from which they are derived are reliable. 
As noted above, some problems with the estimate to exist. Relevant 
elasticities computed are now presented, and their use in analyzing 
various trade policies is i llustrated . In addition, some interesting 
tentative conclusions about the direction of selected policies, 
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using the import demand in forma tion obtained from the empirical analy-
sis, are discussed. 
Compensated own-price elasticities (Ejj) for U.S . whea t in 1974, 
ranged from -0 .848 in the Japanese marke t, to -1.6 23 in the Italian 
market. In the Netherlands market the elasticity equaled -0.9 75 in 
1970, the terminal- year observation for this market. Estimated 
expenditure elast icities fo r all supplie rs in the four markets 
ana l yzed were positive, with the exception of a negative expenditure 
elasticity for Aus tralian wheat impor t ed by J apan. The U. S. faced 
a positive expenditure elasticities for U.S. wheat in each market 
suggest that increases in expenditure on whea t in t hese marke t s in-
creases the expenditur e on wheat imported from the U. S . The inc re ase 
in expenditur e on U.S . wheat in thr ee out of four markets , namely, 
U. K., Netherlands and Italy was more than direccly proportional , i . e ., 
the expendi ture elastici t y was g r eater than one . The increase in expend-
iture on wh ea t in the Japanese market, will increase expendi ture on 
U. S . wheat (ignoring the expenditure elast i cities for the U.S. wheat 
in 1965 and 1974) l ess than direc tly proportional . 
Th e substitution elasticities for the U.K. marke t r anged from 
-0. 104 between U.S. and domestic wheat, implying complimentary, to 
0.841 between U.S. and Canada, implying substitution, in 1974. The 
range of the substitut ion elasticities in the I t alian market we re 
from -0.19 8 t o 0.796, a nd in the Japanese market from -5.220 to 7.753 . 
In the Netherlands ma rket inconsistent es timates of the elasticities 
of substitution between Argentina a nd other suppliers were obtained. 
In fact, the own-price elasticities for Argentine wheat in the 
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Netherlands marke t were a l so inconsistent with what was expected on 
the basis of micro- theory . lVith the exception of the substitu tion 
between imported Argentine wheat and wheat f r om other suppliers , the 
elasticities of substitution in 1970 ranged from -1.093 to 2.056 in 
t h e Netherlands market. The low values for the elasticities of 
s ubstitution in most cases in all four markets showed some evidence 
that wheat from different sour ces of suppl y are not perfect substitutes 
for each other and, therefore, may not be the same commod ity. The 
compensated cross-price e l astic ities for U.S. wheat imply that Canada 
is the majo r compe ti tor of the U.S. in the U.K. and Netherlands markets, 
while Australian wheat competes with U. S . wheat in the U. K. and 
Japanese markets. 
In the Italian market the compensated cross--price elasticity 
for all competitors are very close to zero, reflecting t he explicit 
additivity restrictions in this market , The shares of any competitor 
in this ma r ket do not change i n response to changes in the other 
competitor ' s prices , implying some barter agreements in this market 
between exporters and importers . In fac t, throughout the 1950s , 
Italy did barter for most of i ts wheat imports, par ticulary from 
Argentina. After 1962, Italy instituted the variabl e levy in accordance 
wi th EEC regulat ions. 
Using these elast ic ities it is possible to r eview the implica-
tions of some wh ea t trade policies which are related to the magnitude 
of the e last ici ties although caution is needed in their us e i n light 
of earlier discu s sion of their weaknesses . Trade policies implemented 
by various exporters have varied from export subsidy to export tax 
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and other means of reducing production and exports. On the other 
hand, importing countries have implemented numerous measure to protect 
domestic producers from foreign competi tion, and to guarantee adequate 
supply for consumption . In this study, the policy of export subsidy 
and the appropriateness of this policy in contrast to an export tax 
on wheat from a national interest point-of-view, is considered. 
Further policies which are related to the magnitude of import demand 
and export supply elasticities, such as variable l evy schemes used 
by the EEC, tariff and tariff reduction policies, quota, and price 
stabilization policies , have also been addressed. Since the emphasis 
of this research is on the outcome of these policies from the point-
of-view of the U.S., only the implications of these policies on the 
U.S. are discussed. The same procedure can be used to find the ou t-
come of these policies for other suppliers in the markets under con-
sideration. 
Export Subsidy and Export Tax for Hheat 
The export subsidy is not a new policy for the U.S. in relation 
to wheat export. The U. S. has implemented this policy in the past 
at various l evels and proceeded to reduce it in 1967- 1968, 1968- 1969, 
and 1969- 1970, but increased it in the first half of 1971 , and then 
entirely eliminated it for some types of wheat (Johnson, 1973). 
Justifications behind the arguments in favor of export sub-
sidies are general l y of two types; 
1. Necessi t y of export subsidy to maintain r easonable 
level of income fo1 farm families. 
2. Exchange rate is overvalued; therefore, the real value 
of foreig~ exchange earned is mor e than what i s implied 
by the exchange rate. 
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An export s ubsidy can b e viewed as a specifi c case of price 
support for whea t. Price s uppor t for agricultural commodit ies gener-
ally has benefited land owners and high-income fa r m families. There-
fore, the objective of i ncome maintenance cannot be a valid argument 
on behalf of price support as a fi r s t-bes t policy (Johnson, 1973). 
The second ar gument in favor of expor t subsidy is the assertion that 
marginal social value of exports is gr ea t er than priva t e soc i a l value , 
because the exchange rate is overvalued, and for some reason cannot 
be changed. In this si t uat ion the export subsidy i s a second-bes t 
policy , first -best being devaluation. The expenditur e and price 
da ta (Appendix A), !'h;s elast i cities derived fo r U.S. wheat in 
1970 fo r the Netherlands, and 1971 for the U.K., Italian and Japanese 
marke ts, ar e used t o analyze the effec ts of a 10 pe r cent reduction of 
the dollar price of one metric ton of wheat due to an export subsidy 
on whea t high enough to induce U.S . producers to lowe r their export 
price by 10 per cent. In this example, following Fl oyd (1965) the 
dol l ar in 1971 is assumed to be 10 percen t overvalued. Subsequent 
devaluation of the dollar of this magnitude justified this finding. 
Fur ther, we need the export supply elasticity fo r U.S. wheat in the 
year under consideration derived f rom a flexible functional form, 
or from a known appropriate functional form. Since these kinds of 
es timates of the U.S. export supply elasticity of wheat a re not 
available, we used an estima te of excess s upply elasticity (Es 0.2) 
derived by Shun and Thompson (1977) , together with assumed values 
fo r Es of 0 . 8 and 1.6, while reserving al l the crit icism made so 
fa r of the restrictive assumptions of the l inear models . 
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In this sect i on, and all following sections, dealing wi th loss 
and gains in t he pr oducers and consumers surplus when impor t demand 
elasticities are i nvolved it is assumed that, 
l. Nargina l utility of money is constant. 
2. Resour ces are in fu ll employment . 
3. Terms of t rade are constant. 
Figur e 2 is used to demonstrate this situation . The impor t 
demand and export supply curves before the export subsidy for wheat 
ar e DiDi and SxSx ' respectively. The subsidy causes the s upply cu r ve 
of wheat facing the importer to shift form SsSs to S~S~. The equilib-
rium price before the subsidy is Pe.. Introduction of the subsidy, 
equal to be per metric ton of wheat caused the price paid by consumers 
to decrease by 10 percent (i. e . , Pe - Pc ab is 0.1) from P to P 
e c 
and the price received by producers to increase from Pe to P
5 
= Pc +be. 
The cost of the s ubsidy to the taxpayers is P
8
bCPc = S (Q 2), where 
S i s the r a t e of s ubsidy at price Pc, and can be estimated from 
equation 52, (Rayan, 1964) as fo ll ows; 
ab (52) 
where Es is export supply elastici t y and Ed is the compensa ted own-
price elas ticity of i mport demand. The more inelastic the expor t 
supply curve, and the more el as tic the import demand curve, the 
lar ger i s the subsidy per unit requi r ed to l ower the export supply 
Ps 
Pe 
-(/) 
a:: Pc <l 
..J 
..J 
0 
0 
-
w 
0 (i: 
a. 
Sx 
Dr 
o, Q2 
QUANTITY (METRIC TONS) 
Figure 2. Comparison of cost with i n crease i n exchange 
earnings due to subs i dization of wh eat exports. 
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price by a given amount and the larger is the cost of the s ubsidy. 
The n e t earnings of foreign exchange because of the subsidy is equal 
to pc Q2 - pe Ql . 
The Ed for U. S. wheat in 1971 was -1.081, -1.393, and -1 .085 in 
the U.K ., Italian and Japanese markets, respectively, and it was 
-0.975 in the Ne ther lands marke t for the year 1970, which is the 
terminal year of the data s eries in this market. From these elasti-
c ities it is obvious tha t r evenue is not go ing to increase in the U.K. 
and Japanese market, and that it will dec line in the Netherlands 
market, because of a r eduction in the U.S. wheat export prices . 
The reduction of 10 percent in export prices of wheat to each market 
will increase the quantity demand of U.S. wheat by 10.8, 10.8 and 
9 . 7 percent in the U. K., Japanese and Netherla nds markets respectively. 
On th e uth e.r hand, the cost of the subsidy per uait of tvh ea t export, 
when £ 
s 
0.2, is as much as 64, 64 and 59 percent of t he C.I.F. 
prices in the U. K., Japanese and Netherlands market s , respectively. 
When the export supply e l a sticity is equal to 1.6 the cost of the 
subsidy per unit is 17, 17 and 16 percent, respectively, of the C.I.F. 
prices in the same aforementioned markets . 
Using the model estimates, the high cost of the subsidy, together 
with zero or negative increase in revenue, sugges ts that the subsidy 
is not a favorable policy for the U. S . to implement for wheat exports 
to the U.K., Japan, and the Netherlands, under the assumption that 
the dollar is overvalued by 10 percent relative to the currency of 
these countries. In the Italian market, since the elasticity of 
import demand for U.S. wheat is greater than one in absolute value, 
the effect of a subsidy and reduction in wheat export prices is to 
increase r evenue; therefore, exchange earnings. In Table 29, the 
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cost of subsidy and the gain in exchange earnings under various assump-
tions regarding the magnitude of the export supply elasticity are 
presented. Difference between gain and cost as net gain (+) or net 
loss (-) is given. Data in Table 29 shows that the net effect of a 
subsidy in this market is to impose a loss on the U.S. Value of the 
loss is sensitive to the choice of the magni tude of the supply 
elasticity. However, for very large values of the export supply 
elasticity the cost of the subsidy per unit (i.e., s in equation 52) 
will approach ab, which is 10 percent of the C.I.F. price. Under 
this situation the subsidy will still cause as much as a 1.4 million-
dollar loss for the U. S. and remain unacceptable from an economic 
viewpoint . Devaluation, even though preferahl~ to Cl. subsiC.y since 
it does not have the cost of the subsidy, will raise revenue earned 
from wheat exports to the Italian market, but leaves revenue 
unchanged from wheat exports to the U.K. and Japan, and reduces the 
revenue earned from wheat e..xports to the Netherlands market . 
In fact, if the import demand curve facing U. S. producers 
of wheat slopes downward, which the es timates of this study indicate, 
the optimum policy from a national viewpoint calls not for a subsidy 
by government, but for encouragement of producers to extract this 
monopoly power . If the domestic exporters are competitive, then 
the solution suggests that government should impose a tax on expor ts 
of wheat high enough to raise prices to the level t ha t would b e 
char ged by a monopolist. The level of appropriate tax under some 
Table 29. Cost and earning of 10 percent reduction in U.S . wheat prices because 
of subsidizing export to the Italian market for different magnitude 
of" the exports supply elasticity. 1971. 
Unit Cost Total Cost Gain of Ex- Net Gain 
Supply of Subsidy of Subsidy change earnings or Loss 
Elasticity (dollar) (1000 dollar) (1000 dollar) (1000 dollar) 
0 . 2 50.0 14,885 465 -14,420 
0 . 8 17.3 5,159 465 - 4,694 
1.6 11.8 3,522 465 
-3 '05 7 
co 
~ 
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restrictive assumptions is equal to tx = 1/nd, where tx is the rate 
of taxation and nd is t~e uncompensated price elasticity of import 
demand for a commodity (e.g., wheat), (Cordon, 1974). Given the 
values of this elasticity in 1974 for U.S. wheat in each market 
(Appendix B) the appropriate rate of tax is 86 percent, 61 percent, 
and 125 percent for exports of wheat to the U.K. , Italy, and Japan, 
respectively, while the tax is 76 percent for wheat exports to the 
Netherlands in 1970 . It is obvious that a tax greater than 100 per-
cent is not applicable. The concept of the optimum tax rate suggests 
that starting from the free-trade situat:ion, and facing a negatively 
sloped demand curve, the exporting country should impose a tax on 
th e export of the commodity under consideration (i.e., wheat). 
As the tax is gradually increased, facing a demand curve with variable 
elast i city , the usual expecta tion is that the elastici ty will increase , 
and at the optimum point it becomes greater than one in absolute terms. 
At the optimum point, wherever it is, the t ax is tx = 1/nd, and the 
ra t e of tax is less than 100 percent. 
The compensated cross-price elasticities presented in Tables 
13, 18 , 23 and 28 for U.S. wheat in the U.K .. , Netherlands, Italy and 
Japan, respectivel y, sugges t that the increase in U.S . wheat prices, 
due to imposing a tax on exports of tvheat, will reduce the share of 
the U.S. in these markets. The U.S. will lose its share as its 
wheat export prices increase relative to Canada and Australia in 
the U.K. markets; relative to Canada in the Netherlands and Italian 
market; and relative to Australia and domestic producers in Japan. 
Overall, the imposition of the tax should be considered as a short- run 
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instrument which can be used to bargain for tariff and tax reductions 
and movement toward freer trade in wheat with importers. For this 
policy to be more effective it is necessary tha t all major wheat 
exporters agree upon implementing it at the same time . If a single 
country, such as the U. S., is going to impose a tax on wheat exports 
for a long period of time, it will lose its share to the competitors 
that choose not to do so, resulting in a loss of producers surplus 
to U. S. producers. 
Tariff and Tariff Reduction 
One of the important barriers to the free trade in wheat between 
the U. S. and the EEC has been the variable levy imposed by the EEC 
on imports of grain . The nominal rate of this levy has been calcu-
lated (Sampson and Yeats, 1977) to be as high as 73 percent of the 
C.I.F. prices of wheat. This level of levy is used to calculate the 
loss to the U.S . wheat producers because of the protectionist policies 
of EEC compared to a free-trade situa tion. The barrier for U.S. 
expor ts of wheat to Japan was due to the monopoly position of the 
Japanese government as sole seller and buyer of wheat. The government 
of Japan purchases domestically- produced wheat for as much as twice 
the price it pays for imported wheat, and sells it to the processors 
at least 50 percen t above imported price (Bale and Greenshil~l977). 
This 50-percent difference between the imported wheat price and the 
price paid by processors is used as a proxy for t he Japanese tariff 
on impor ted whea t . The 50 percent tariff is used to calculate 
surplus l osses fo r U.S. producers , compared to a free-trade situation. 
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Price and quantity data fo r 1973 were used i n Japanese a nd Italian 
markets in asses sing the effec ts of the Italian and J apanese pro-
tectionist policies, because of the high international wheat prices 
in 1974 , which reduced the effective levies and tariffs to zero . 
In the Netherlands market, price and quanti ty data in this study 
for the t erminal year (1970) are used to evaluate the effects of 
the variable levy in this market on the U. S. producer's surplus. 
In 1964, the U. K. introduced a minimum i mport price, and a 
levy system to protect the implemented minimum import prices for 
wheat. In 1971, in anticipation of joining the EEC, it increased 
the minimum import price for different classes of wheat by more than 
20 percent (International Wheat Council , 1970-19 71). Table 30 
gives t h e minimum import prices for two classes of wheat, denature 
vi~1eat G:.nd D.S. No . 2 dar!<. spring) 14 per ce!lt , during t'be p~?.riod 
1971-1 972 . 
Table 30. Minimum import price for two classes of wheat in the 
U.K. market (dollars per metric ton). 
Type of Wheat Period 
June 1971 Ju l y 1971 July 
U. S. No . 2 Dark Northern 
1972 
Spring 15 percent 70.2 76.2 91. 44 
Denature Wheat 55 . 08 59.16 70.99 
Source: International Wheat Council, Review of the World Wheat 
Situation, 1971-1972, London . 
88 
The C. I.F . prices for these two types of wheat fo r the period 
July 197 1-June 1972 was 59.48 and 72.03 dollars per metric ton for 
denature whea t and U.S. No . 2 dark Nor thern Spring 14 percent, 
respectively . From comparison of minimum import prices, d ur i ng each 
period of 1971-1972, and C.I.F . prices in 1971-1972 one can get a 
picture of the trend of i ncreases in the levy imposed on wheat during 
these period . Table 31 gives the levy as a percentage of the C.I.F. 
prices in these periods. From This data i t is clear that the levy 
during the period 1971-1972 has increased from zero to as much as 
20 percent or more. The 20 percent figure is used as a rough estima te 
of the U.K. levy on wheat in 1971-1972. The 1972 prices and quanti t y 
data, and compensated own-price elasticity for the U . K. marke t are 
used to calculate the effect of imposing a 20 percent levy on U.S. 
wheat by t he U.K. on U.S . producer s surplus . 
Tab l e 31. Levy as a percentage of the C.I .F. prices for whea t 
in the U.K. market . 
Type of Wheat 
U. S. No . 2 Dark Northern 
Spring 14 percent 
Denature Wh ea t 
June 1971 
0 
0 
Period 
July 1971 July 1972 
5.8 26 . 9 
0 19.35 
Figur e 3 is us ed to demonstrate the effects of the levy and 
tariff on producers and consumers s urplus . The curve S S is the 
X X 
export supply of wheat by the U.S., and DcDc is the consumer-demand 
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Fi gure 3. Effects of tariff on wheat imports for producers 
and consumer surplus . 
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curve in a given market (e.g., Japan) for U. S. wheat. The imposi-
tion of a tariff or the l evy causes the demand facing the U.S. pro-
ducers, DPDP (i.e., the demand curve estimated in this s tudy) to 
diver ge f rom the demand curve which would have faced them under f r ee 
trade (DcDc) equal t o the amount of levy or tariff in each year. 
Under free trade, supply and demand would i ntersec t a t point b, and 
amount Q2 would be purchased at price Pe. The introduction of the 
tariff or levy equal to af causes consumer s to pay a price of PC 
fo r each unit and consume Q1 units of U.S. wheat . Producers would 
then receive Pp per unit fo r Q1 uni t s sold . The loss in consumer 
surplus is PcabPe and l oss to the producers is PebfPP, compared with 
t he free- trade positions. Governments of the importing country collec t 
PcafPP as tariff revenue. The importing country will gain from 
i~posing a ta~i!f i f PedfPP in gr eater than abd, igcori~g tPe 
repercussion of the effec ts of a tariff on the domestic supply and 
demand for wheat. There is a net loss t o t he U.S. pr oducers equa l 
to P bfP which is calculated for each market under the related rate 
e p 
of levy or tariff. It is assumed in each year that the compensa ted 
own-price elasticity, along DcDc and DPDP, are equal (i.e., Ed at a 
i s equal Ed at f), and the elasticity is the same along the ab segment 
of the D D demand curve. 
and 
c c 
Loss to the producers is compos ed of two parts as follmvs; 
P dfP 
e p 
dbf db (df) 
(53) 
(54) 
Table 32 gives the dollar values (in million dollars) of producer 
surplus loss to U.S. producers for each market under study by year 
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and rate of tariff or levy mentioned above. All calculations of pro-
ducers gains and losses, due to the various policies implemented by 
the EEC and Japan, are made under the same assumptions as in the case 
of the subsidy. The supply elasticity used is also the same as in 
the case of the subsidy . The value of the elasticity of supply used 
will effect the magnitude of loss. The lower the elasticity of the 
export supply, and the higher the elasticity of the import demand, the 
greater the loss in the producers surplus, due to a specific amount of 
tariff or levy. The increase of the export supply elasticity reduced 
the amount of the loss in U.S. producer's surplus for a given amount 
of levy or tariff, but much less than directly proportional (Table 
32). An increase in the ex!)ort supply elasticity of as much as 8-fold 
cut the producers surplus loss by approximately 50 percent for a 
specific amount of tariff or levy . This finding sugges t that the 
magnitude of the producer surplus loss is not very sensitive to the 
change in the export supply elasticity. 
Tariff reduction 
It is assumed that the tariff rate imposed by importers on 
wheat in each year studied was 50 percent of what it had actually 
been . Effects of a reduction in the tariff are demonstrated in 
Figure 4. Tariff before reduction was af per unit. Because of a 
reduction in tariff by 50 percent now gh = .5, af tarrif per unit 
is imposed on each unit of wheat imported. The effects of this · 
reduction in the tariff is to raise prices received by U.S. exporters 
Table 32. Effects of i mposing tariff or levy by various importers on wheat, on the U. S. producers 
surplus, for different magnitude of the export supply elasticity . 
Rate of Tariff or Value of Tariff U.S. Producers Surplusa 
Year of Levy (Percentage or Levy (Dollars Loss (Million Dollars) 
Harkets Calcula t ion of C.F .I . Prices) per ~letric ton) 
E: = 0.2 E: = 0 . 8 E: = 1. 6 
s s s 
U. K. 1972 20 14.6 10.1 7.1 5.1 
Italy 1973 73 102.3 39.5 33.3 26.9 
Netherlands 1970 73 49.6 23.0 16.8 12.4 
Japan 1973 50 61.3 196.5 142.4 103.4 
~athemat ical equat i ons used to calculate gains because of tariff reductions are presented in 
Appendix C. 
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Figure 4 . Effects of tariff reduction by importers on 
domestic consumers and foreign producers 
surplus. 
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from Pp to P~ , and to lower the prices paid by the EEC and Japanese 
consumers of U.S. wheat from Pc to P~, and to raise the quantity of 
wheat exports by the U.S . from Q1 to Q3 . The loss in consumer sur-
plus is now P~gbPe compared to PcabPe in the previous case , and the 
loss to the producer is now equal to PebhP~ i n contrast to PebfPP 
before the reduction in tariff . Governments of importing countries 
collec t P~ghP; tariff revenue and loss PcafPP - P~ghP~, because 
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of the reduction in tariff . Consumers in the importing country gain 
PcagP~, and the surplus gain to U.S. producers is equal to P~hfPP . 
Table 33 gives dollar values of the producers s urplus gains 
which would result from a 50 percent reduction in tariff and shows 
the los s t hat st ill exis t s , when compared to the free-trade situation 
(i.e., point b) . The magnitud e of the gain, due to the tariff reduc-
t ion in all four ruarkets , is as much as 50 percent of the. loss tha t 
was incurred under the original tariff rate (Table 32) , fo r various 
magni tudes of the export s upply elast i ci t y . Therefore , the gain in 
the producers s urplus, because of the t ar iff and levy reduction, as 
a percentage of the loss is not sensitive to the magnitude of the 
export supply e lasticity (Table 33). Given these estimat es of the 
po t ential gains in producers surplus of U.S . producers due to t a riff 
r eductions, the importance of the r ecent Geneva Conference i n 
Mu l tilateral Trade Negotiation (MTN), and the proposal of Tiutual 
tariff reduction by the EEC and the U.S . (USDA, 1977), for U.S. 
expor ts of agricul t ural commodities becomes obvious. Reductions in 
t a r i ffs a nd levies imposed by the EEC and Japan on U.S . agricultural 
exports t o these markets shoul d receive a higher priority compared 
to expor t subsidy po l icies . 
Table 33. Effects of tariff or levy reduction by various importers of wheat on the U.S . producers 
surplus, for different magni tude of the export supply elasticity. 
Value of U.S . Producers Surplus Loss Year of Tariff or Levy (Million Dollars)b Markets Calculation (Dollars per (Hillion Dollars)a Gain 
Metric Ton) 
£ = 0.2 £ = 0 . 8 £ = 1. 6 £ = 0.2 £ = 0.8 
s s s s s 
U. K. 1972 7.3 5 . 0 3.5 2 . 5 5.1 3.6 
It aly 1973 51.1 19.9 16.7 13.5 19.6 16.6 
Netherlands 1970 24.8 11.4 8 .4 6.1 11.6 8.4 
Japan 1973 30.6 96 . 2 71.0 51.9 100.3 71.4 
~reducers surplus loss compared to f r ee-trade situation, after reduction in tariff or levy. 
~athematical equations used to calculate gains because of tariff reductions are presented in 
Appendix C. 
£ 
s 
= 1. 6 
2.6 
13.4 
6.2 
51.5 
"' ln 
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In the case of a quota the analysis is basically the same as 
for a tariff or levy . Suppose free trade exis ts, then U.S. exports 
of wheat to a particular market (Figure 3) is Q2 and the price per 
metric ton is Pe. If the importing country wishes to reduce importa-
tion of U.S. wheat to Q1 , it can impose a quota equal to that amount. 
The loss to l! . S . producers will be the same as in the case of a tariff 
used to reduce imports to Q
1
. Table 32 gives dollar values (in 
millions of dollars) of these losses for different magnitudes of 
the export-supply elasticity . The difference in this case is that 
there is not necessarily any revenue that accrues to the importing 7 
country's government, as opposed to revenue equal to PcafPP in the 
case of the tariff . The revenue may be transferred to quota holders, 
or g overnments may sell import licences and try to ma intain part, 
or all, of this revenue. 
The proposition of establishing import quotas on U.S. wheat, 
as is sometimes suggested, is analyzed using Figure 4. Suppose the 
same situation exists as it did in 1973. The U.S. is exporting an 
amount of wheat equal to Q1 at price Pp with a tariff equal to the 
amount af per unit. If the tariff is replaced by a quota, any quota 
greater than Q1 will clearly reduced losses in U.S. producers sur-
plus, compared to a tariff equal to af per unit, and is preferable 
to the tariff. From the importing country ' s viewpoint, if the 
elasticity of export suppl y and impor t demand are ver y low, it would 
imply that a higher tariff is required to reduce imports by a given 
amount. Under this situa tion a quota is a preferable means to reduce 
imports. 
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Price Stabilization Schemes 
The price of a commodity may fluctuate because of shifts in 
the export supply and the import demand. If shifts in supply curves 
are the cause of price destabilization, then starting from a given 
price under a competitive situation, consumers stand to gain more 
from a price decline than to lose from a price increase (Waugh, 1944). 
Alternatively, if the cause of fluctuations are shifts in the demand 
curve , starting from a given price under a competi tive situation, pro-
ducers stand to gain more from a price increase than to lose from a 
decline in price (Oi, 1961). The case of a fluctuation in prices, 
due to shifts in the demand curve and the effects of a price stabili-
zation scheme from the U.S. producers point-of-view, is discussed 
further . 
Figure 5 is used to demonstrate the Oi (1961) case of price 
fluctuation due to shifts in the import demand curve. The S S 
X X 
is the export supply curve of wheat, D1D1 and DiD~ are import demand 
curves in the two time periods. P
1
, Q1 and P2 , Q2 are prices a nd 
quantities sold in periods 1 and 2, respectively. Each are assumed 
to o ccur with 0. 5 prohrtbili ty. In period 1 producers surplus is 
P1cd and in period 2 it is P2ad. The stabilization of the prices 
at P3 , using a buffer stock and assuming no storage cost, causes 
producers to lose P2abP3 half of the time and to gain P3bcP1 in 
another half, with the net loss to the producers because of price 
stabilization equal to P2abP3 - P3bcP1 . The more inelastic the supply 
curve the smaller the loss to the producers due to price stabilization, 
since the difference between P2abP3 and P3bcP1 , which is the loss to 
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Figure 5. Price fluctuation and stabilization. 
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the producers, becomes smaller. If, in fact, the probability of P1 
occurring is much greater than 0.5, and the probability of P2 
occurring is much less than 0.5, then the producers stand to gain 
from stabilizing prices at the average price. The implications of 
the current EEC suggestion of imposing a floor and a ceiling price 
for imported wheat, compared to a single threshold price can be dis-
cussed in this context. 
Assume P2 is a price that would have existed under equilibrium 
conditions and the EEC ceiling price is equal to that price, and the 
imposed floor price is P1 , if the previous single threshold price has 
been P3 , equal to the average of P1 and P2 , and if P1 and P2 each 
have a probability of occurrence equal to 0.5, then the imposition 
of floor and ceiling prices is preferable to the single threshold 
price from the U.S. producers point-of-view. \.Jhat is really important 
is the relationship between the ceiling price and the price that would 
have existed under free-trade. The lower the ceiling price relative 
to the potent ia l free-trade price, the greater the loss in producers 
surplus compared to the fret-trade position. Past experience with 
EEC policies to protect domestic producers against foreign competitors 
suggest that the EEC preference will be to set a floor price high 
enough, relative to the C.I.F . prices of imported wheat (i.e., P1), 
to give their domestic producers a sufficient degree of protection 
against foreign competitors. The ceiling price below the potential 
free-trade equilibrium (i.e., P 2) will prevent import prices from 
increasing to the f ree-trade level, as it did in 1974, and to limit 
demand for imported wheat in periods of strong demand to the level 
that will be supplied by foreign exporters at current ce i ling prices . 
100 
Conclusion 
The results of the study give some evidence to support the 
suspicion that the traditional linear and log-linear models may not 
be appropriate in some cases for estimating trade relationships. The 
use of traditional models should be justified using the appropriate 
tests of the structure of preference for, and production of, a 
commodity . The assumption used that import demand is not an excess 
demand has been partially supported by the substitution elasticities 
small enough to justify the assertion that they a re less than infinity. 
This assumption is further supported by the explicit group wise 
separability tests. The group wise separability of all jnports 
from domestic wheat (i.e., explicit group wise separability of groups 
1, 2, 3 from 4) has been rejected in three out of four markets namely 
the U.K., Netherlands, and Japan . In Italy, all four groups, 1, 2, 3 
and 4, are separable from each other, which implies that imports are 
also separable. 
The compensated own-price elasticities for U.S. wheat during 
the time period studied in just one out of four markets (i.e., Italy) 
are substantially above one; while in the Netherlands and Japan during 
most of the time periods, they are below one; and for the U.K. they 
are very close to one. Given these values of import-demand elasticities, 
and knowing that Italy is not a big market for U.S. wheat exports com-
pared to the other three markets, one should not expect g r eat increases 
in revenue from exports of wheat because of the dollar devaluation . 
The policy of an export subsidy for wheat was rejected as a 
viable policy for improving farm income levels in the U.S., in contrast 
to an export tax in the short-run as suggested. Given the current 
situation in wheat trade, it is in the best interests of the U.S., 
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as well as other major exporters (i.e., Canada, Australia and Argentina), 
to co-ordinate their trade policies, particularly in dealing with the 
question of imposing a tax on wheat exports , tariffs, and tax reduc-
tion negotiations with the EEC and Japan. The U.S. stands to gain 
substantially from reductions in EEC and Japanese variable levies 
and tariffs on wheat, and should give high priority to levy and tariff 
reduction policies in bargaining with the EEC and Japan. 
At this point it is suggested that a detai led study of the 
und erlying structure of produc tion be undertaken. One of the major 
shortcomings of this study was the use of a constant elasticity of 
supply derived from a traditional log linear model. Another prob lem 
in this study was the lack of wholesale prices and quantity data 
on the domestic wheat consumed in all four markets and use of the 
prices received by producers and the quantities sold as a proxy. 
Appropriate data in this respect would have increased the reliability 
of the estimates . Further information regarding the qual i ty (i . e., 
hard wheat and soft wheat) and classes of wheat imported by each 
market, and sources of supply, might have helped in explaining the 
various group wise separability restrictions accepted in each market . 
Another area of research that may prove to he productive would 
be to model the wheat import as an input in the agricultural sector 
of an importing country's economy . Imports in this study have been 
explicitly assumed to he final goods, It has been argued by others 
(Burgess, 1975; Kohli, 1975) that all imports undergo some degree of 
1~ 
processing before reaching the final consumption stage . In this 
sense, a derived demand for input model should be the basic frame-
work used in the context of production theory in contrast to con-
sumption theory which has been used in this study . 
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Table 34 . U.K. wheat expenditure and price data by source. 
u.s. 1 Canada1 Aust ralia1 U.K. 2 
Year 
Price Price Price Price 
Expenditure ($ Per Met- Expenditure ($ Per Met- Expenditure ($ Per Met- Expenditure ($ Per Met-
($1000) ric Tons) ($1000) ric Tons) ($1000) ric Tons) ($1000) ric Tons) 
1952 41745 90.53 240807 85.61 38348 84.43 185176 79.00 
1953 38617 85.34 236017 83.25 39050 82 . 54 224681 83.00 
1954 21596 56 . 66 154542 77.50 22714 72 . 68 246036 83.00 
1955 34198 71. 02 185 779 80.95 37509 73 . 55 219203 83.00 
1956 72631 75.82 217001 81.00 45337 73.72 239953 83.00 
1957 63572 74.79 170390 78.74 48138 74.06 212628 78.00 
1958 46001 65 . 53 178580 73 . 22 18354 69.69 212135 77.00 
1959 34105 69 . 74 169791 72.87 32877 66.17 212250 75 . 00 
·-
1960 39063 68 . 66 158706 73.24 46177 66.63 224960 74 . 00 
Units are presented in parentheses. All obser vations will be normalized by dividing to 1963 values. 
Sources: St atistical Office of the United Na tions, Commodity Trade Statistics, Series D, Volume 2-24, 
1952- 1974 , (New York). 
Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, Production Yearbook, Volume 6- 28, ,... ,... 
1952-1974 (Rome). 0 
Table 31+ . Continued . 
u.s. 1 Canada1 Australial U.K. 2 Year 
Price Price Price Price 
Expenditure ($ Per Me t - Expenditure ($ Per Met- Expenditure ($ Per Met - Expendi t ure ($ Per Met-
($1000) ric Tons) ($1000) ric Ton~) ($1000) ric Tons) ($1000) ric Tons) 
1961 29120 71.38 157839 74.28 43189 68.09 193436 74.00 
1962 23637 67.33 152140 76.76 39154 70.29 298050 75.00 
1963 17927 7 3 . I. 7 162681 76.88 39096 69. 06 225404 74.00 
1964 25827 75.77 161456 79.65 40370 7 3. 25 273096 72.00 
1965 21627 67.39 16116 78.06 42699 68.75 283628 68.00 
1966 43024 71.30 13 7261 79.71 38291 72.29 243250 70.00 
1967 31295 70 . 40 132935 80.76 28132 72 . 16 253695 65.00 
1968 11063 71.15 113762 75.54 24281 69 .39 225485 65 .00 
1969 3118 73 . 65 96413 75.9 2 58359 69.80 232116 69 . 00 
Units ar e presented i n parentheses . All obser vations will be normalized by dividing to 1963 values. 
Sources: St atistical Office of the United Nations, Commodity Trade Statistics , Series D, Volume 2-24, 
1952- 1974 (New York). 
Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations , Production Year book, Volume 6-28, >-" 
>-" 1952- 1974 (Rome). >-" 
Table 34. Continued. 
Year 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
Expenditure 
($1000) 
47425 
63712 
57653 
51790 
78805 
u.s.l 
Price 
($ Per Met-
ric Tons) 
69.25 
73.39 
73.24 
100.37 
220 . 37 
Canada1 
Expenditure 
($1000) 
113636 
105301 
102 792 
171524 
239234 
Price 
($ Per Net-
ric Tons) 
74.03 
76.86 
79.87 
116.13 
216.89 
Australia1 
Expenditure 
($1000) 
76935 
95974 
41082 
21982 
146 
Price 
($ Per Met-
ric Tons) 
65.25 
69.90 
71.68 
91.84 
239. 74 
u.s. 2 
Expenditure 
($1000) 
313464 
394830 
409360 
700420 
827550 
Price 
($ Per Net-
ric Tons) 
74.00 
82.00 
86.00 
140.00 
135.00 
Units are presented in parentheses. All observations will be normalized by dividing to 1963 values . 
Sources: Statistical Office of the United Nations, Commodity Trade Statistics, Series D, Volume 2-24, 
1952-1974 (New York) 
Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, Production Yearbook, Volume 6-28, 
1952-1974 (Rome). 
..... 
..... 
N 
Table 35. Netherlands wheat expenditures and price data by source. 
u. s. 1 Canada1 Year Argentina
1 Netherlands2 
Price Price Price Price 
Expenditure ($ Per Met- Expenditure ($ Per Met- Expenditure ($ Per Met- Expenditure ($ Per Met-
($1000) ric Tons) ($1000) ric Tons) ($1000) ric Tons) ($1000) ric Tons) 
1953 16625 81.51 33697 81.4 7 1773 85.70 16932 68.00 
1954 13107 73 .00 25272 75.94 7693 73.14 26599 67 . 00 
1955 34917 69.85 7872 78.45 703 68.00 23100 66 . 00 
1956 32681 70.70 21657 68.86 323 70.42 21012 68.00 
1957 20052 73.46 21959 65.85 8068 69.24 29082 74.00 
1958 11898 65 . 27 24 756 61.94 1964 65.22 30552 76.00 
1959 11380 63 . 20 10022 64. 39 1111 64.34 39520 80 .00 
1960 13549 64 .72 10676 64.87 3162 65.27 47790 81.00 
1961 26165 66.43 6651 67.64 1739 66.74 40488 84.00 
Units are in the bracke t. All observations will be normalized by dividing to 1964 values. 
Sour ces: Statistical Office of the United Nations, Commodity Trade Statistics, Series D. Volume 3- 20, 
1953- 1970 (New York). 
Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, Production Yearbook, Volume 7-24, 
1-' 1953-1970 (Rome). 1-' 
w 
Table 35. Continued. 
u.s .1 Canada1 Argentina 1 Ne therlands2 
Year 
Price Price Price Price 
Expenditure ($ Per Met - Expenditure ( $ Per Met - Expenditure ($ Per Met- Expenditure ($ Per Met-
($1000) ric Tons) ($1000) ric Tons) ($1000) ric Tons) ($1000) r ic Tons) 
1962 31514 68.47 5420 74.24 5757 68.73 51858 86.00 
1963 28312 69.84 5723 71.43 447 6 67.02 48230 91.00 
1964 27627 73 .31 4446 77.12 8404 70.91 67640 95.00 
1965 21209 67 . 67 2617 75.48 14600 64.5 2 69696 99 . 00 
1966 35478 68 . 32 3755 78 . 26 1487 66.26 59202 99.00 
1967 21113 72.46 3680 78.41 3856 69.84 73161 99 . 00 
1968 25193 68.61 17 36 68 . 60 1622 65.37 66542 98 . 00 
1969 14287 67 .67 4363 72.01 2638 62.99 65669 97 . 00 
1970 35276 67.89 10103 69.22 482 63.64 65586 102. 00 
Units are in the parentheses. All observations will oe normalized by dividing to 1964 values. 
Sources: Statistical Office of the United Nations, Commodi t y Trade Statistics, Ser ies D, Vo lume 3-20, 
1953-1970 (New York) 
Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Na ti ons, Producti on Yearbook , Vo lume 7-24, >-' 
1953-1970 (Rome). >-' ..,_ 
Table 36. Italy wheat expenditure and price data by source. 
u. s.l Canada1 Argentina1 Italy2 
Year 
Price Price Price Price 
Expenditure ($ Per Het- Expenditure ($ Per Het - Expenditure ($ Per Het - Expenditure ($ Per Het-
($1000) ric Tons) ($1000) ric Tons) ($1000) ric Tons) ($1000) ric Tons) 
1953 33332 87.34 16808 82 . 82 24902 106.35 1022876 113.00 
1954 919 78.50 1595 79.79 4856 94.73 852111 117.00 
1955 250 75 .69 4057 77.98 35667 79.21 1035936 109.00 
1956 5935 77.09 8218 99.31 29150 85.41 955240 110.00 
1957 17496 101. 83 5350 92 . 51 17094 90.15 937839 111.00 
1958 534 111. 93 525 77.55 3104 102 . 55 1040284 106.00 
1959 1321 88.66 2543 71.40 144 61.43 84 7100 100.00 
1960 14108 67 . 70 17538 77.06 4098 71.23 733752 108.00 
1961 91304 68.44 19351; 78.35 11143 73.89 888207 107.00 
Units are in the parenthesis. All observations will ae normalized by dividing to 1964 values . 
Sources: Statistical Office of the United States, Commodity Trade Statistics, Series D, Volume 3-24, 
1953-1974 (New York). 
Food and Agricultural Organization of the U,1ited Nations, Production Yearbook, Volume 7-28, .... 
1953-1974 (Rome). .... 
"' 
Table 36. Continued. 
u.s . 1 Canada1 Argentina1 Italy2 Year 
Price Price Price Price 
Expenditure ($ Per Met- Expenditure ($ Per }!et- Expenditure ($ Per Met- Expenditure ($ Per Het-
~$1000) ric Tons) ($1000) ric Tons) ($1000) ric Tons) ($1000) ric Tons) 
1962 6355 70. 74 9722 84.90 7205 84.77 1006682 106.00 
1963 2899 82.54 9879 77.07 10106 75.99 902097 111.00 
1964 7293 65.11 5312 80.50 11767 78.32 953046 111.00 
1965 1514 71.15 13573 79.02 23911 70.00 1075360 110.00 
1966 14534 75.60 16337 80.26 32038 72.75 996400 106.00 
1967 6198 74.42 18217 82.89 22593 77.48 1036368 108.00 
1968 16360 76.55 28783 80.32 32962 75.28 968590 101.00 
1969 27387 76.74 29086 77 . 26 32391 76 . 20 968085 101. 00 
1970 13458 71.64 23076 75.50 34153 73 . 05 1065790 110.00 
Units are in the parentheses. All observations will be normalized by dividing to 1964 values. 
Sources: Statistical Office of the United States, Commodity Trade Statistics, Series D, Volume 3-24, 
1953- 1974 (New York). 
Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, Production Yearbook, Volume 7-28, ,_. 
1953- 1974 (Rome). ,_. 
"' 
Table 36. Continued. 
u.s. 1 Canada1 Argentina! Italy2 
Year 
Price Price Price Price 
Expenditure ($ Per Met- Expenditure ($ Per Met- Expenditure ($ Per Me t- Expenditure ($ Per Met-
($1000) ric Tons) ($1000) ric Tons) ($1000) ric Tons) ($1000) ric Tons) 
1971 18358 70 . 25 34883 75 . 46 28416 72.76 1139316 114.00 
1972 6148 71.98 34899 77 . 55 19874 71.06 1121337 119.00 
1973 57354 11.o. 20 39012 133.68 50602 140 . 74 1284480 144.00 
1974 50802 263.63 18608 25 7. 07 80895 271.86 1512420 156.00 
Units are in parentheses . All observations will be normalized dividing to 1964 values. 
Sources: Statistical Office of the United States, Co~modi ty Trade Statistics, Series D, Volume 3-24, 
1953-1974 (New York). 
Food and Agricultural Organizing of the Uni ted Nations, Production Yearbook, Volume 7-28, 
1953-1974 (Rome). 
1-' 
1-' 
..... 
Table 37. Japan wheat expenditure and price data by Rource. 
u. s.l Canada1 Australia1 Japan2 
Year 
Price Price Price Price 
Expenditure ($ Per Met- Expenditure ($ Per Het- Expenditure ($ Per Met- Expenditure ($ Per Met-
($1000) ric Tons) ($1000) ric Tons) ($1000) ric Tons) ($1000) ric Tons) 
1954 83089 75.95 59356 73.50 1318 65.59 150084 99.00 
1955 82764 71.72 65606 75.21 127 30 69.94 145332 99.00 
1956 76014 70 . 38 69026 76.32 17328 69 . 13 133375 97.00 
1957 73956 74 . 21 62009 71.95 7327 66.15 135660 102.00 
1958 75060 68.80 69010 66 . 68 9968 66.02 130662 102.00 
1959 57956 66.37 77495 68 . 82 24064 60.72 144432 102.00 
1960 62987 64.23 90859 68.57 18607 60.56 159224 104.00 
1961 52909 66.26 102789 70.45 22457 63.32 197802 111.00 
1962 59967 68 . 11 89978 74.61 28988 64.93 189312 116.00 
Units are in the parentheses. All observa tions will be normalized by dividing to 1964 values. 
Source: Statistical Office of the United States, Commodity Trade Statistics, Series D, Volume 4-24, , 
1954- 1974 (New York). 
Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, Production Yearbook, Volume 8-28, ,._. 
1954-1974 (Rome) . ,._. CXl 
Table 37. Continued. 
u.s. 1 Canada1 Australia1 Japan 2 
Year 
Price Price Price Price 
Expenditure ($ Per Met- Expenditure ($ Per Met- Expenditure ($ Per Met- Expenditure ($ Per Met-
($1000) ric Tons) ($1000) ric Tons) ($1000) ric Tons) ($1000) ric Tons) 
1963 97241 66.97 92736 71.17 24669 64.61 85920 120.00 
1964 120075 71.43 106395 76.00 33764 69.82 155500 125.00 
1965 131578 66.76 92067 73.71 27296 64.67 168597 131. 00 
1966 149413 69.24 104062 75.03 25292 68.06 143360 140.00 
1967 159043 72.76 113664 79.15 349 37 68.88 145562 146.00 
1968 143561 69.29 94636 76.26 50464 67.46 153824 152.00 
1969 132967 66. 95 7581.7 74.70 83222 66.84 120681 159.00 
1970 173712 67.17 87220 72.99 57456 63.61 79325 167.00 
1971 179617 70 . 08 93171+ 74.78 69482 65.36 90846 206.00 
Units are in parentheses. All observations will be normalized by dividing to 1964 values. 
Source: ·Statistical Office of the United States, Commodity Trade Statistics, Series D, Volume 4-24, 
1954-1974 (New York). 
Food and Agricultural Organizational of the ~lnited Nations, Production Yearbook Volume 8-28, >-' 
1954-1974 (Rome). >-' \0 
Table 37. Continued. 
Year u. s.l Canada1 Australia1 Japan2 
Price Price Price Price 
Expenditure ($ Per Met- Expenditure ($ Per Met- Expenditure ($ Per Met- Expenditure ($ Per Met-
($1000) ric Tons) ($1000) ric Tons) ($1000) ric Tons) ($1000) ric Tons) 
1972 178230 70.03 91513 74 . 04 91409 66.87 59664 226 . 00 
1973 443355 122 . 61 182032 125.54 19344 105.83 54136 268 . 00 
1974 666030 220 .18 345349 232.09 190618 229.52 74472 321.00 
Units are i n parentheses. All observations will be normalized to 1964 values. 
Sources: Statistical Office of the United States, Commodity Trade Statistics, Series D, Volume 4- 24 , 
1954- 1975 (New York). 
Food and Agr i cul t ural Organization of the United Nations, Production Yearbook , Volume 8- 28, 
1954-1974 (Rome ). 
.... 
N 
0 
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Table 38. Share of the suppliers in the U.K. market, 1952-1974.a 
Year u.s. Share Canadian Share Australian Share Domestic Share 
1952 0.0824 0.4758 0.0758 0.3659 
1953 0.0717 0. 4 384 o. 0725 0. 4173 
1954 0.0485 0.3474 0. 0511 0.4430 
1955 0.0717 0. 3897 0.0787 0 . 45 98 
1956 0.1263 0 . 3774 0.0789 0.4174 
1957 0.1285 0. 3444 0 . 0973 0 . 4298 
1958 0.1011 0.3924 0.0403 0.4662 
1959 0.0760 0.3781 0.0732 0.4727 
1960 0.0833 0.3385 0.0985 0. 4798 
1961 0.0687 0. 3726 0.1020 0. 4567 
1962 0 .0461 0 . 296fi 0.0763 0.5Rl0 
1963 0.0403 0.3655 0.0878 0.5064 
1964 0.0516 0,3224 0,0806 0.5454 
1965 0.0426 0.3165 0.0839 0 . 5571 
1066 0 . 0932 0 . 2972 0.0829 0.5267 
1967 0.0702 0 . 2980 0.0631 0.5688 
1968 0.0295 0.3037 0.0648 0.6020 
1969 0.0080 0 . 2472 0.1496 0 . 5952 
1970 0.0860 0.2061 0. 1395 0.5684 
1971 0 . 0966 0.1596 0.1455 0.5984 
1972 0 .0944 0.1683 0 . 0672 0.6701 
1973 0.0548 0.1814 0.0232 0. 7406 
1974 0.0688 0.2088 0.0001 0 . 7223 
a Shares may not add to one in each year due to rounding. 
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Table 39. Share of the s uppliers in the Netherlands market, 1953-
1970.a 
Year u.s. Share Canadian Share Argentina Share Domestic Share 
1953 0 . 2408 0 . 4882 0.0257 0.2453 
1954 0.1804 0.3478 0.1059 0.3660 
1955 0.5243 0.1182 0.0106 0.3469 
1956 0.4319 0.2362 0 . 0043 0. 2777 
1957 0.2533 0.2774 0.1019 0.3674 
1958 0.17 20 0.3579 0.0284 0.4417 
1959 0.1835 0.1616 0.0179 0 . 6371 
1960 0.1802 0.1420 0.0421 0.6357 
1961 0. 3487 0.0886 0.0232 0.5395 
1962 0.3333 0.0573 0.0609 0.5485 
1963 0.3264 0. 0660 0.0516 0. 5560 
1964 0 . 2555 0. 0411 0. 0777 0.6256 
1965 0.1962 0.0242 0.1350 0.6446 
1966 0 . 3551 0 . 0376 0 . 0149 0. 5925 
1967 0.2074 0.0361 0 . 0379 0.7186 
1968 0. 2649 0 .1326 0.0171 0.7000 
1969 0 . 16113 0.0502 0.0303 0.7552 
1970 0 . 3165 0.0907 0 . 0043 0.5885 
3 Shares may not add to one in each year due to r ounding . 
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Table 40. Share of the suppliers in the Italian market, 1953-1974.a 
Year u.s . Share Canadian Share Argentina Shar e Domestic Share 
1953 0.0304 0 . 0153 0.0227 0.9317 
1954 o. 0011 0 .0019 0.0056 0.9914 
1955 0.0002 0.0038 0.0332 0.9628 
1956 0.0059 0.0082 0.0292 0.9566 
1957 0.0179 0.0055 0.0175 0. 9592 
1958 0.0005 0.0005 0 .0030 0.9960 
1959 0.0016 0.0030 0.0002 0.9953 
1960 0.0183 0.0228 0.0053 0.9535 
1961 0.0904 0 . 0192 0.0110 0.8794 
1962 0.0062 0.0094 0.0070 0. 9774 
1963 0.0031 0. 0107 0.0109 0.9753 
1964 0.0075 0.0054 0.0120 0.9751 
1965 0.0014 0.0122 0.0215 0.9650 
1966 0. 0137 0 . 0154 0.0302 0. 9406 
1967 0.0057 0 .0168 0.0209 0.9566 
1968 0 .0057 0.0168 0.0209 0.9566 
1969 0.0259 0.0275 0.0306 0.9159 
1970 0.0118 0.0203 0.0301 0.9378 
1971 0.0150 0.0286 0 . 0233 0.9331 
1972 0 . 0052 0. 0295 0.0168 0 . 9485 
1973 0. 0401 0.0273 0.0354 0 . 8973 
1974 0.0278 0.0167 0.0442 0.8264 
ashare may not add to one in each year due to rounding. 
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Table 41. Share of the suppliers in the Japanese market, 1954-1974.a 
Year u.s. Share Canadian Share Australian Share Domestic Share 
1954 0.2828 0. 2020 0.0045 0.5108 
1955 0.2701 0.2141 0.0415 0.4743 
1956 0 . 2570 0. 2334 0.0586 0.4510 
1957 0. 3143 0.3074 0.0245 0. 4538 
1958 0.2636 0.2424 0.0350 0.4539 
1959 0.1907 0.2550 0.0792 0.4752 
1960 0.1899 0. 2739 0.0561 0.4801 
1961 0.1408 0.2734 0. 0597 0.5261 
1962 0.1528 0. 2443 0.0787 0.5141 
1963 0.3235 0.3085 0. 0821 0.2859 
1964 0.2888 0. 2559 0.0812 0.3740 
1965 0 . 3136 0.2194 0.0651 0.4019 
1966 0. 351!0 0. 2495 0.0599 0.3396 
1967 0.3509 0.2508 0. 0771 0.3212 
1968 0.3244 0.2139 0.111,0 0.3476 
1969 0.3222 0.1837 0. 2017 0. 2924 
1970 0.4363 0.2193 0.1445 0.1995 
1971 0.4147 0. 2151 0.1604 0.2097 
1972 0.4235 0. 2175 0.2172 0.1418 
1973 0.6344 0.2605 0. 0277 0. 0775 
1974 0. 5218 0.2706 0.1493 0.0583 
aShar es may not add to one in each year due to rounding . 
Appendix B 
Uncompensated 0Hn- anC Cross- Price El.e.sticities, and 
Substitution Elasticities for 1-lheat in the 
U. K. , Netherlands , Italian, and Japanese Markets 
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Table 42. Uncompensated own-price elasticities for wheat in the U.K. 
market, 1952-1974. 
Year 11u 1122 1133 11 44 
1952 -1.15626 -1.37708 -1.62416 -1. 50904 
1953 -1. 15572 -1.37706 - 1.60336 -1.50562 
1954 -1.15548 -1.37701 -1.62073 -1.50693 
1955 -1.15565 -1.37651 -1.60530 -1.50628 
1956 -1.154 91 -1.37560 -1.56522 -1.50060 
1957 -1.15560 -1.37646 -1.59796 -1.50536 
1959 -1.15553 -1.37693 -1. 60364 -1.50534 
1960 -1.15540 -1.37608 -1.58623 - 1.50393 
1961 -1.15602 -1.37675 -1.61481 -1.50792 
1962 -1.15510 -1.37562 -1.57890 -1.50280 
1963 -1.15591 -1.37622 -1.60609 -1.50729 
1964 -1.15559 -1.37565 -1.59265 -1.50559 
1965 -1.15514 -1.37459 -1.57585 -1.50362 
1966 -1.15583 -1.37568 -1.60871 -1.50798 
1967 -1. 15601 - 1. 37520 -1. 61698 - 1.50981 
1968 -1.156 73 -1.37664 -1.65368 -1. 51353 
1969 -1.15660 - 1. 37683 - 1.64343 -1. 51206 
1970 -1.15462 -1.37483 -1.55025 -1.49866 
1971 -1.15406 -1.37484 -1.53178 - 1.49445 
1972 -1.1544 7 -1.37531 -1.54889 -1.49759 
1973 -1.15373 -1.37413 - 1.51851 -1.49232 
1974 -1.15718 -1.37659 -1.69 396 -1.51789 
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Table 43. Substitution elasticities for wheat in the U.K. market , 
1952-1974. 
Year a l2 0 13 0 14 0 21 0 31 0 41 
1952 0. 04140 0. 73915 -0.01383 0.07316 0.77890 -0. 10412 
1953 0. 04113 0 . 70660 -0.01386 0. 07248 0.76404 -0.10315 
1954 o. 04123 0. 72913 -0.01384 0.07105 0.75576 -0.10111 
1955 0.04125 0. 70848 -0.01384 0.07208 0.76059 -0.10258 
1956 0.04094 0.64643 -0.01388 0. 07152 0 . 73952 -0.10178 
1957 0 . 04ll.9 0.69774 -0.01385 0 . 07221 0 . 75908 -0.10276 
1958 o. 04112 0.70565 -0.0138 5 0. 07183 0.75794 -0. 10229 
1959 0. 04117 0. 69243 -0.01385 0. 07240 0.75957 -0.1030 
1960 0. 04113 0.67966 -0.01386 0.07206 0.75310 -0.10255 
1961 0. 04135 0. 72442 -0.01383 0.07282 0. 77180 -0.10362 
1962 0.04111 0.66703 -0.01386 0.07142 0.74369 -0.10164 
1963 0. 04137 0. 71103 -0.01383 0.07273 o. 76743 -0.10350 
1964 0. 04133 0.68955 -0.01384 0.07224 0.75719 -0.10280 
1965 0. 04132 0.66222 -0.01384 0. 07149 0. 74299 -0.1017 3 
1966 0.04151 0 . 71375 -0.01382 0.07229 0.76379 - 0.10288 
1967 0.04173 0.72611 -0.01380 0 . 07239 0.76782 -0.10302 
1968 0.04182 0.78319 -0.01379 0.07344 0.79270 -0.10450 
1969 0. 04167 0.76824 -0.01380 0. 07 344 0.78895 -0.10451 
1970 0.04089 0. 62271 -0.01388 0. 07131 0.73144 -0.10148 
1971 0.04056 0.59267 -0 .01392 0.07068 0 . 71808 -0.10059 
1972 0 . 04074 0.62021 -0.01390 0. 07103 0.72827 -0.10108 
1973 0.04047 0.57120 -0.01392 0. 07049 0. 71093 -0 .10032 
1974 o. 04221 0.84128 -0 .01377 0 .07338 0.80677 -0. 10442 
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Table 43. Continued. 
Year 0 23 0 24 0 32 0 42 0 34 0 43 
1952 0. 53712 0 .05 497 0.13058 0.11021 - 0.01383 0. 53712 
1953 0.51406 0.05498 0.12973 0.10997 -0.01386 0. 51406 
1954 o. 53356 0. 05497 0. 13002 0.11004 -0.01384 0.53356 
1955 0. 51623 0.05510 0 . 13010 0 .11019 - 0.01384 0.51623 
1956 0 . 4 7084 0 . 05535 0.12910 0.11016 -0.01388 0.47084 
1957 o. 50799 0 . 05512 0.12991 0.11017 -0.01385 0. 50799 
1958 0.51443 0.05500 0 . 12969 0.10998 -0.01385 0. 511>43 
1959 0.50368 0 . 05513 0.12983 0.11015 -0.01385 0 . 50368 
1960 0.49476 0 . 05522 0 . 12972 0.11021 - 0 . 01386 0. 49476 
1961 0.52673 0.05504 0.13041 0.11022 - 0.01383 0 . 52678 
1962 0 . 48648 0.05534 0.12965 0.11031 - 0 . 01386 0. 48648 
1963 0. 517()2 0.055Hl C.13049 0.11038 -0 .01383 0. 51702 
1964 0.50194 0. 055 33 0.13035 0.11050 -0.01384 0.50194 
1965 0.48290 0.05560 0 . 13033 0.11077 -0.01384 0 . 48290 
1966 0 . 51995 0. 05532 0 . 13093 0.11066 -0.01382 0 . 51995 
1967 0. 52909 0. 05544 0 .13162 0.11098 -0.01380 0.52909 
1968 0.56951 0. 05507 0.13188 0 .11068 -0.01379 0.56951 
1969 0. 55831 0. 05502 0.13142 0.11049 -0.01380 0. 558 31 
1970 D. 45350 0. 05555 0.12897 0.11033 -0 .01388 0.45350 
1971 0.43190 0.05556 0.12792 0.11004 -0 .01392 0.43190 
1972 0 . 45199 0 . 05543 0.12848 0.11006 - 0.01390 0.45199 
1973 0.41607 0.05572 0.12763 0.11011 -0.0139 2 0. 416 07 
1974 0 . 61307 0.05513 0. 13314 0.11112 -0.01377 0. 61307 
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Table 44 o Uncompensated cross-price elasticities for wheat in the 
U.K. market, 1952-19740 
Year r\2 nl3 n14 n21 n 31 n41 
1952 -Oo30874 -Oo 02161 -0055575 -Oo06536 -0005038 -0o07406 
1953 -Oo30912 -Oo02502 -Oo55165 -Oo06568 -Oo05002 -Oo07432 
1954 -0 0 30840 -Oo02229 -Oo55232 -Oo06722 - 0o05314 -Oo07579 
1955 -Oo 30316 -0002474 -Oo55216 -0006610 -0 o05071 -0 o07471 
1956 -O o 30775 - Oo03221 -0054566 - 0006605 -0004893 -Oo07458 
1957 -0030828 -Oo02599 -0055122 -Oo06589 -0005008 -Oo07450 
1958 -0 030882 -O o02501 -0o55102 -O o 06623 -Oo 05087 -0o07483 
1959 -Oo 30834 -0002664 -Oo 55095 - Oo06566 -00 04958 -Oo 07428 
1960 -Oo30797 -Oo02810 -Oo 54959 -O o06587 -0004954 -Oo 07446 
1961 -0o30842 -Oo 02311 -0055435 -0006555 -Oo05028 -Oo 07422 
1962 -0 o30735 - Oo02953 -0o54800 -Oo06638 -Oo 04998 -Oo 07491 
1963 -Oo 30778 -Oo 02457 -0055360 -Oo06555 -0004989 -Oo07421 
1964 -Oo30714 -0 0 02696 -0 0 55148 -Oo06585 -Oo 04975 -Oo07446 
1965 -0o30582 -0003012 -0054893 -0006635 -Oo04974 -0.07488 
1966 -0.30676 -0002420 -005411 -0006603 -Oo05070 -0007466 
1967 -0o30582 -0002288 -0055616 -0006610 -00 05110 -Oo07473 
1968 -0030743 -Oo0l730 -0o56079 -Oo06550 -Oo05180 -0 007425 
1969 -Oo30796 -O o0l872 -0o55919 -Oo06536 -Oo05117 -Oo07410 
1970 - Oo30698 -O o03543 -Oo 54343 -Oo 06604 -Oo04824 -O o07453 
1971 -Oo30755 -0003974 -0053852 -0006625 -D o 01;779 -0007467 
1972 -O o 30774 -Oo 03571 -Oo 54212 - Oo06623 -Oo 04850 -0o07470 
1973 -Oo30696 -0.04314 -Oo 53609 -0006616 -Oo 04711 -0007454 
1974 -Oo30647 - 0001220 -Oo 56553 -0006603 -0o05432 -0007 481 
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Table 44. Continued. 
Year 1123 1124 1132 1142 1134 1143 
1952 -0.03465 - 0.50175 - 0.42684 -0.25964 -0 .80487 -0.03042 
1953 -0.03785 - 0.49823 -0.42050 -0.26015 -0. 78709 -0.03347 
1954 -0.03503 - 0.49959 - 0 . 42625 -0.25994 -0. 79959 -0.03080 
1955 -0.03754 -0 .49889 -0.41999 -0.25942 -0 .78929 - 0.03317 
1956 -0.04471 -0.4929 9 -0.40553 - 0.25916 -0.75636 - 0.03798 
1957 -0.03876 -0.49 793 -0.41753 -0.25948 -0.78 344 - 0.08433 
1958 - 0. 03777 - 0.49794 -0.42048 -0. 26006 - 0. 78635 -0.03340 
1959 -0.03942 -0.497 58 -0 . 41618 -0.25948 -0.78061 -0.03496 
1960 - 0.04080 -0.49645 -0.41303 -0.25923 -0.77417 -0.03626 
1961 -0.03606 -0.50059 -0.42330 -0.25945 -0 .79754 - 0.03176 
1962 - 0.04211 -0.49525 -0.40987 -0 . 25884 -0.7 6801 -0.03751 
1963 -0 . 03747 -0.49990 -0.41937 -0 . 25890 -0.79129 -0.03310 
1964 -0 . 03973 -0.49812 -0. 41399 - 0.25844 -0. 78057 -0.03523 
1965 -0.04275 - 0.49604 -0. 40657 -0.25746 -0. 76737 -0.03810 
1966 -0.03707 -0.50058 -0. 41902 -0.25811 -0.79 394 - 0 . 03270 
1967 - 0.03581 - 0.50243 - 0.42043 - 0.25724 -0.80175 - 0.03149 
1968 -0 . 03053 - 0.50634 - 0.43489 - 0.25844 -0.82960 - 0.02649 
1969 -0.03191 -0. 50485 -0. 43218 -0.25890 -0. 82115 -0.02780 
1970 -0.04781 -0.49096 - 0.39917 -0.25851 -0.744 24 -0.04293 
1971 -0.05189 -0. 48664 - 0.39355 - 0 . 25916 -0. 72668 -0.04682 
1972 - 0.04803 - 0.48989 -0.39988 -0.25926 -0.74188 -0.04315 
197 3 -0.05516 -0. 48441 -0.38794 -0 .25863 -0.71528 -0 .04994 
1974 -0. 02561 -0 .51083 - 0.44703 - 0.25760 -0 .86058 -0 . 02180 
131 
Table 45. Uncompensated own-price elasticities for wheat in the 
Netherlands market, 1953-1970. 
Year 11n 11 22 11 33 11 44 
1953 -1. 32151 - 2.65517 0.34880 -1. 22226 
1954 - 1.32181 - 2.42635 0.93330 -1.24021 
1955 - 1. 32160 -2.74537 0.87818 -1.23666 
1956 -1. 32101 -2.23680 l. 29454 - 1.25258 
1957 -1.32019 -2.16362 l. 68720 - 1.26265 
1958 -l. 32225 - 2.36341 1. 22515 -1.27597 
1959 -1.32823 -2.82684 0 . 82217 -1.27775 
1960 -1. 321 21 - 2.33067 l. 74302 - 1.28560 
1961 -1.3225 -2.41975 1. 56934 -1.28489 
1962 -1.31914 -2.16020 4.41739 -1.28842 
1963 -1.31846 -2.11934 6.33852 -1.29568 
1964 -1.31823 -2.07107 11.28505 - 1.29546 
1965 -1.31757 -2.09128 -77 0 26143 -1. 30971 
1966 -1. 31889 -2.22780 9 . 82099 -1. 30511 
1967 -1. 31884 -2.18420 6.91241 -1. 29936 
1968 -1. 31894 -2. 14603 6.78217 -1.30770 
1969 -1.3 2147 -2.34063 4.52275 -1.30311 
1970 - 1 . 31605 -2.00597 -18.49937 -1.31693 
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Table 46. Substitution elasticities for wheat in the Netherlands 
market, 1953-1970. 
Year 0 12 0 13 0 14 0 21 0 31 0 41 
1953 3.39438 - 1.38980 -1.29807 2.05126 -0.35152 -1.19763 
1954 2.88383 - 1.96230 -1.20511 1. 81526 -0.33490 -1.10169 
1955 3.58004 -1.90805 -1.20369 2.10777 -0.34658 -1. 09202 
1956 2.49083 -2.31896 -1.19898 l. 6 7881 -0.33376 -1. 08331 
1957 2.37147 -2.70807 -1.22926 1. 68922 -0.34824 -1.08878 
1958 2.95022 -2.25037 -1. 28462 2.06880 -0 . 38781 -1.09241 
1959 4.16541 -1.35292 -1.35878 2. 75520 -0.43460 -1.11665 
1960 2.86755 -2.76350 -1.23507 2.01319 -0.37884 -1.04440 
1961 3.09582 -2.59124 -1.25129 2.13929 -0.38854 -1.05144 
1962 2.36550 -5 .42771 -1.10905 1. 65627 -0.33244 -0.96301 
1963 2. 30500 -7.34613 -1.1328/t 1.67505 -0.34377 -0.96948 
1964 2.15738 -12 .28957 -1. 09099 l. 56358 -0.32724 -0.94412 
1965 2.23370 76.26216 -1. 07091 1. 62293 -0.33358 -0.90787 
1966 2.57902 -10.82616 -1.10557 l. 30263 -0.34955 -0.93056 
1967 2.46854 -7.91943 -1.12377 l. 75637 -0 . 34828 -0.95375 
1968 2.44202 -7.78935 -1.17596 l. 82234 -0 . 36859 -0.97883 
1969 2. 92589 - 5.53298 -1.19737 2.07074 - 0.38557 -0.98727 
1970 2.05612 17.50252 -1.09294 l. 57815 - 0.33920 -0.91818 
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Table 46 o Continued. 
Year a23 a 24 a 32 a42 a 34 a43 
1953 -1. 38980 -1.69268 -1.69268 Oo05751 Oo27056 -1. 38980 
1954 -1.96230 -1.37155 -00 71312 Oo 09258 Oo25003 -1.96230 
1955 -1.90805 -1. 70599 - Oo89044 Ool8029 Oo25412 -1. 90805 
1956 -2031896 -1.12632 -0 060547 Oo 09249 0023659 -20 31896 
1957 -2070807 -1.00534 -Oo56310 Ool2116 Oo22705 - 2o7 0807 
1958 -2025037 -1.15628 -Oo 67768 Oo25563 Oo2l708 -2 0 25037 
1959 -1.85292 -1.55758 -Oo93520 Oo47391 Oo2l655 -1.85292 
1960 -20 76350 - 1.10610 -00 65924 Oo26939 Oo20916 -20 76350 
1961 -2059124 -1.18653 -Oo 70953 Oo30879 Oo2l021 -20 59124 
1962 -5.42771 -Oo95583 -0.56165 Ool8837 Oo 201;81 -5o42771 
1963 -7 o 31o613 -Oo89123 -Oo 53776 Oo 20195 Ool9946 -7 0 34613 
1964 -12028957 -Oo 85213 -0o50946 Ool7399 Ool9850 -l2o28957 
1965 76 0 26216 -00 84202 -Oo52161 0022278 Ool8902 760 26216 
1966 -10082616 -0097502 - Oo60082 Oo27529 Ool9390 -10082616 
1967 -7091948 -0o94525 - Oo 57558 Oo 24075 Ool9755 - 7o9l948 
1968 -7o78935 -00 88288 - Oo 55339 Oo25545 Ool9188 -7o78935 
1969 -5054398 -1.061 54 -Oo 66496 Oo 34 004 Ool9683 -5o 53298 
1970 l7 o50252 -00 74389 - Oo47086 Oo 204 72 Ool8323 l7 o50252 
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Table 47. Uncompensated cross-price elasticities for wheat in the 
Netherlands market, 1953-1970. 
Year r\2 1113 Tll4 Tl21 Tl31 Tl41 
1953 0 . 30563 -0.21288 -1. 17274 -0.15206 0.17919 -0 . 64468 
1954 0. 26439 -0.17474 -1.09683 -0.13682 0.36297 -0 . 61254 
1955 0.31252 -0.18531 -1.13169 -0.17525 0.35430 -0.61159 
1956 0.22632 
-0.15832 -1.11409 -0.09948 0.45384 -0 . 58418 
1957 0.21205 -0.14998 -1.17671 -0.06252 0.53887 -0.55320 
1958 0.26347 -0.16755 -1.33149 -0.02521 0.36673 -0.50712 
1959 0.34415 -0.19608 -1.49654 0.00174 0 . 24041 -0.48027 
1960 0.25311 -0.15266 -1.32247 -0 .03113 0 . 50874 -0.49537 
1961 0.27229 -0.15918 -1. 351,4/f -0.02715 0.1,5772 -0.1•9186 
1962 0. 20360 -0.12073 -1.17894 -0.07741 1. 34530 -0.51530 
1963 0 . 19562 -0.11453 -1.22751 -0.05345 1. 83521 -0.49604 
1964 0.17857 -0.10545 - 1.17429 -0.07038 3.33937 -0.50501 
1965 0.18449 -0.09384 -1.22 241 -0.06076 -22.06521 -0 . 47939 
1966 0.22189 -0.11076 -1.26780 - 0.05674 2. 81877 - 0.1,8012 
1967 0.21249 -0.11472 -1.25104 -0.05467 1.99633 -0.48892 
1968 0 . 20721 -0.114 70 - 1.33012 -0.02021 1. 83199 - 0.46474 
1969 0.25547 -0.12783 -1.38 252 - 0 . 01953 1. 23824 - 0 . 45418 
1970 0.15953 -0.03620 
-1.25074 -0.04010 -5.04398 -0. 46358 
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Table 47. Continued. 
Year n23 n24 n32 n42 n34 n43 
1953 -0.32454 -1.89597 0. 00770 -0.09706 0. 52610 -0.17904 
1954 -0.23446 - 1. 66855 0.11230 -0.10401 0.78386 -0.15268 
1955 -0.27415 -2. 07587 0.06758 -0.07354 o. 79722 -0.16033 
1956 -0.19503 -1.45982 0.20313 -0 . 11846 0. 94241 -0.13993 
1957 -0.17604 -1. 39714 0.293?8 -0 . 11980 1.14897 -0.13300 
1958 -0.20939 -1. 72263 0.16416 -0. 07769 1.00561 -0 . 14236 
1959 -0.28272 - 2.38930 0.05078 -0.02961 0.87053 -0.15791 
1960 - 0.18499 -1. 70517 0.24788 -0.07630 1. 28271 -0.13295 
1961 -0.19850 - 1.83127 0.20247 -0.06518 1. 21305 -0.13704 
1962 -0.13364 -1.46242 0.75597 - 0.10255 2. 57794 -0.11280 
1963 - 0.12294 - 1.42904 1.13 782 -0 . 10346 3.62024 -0.10835 
1964 -0.11008 -1.35546 2.11062 -0 . 11369 6.07855 -0 .10207 
1965 - 0.0938 - 1.425 76 -14.14567 -0.10017 - 40.81908 -0.09441 
1966 -0.11784 -1.61396 l. 59837 -0.07983 5.65695 -0.10636 
1967 -0.12365 - 1.53395 1.16873 -0.08991 4 . 00380 - 0.10878 
1968 -0.12254 -1. 50713 1.18731 - 0.09877 4.01788 -0 .10814 
1969 -0.14392 - 1. 78262 0. 6 7438 -0.06267 2.88391 -0 .11764 
1970 -0 .08366 -1. 31966 -3 . 65950 -0 . 11262 -9 . 57551 ··0 . 08869 
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Table 48. Uncompensated own-price elasticities for wheat in the 
Italian market, 1953-1974. 
Year 11u 11 22 11 33 11 44 
1953 - 1.4 7296 - 1.55183 - 0 . 91764 - 1.93177 
1954 - 1.50 310 -1.61587 -0 .91942 - 1. 93438 
1955 -1. 4 4 930 - 1.54114 - 0 . 91422 - 1.93114 
1956 -1.46699 -1.64090 - 0 . 91624 -1.93443 
1957 -1.53587 -1.62257 - 0 . 91722 -1.93571 
1958 - 1.54360 -1.54758 - 0 . 91797 -1.93341 
1959 - 1.53592 - 1.58272 - 0.91403 - 1.93502 
1960 -1.49455 -1.64354 - 0 . 91726 - 1.93522 
1961 - 1.44260 -1.55959 - 0.91 414 - 1.93158 
1962 -1.44500 -1.57731 -0 . 91569 - 1. 93202 
1963 -1.49773 -1.58060 - 0.91570 -1.93375 
1964 -1.43963 - 1.57704 -0 . 91534 - 1.93188 
1965 -1.43240 - 1.53548 - 0.91208 - 1.93063 
1966 - 1.45194 -1.55304 -0.91331 -1.93179 
1967 -1.44502 -1.55573 - 0.91384 -1.93157 
1968 - 1.45650 - 1.55656 - 0 . 91393 -1.93197 
1969 - 1.45513 - 1.54338 - 0 . 91395 - 1.93145 
1970 -1.43026 - 1.51938 -0.91 238 - 1.92988 
1971 - 1.41 574 -1. 50276 - 0 .9113 3 -1. 928 78 
1972 -1. 42 4 60 - 1.51636 - 0. 91146 - 1.92968 
1973 - 1.51998 - 1.61796 - 0 . 91802 - 1.935 07 
1974 - 1.64070 - 1.80890 -0.92315 - 1. 94065 
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Table 49. Substitution elasticities for wheat in the Italian market, 
1953-1974. 
Year a12 a13 a 14 a21 a 31 a41 
1953 0. 53239 - 0.10255 -0.00095 0.45856 -0.14373 -0 .06160 
1954 0.59853 -0.10111 -0.00095 0.48957 -0.15345 . -0.06576 
1955 0.52130 - 0 .10541 -0.00095 0. 43409 -0.13606 - 0.05331 
1956 0.62427 -0.10377 -0.00095 0.45235 -0.1U78 -0 .06076 
1957 0.60541 -0 .10297 -0.00095 0.42319 -0.16398 -0.07028 
1958 0 . 52794 - 0.10231 - 0.00095 0 . 53114 -0.16648 -0 . 07135 
1959 o. 56431 -0.10563 -0.00095 0 .52326 -0.16401 -0.07029 
1960 0. 62697 -0.10293 -0.00095 0. 48076 -0 .15069 -0.06458 
1961 0. 54044 -0 . 10548 -0.00095 0.42714 - 0.13383 -0.05738 
1962 0.55878 -0.10419 -0.00095 0.42962 -0.13466 -0.05771 
1963 0. 56216 -0.10421 -0.00095 0 . 48406 -0 .15172 -0.06502 
1964 0.55851 -0.10448 -0.00095 0 . 42405 -0 .13291 -0 .05696 
1965 0.51542 -0.10720 -0.00095 0.41656 - 0.13056 - 0.05596 
1966 0.53364 -0 . 10619 -0.00095 0.43682 - 0.13691 -0.05868 
1967 0. 53644 -0.10573 -0.00095 0. 42965 - 0.13467 -0.05571 
1968 0. 53729 - 0.10567 -0.00095 0.44154 - 0.13839 -0. 05931 
1969 0.42362 - 0. 10564 -0.00095 0. 44012 -0.13795 - 0.05912 
1970 0.49866 - 0.10694 -0.00095 0.41435 -0 .12987 -0.05566 
1971 0.48132 - 0.10781 - 0.00095 0. 39925 -0. 12514 -0 .05363 
1972 0. 49552 -0.10771 -0.00095 0.40847 -0.12803 -0.05487 
1973 0.60067 -0. 10229 -0.00095 0. 40691 - 0.15888 -0.0680 9 
1974 o. 79577 - 0.09815 -0. 00095 0. 63012 -0 .19750 -0. 08464 
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Table 49. Continued~ 
Year a23 a24 a 32 a42 a 34 a43 
1953 -0 .10255 -0.00095 -0.10648 0.53239 -0.00095 - 0.10255 
1954 -0.10111 - 0.00095 -0.11971 0. 59853 -0.00095 -0.10111 
1955 -0.10541 -0.00095 -0. 10426 0. 52130 - 0.00095 -0.10541 
1956 - 0.10377 - 0.00095 - 0.12485 0.62427 -0.00095 -0.10377 
1957 -0.10297 -0 . 00095 -0.12108 0.60541 -0.00095 -0. 10297 
1958 -0.10231 - 0.00095 - 0 . 10559 0. 42794 -0.00095 - 0.10231 
1959 -0.1056 3 - 0 . 00095 - 0.11286 o. 56431 -0.00095 -0.10563 
1960 -0 .10293 -0.00095 -0. 12539 0. 62697 -0. 00095 -0.10293 
1961 -0. 10548 -0.00095 - 0 . 10809 0.54044 - 0.00095 - 0. 10598 
1962 -0.10419 - 0.00095 -0.11176 0 . 55878 -0.00095 -0.10419 
1963 - 0 . 10421 -0.00095 - 0.11243 0.56215 -0 .00095 - 0 . 10421 
1964 -0.10448 - 0 . 00095 -0.11170 0.55851 -0.00095 - 0.10448 
1965 - 0.10720 - 0.00095 -0.10308 0.51542 -0.00095 -0.10720 
1966 -0.10619 - 0.00095 - 0.10673 0. 53364 - 0.00095 -0.10619 
1967 -0. 10573 -0.00095 -0. 10729 0.53644 -0. 00095 -0.10573 
1968 -0.10567 -0. 00095 -0. 10746 0 . 53729 - 0.00095 -0 .10567 
1969 - 0.10564 -0. 00095 - 0 .10472 0. 52362 - 0.00095 -0. 10564 
197 0 -0. 10694 -0.000 95 -0.0997 3 0. 49866 -0.00095 -0. 10694 
1971 - 0 . 10781 - 0.00095 -0 . 09626 0. 48132 - 0 . 00095 - 0.10781 
1972 -0. 10771 -0.00095 -0109910 0 . 49552 -0.00095 -0 .10771 
1973 -0. 10229 -0 .00095 -0. 12013 0.60067 -0.00095 -0. 10229 
1974 - 0.09815 -0.00095 -0.15915 0. 79577 -0. 00095 - 0.09815 
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Table 50. Uncompensated cross-price elasticities for wheat in the 
Italian market, 1953-1974. 
Year Tll2 Tl13 Tll4 Tl21 Tl31 Tl41 
1953 -0.01799 -0.03168 -1.36610 -0.01548 -0.01500 -0.01529 
1954 -0.01542 - 0.03283 -1.39933 -0 .015 02 -0.01424 -0 .01441 
1955 -0.01809 -0.03037 -1.34206 -0.01655 -0.01568 -0.01609 
1956 -0.01373 -0. 03129 -1.36420 -0.01720 -0 . 01521 - 0.01553 
1957 -0.01574 -0.03301 -1.43325 -0.01373 -0.01346 -0.01357 
1958 -0.01970 -0.03330 - 1.43723 -0.0124 2 - 0.01327 -0.01335 
1959 -0.01764 -0.03221 -1.43225 - 0.01319 -0.01341 -0.01356 
1960 -0.01411 - 0.04313 -1. 39224 -0.01583 -0.01445 -0.01467 
1961 -0.01695 -0.03022 -1. 33612 -0 . 01724 -0.01590 -0 .01634 
1962 -0.01610 -0.03064 - 1.33910 -0.01739 -0 .01585 -0 .01626 
1963 -0.01699 -0.03178 -1.39316 -0 . 01475 -0.01433 -0.01456 
1964 -0.01601 -0.03044 -1.33363 -0.01770 -0.01602 -0.01646 
1965 -0.01805 -0.02953 -1.324 78 -0.01742 -0.01621 - 0.01672 
1966 -0.01749 -0.03023 -1. 34557 -0.01661 -0.01559 -0.01601 
1967 -0.01720 -0.03021 -1.33848 - 0.01703 -0.01582 - 0.01625 
1968 -0.01740 - 0.03047 -1.35029 -0 . 01642 -0.01546 -0.01585 
1969 -0.01809 -0. 03044 -1. 34821 -0.01627 -0.01549 -0 .01539 
1970 -0.01894 -0. 02954 -1. 32162 - 0.01727 -0.016 28 -0.01679 
1971 -0.01965 - 0.02899 - 1.30581 -0.01786 -0.01678 -0.01737 
1972 -0 . 01900 - 0.02922 - 1.81578 -0.01756 - 0.01647 -0.01702 
1973 -0 . 01565 -0.03286 -1.41682 - 0.01432 -0.01383 - 0.01397 
1974 -0.01093 -0 . 03703 -1.54290 -0.01236 -0.01165 -0.0114 8 
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Table 50. Continued 
Year 11 23 11 24 11 32 11 42 11 34 11 43 
1953 -0.03319 -1.43588 -0 . 01952 - 0.00892 -0 . 83574 -0.02227 
1954 - 0.03509 -1.52261 - 0.01766 - 0 . 00679 -0 . 83944 -0.02261 
1955 - 0.03210 -1.42442 - 0.01982 - 0.00933 -0 . 83247 - 0. 02171 
1956 -0.03478 -1.52718 - 0.01698 -0.00608 -0.83701 -0.02209 
1957 -0.03470 -1.51129 -0.01748 -0.00661 -0.83887 -0.02228 
1958 -0.03323 - 1.43421 -0.01971 - 0.00910 -0.83744 -0.02235 
1959 -0.03303 -1.47120 -0.01854 -0.00785 -0 . 83573 -0.02175 
1960 -0.03512 -1.53095 -0.01694 -0.00601 -0.83847 -0.02227 
1961 -0.03248 -1.44319 -0.01920 -0.00863 - 0.83280 -0.02170 
1962 -0.03324 -1.46121 -0.01867 -0.00801 -0.88441 -0.02196 
1963 -0.03336 -1.46713 -0.01860 -0.00791 -0.83594 -0.02199 
1964 -0.03314 -1.46074 -0.01867 -0.00802 -0.83401 -0.02190 
1965 -0.0314 7 -1.41811 -0.01997 -0.00955 -0.82.033 -0.02137 
1966 -0.03215 -1.43709 -0.01941 -0.00888 -0.83232 -0 . 02158 
1967 -0.03233 -1.43939 -0.01932 -0.00878 - 0.83255 - 0.02166 
1968 - 0 . 03238 - 1.44082 -0 . 01930 - 0 . 00875 -0 . 83297 -0.02165 
1969 -0.03209 - 1.42710 - 0 . 01974 - 0.00925 -0.83253 -0.02167 
1970 - 0 . 03119 - 1.40114 - 0.02056 - 0.01022 - 0.82991 - 0.02140 
1971 - 0.03058 -1.38313 - 0 . 02119 -0 . 01095 - 0.82810 -0 .02122 
1972 -0.03091 - 1.39788 -0.02066 - 0 . 01035 - 0 . 82900 - 0.02125 
1973 -0 . 03479 - 1.50576 - 0 . 01761 - 0 . 00674 - 0.83894 -0 . 02240 
1974 - 0.04061 -1.70098 - 0.01395 - 0.00252 -0.84 78 9 - 0.02340 
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Table 51. Uncompensated own-price elas ticities for wheat in the 
Japanese market, 1954-1974. 
Year n11 Tl22 T) 33 T)44 
1954 -1.19869 -1.30685 -0 . 84678 -1. 40583 
1955 -1.17597 -1.33273 -0.78098 -1.4 2315 
1956 - 1.18999 -1.32333 -0. 80288 -1. 41373 
1957 - 1.19994 -1.31 728 -0. 82681 -1. 40153 
1958 -1. 22998 -1.31342 -0. 83765 -1.37663 
1959 -1.15573 ··1. 37486 -0. 70213 -1. 42022 
1960 -1.06228 -1.4 5243 -0.48466 -1.47527 
1961 - 0.94317 -1.53960 -0 .16626 -1. 54213 
1962 - 1.04053 -1. 48511 -0.38828 -1. 48133 
1963 -1. 26221 -1. 33912 - 0.80696 -1.33002 
1964 - 0.95020 -1. 55377 -0.11661 -1. 53255 
1965 -0. 90511 -1.64129 0 . 25000 -1. 53218 
1966 -1.01129 -1. 58283 -0. 06506 -1. 46754 
1967 -0.93692 -1. 63302 0.16908 - 1.50656 
1968 -1.00261 -1.6367 8 0.13614 -1.44995 
1969 -1. 14989 -1.55829 -0.24444 -1.34606 
1970 -1. 21685 -1.521 27 -0.40633 - 1.28702 
1971 -1. 29262 - 1.54653 -0.39554 - 1.18109 
1972 - 1. 37922 -1. 49072 -0. 57188 - 1.10050 
1973 -1.13031 -1.53348 -0.34535 -1.36430 
1974 -0.79941 -1.55920 0. 05326 - 1.65311 
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Table 52. Substitution elasticities for wheat in the Japanese 
market, 1954-1974. 
Year 0 12 013 0 14 0 21 0 31 0 41 
1954 - 0.01589 0.84628 1. 09501 - 1.43244 1. 92396 1.14055 
1955 -0.01590 0.88340 1.15527 -1.52593 2.235 94 1.19127 
1956 -0.015 87 0.92082 1.12963 -1.48455 2.11808 1.17280 
1957 -0.01590 0.86854 1.12092 -1.4 5827 2.00651 1.1724 7 
1958 -0 .01591 0. 78716 1.10644 -1.41349 l. 91505 1.18092 
1959 -0.01592 1.14086 1. 26944 -1.65466 2.62471 1. 31192 
1960 -0.01594 1. 74375 1. 46557 -1. 95483 3.84605 1. 46280 
1961 -0.01597 2. 77293 1.68812 -2.80796 5 . 85397 1. 62084 
1962 -0 . 01595 1. 97403 1.54470 -2 .05510 4.37884 1. 53802 
1963 -0.01591 0.75315 1.17814 -1.44065 2. 00216 1. 29966 
1964 -0.01597 2.83062 1. 71541 -2 . 32624 6.09207 1. 65945 
1965 -0.01598 3.75921 1. 92049 -2. 56093 8.30179 1. 864 77 
1966 -0.01598 2. 62136 1. 77074 -2 . 29534 6.11918 1. 78417 
1967 -0.01598 3. 41366 1. 90023 -2.49831 7.68859 1. 87119 
1968 -0.01599 2.99708 1. 89602 -2. 41014 7.20884 1. 92973 
1969 -0.01598 1. 76299 1.71274 - 2.05948 4. 75113 1. 85207 
1970 -0.01597 1. 32818 1. 64330 - 1.90122 3.82442 1. 83859 
1971 -0.01599 1.10729 1. 74321 - 1.86193 3.70141 2.05546 
1972 -0.01598 0 . 71508 1. 64706 - 1.65 320 2. 79779 2.03864 
1973 -0 . 01598 1. 69681 1. 67315 - 2.03581 4. 32978 1. 78585 
1974 - 0.01598 1. 69681 1.67315 - 2.03581 4 . 32978 1. 78585 
143 
Table 52. Continued. 
Year 0 23 0 24 0 32 0 42 a 34 0 43 
1954 -1.91033 -0. 45984 -1.80809 -0.01589 0.98764 - 0.46285 
1955 -2.13954 -0 . 47784 -1.80864 -0.01590 1.12060 -0.54160 
1956 -2.06021 -0 . 47254 -1.80720 -0.01587 l. 07954 - 0.40812 
1957 -1. 98564 -0.47332 -1. 80920 -0.01590 l. 04201 -0.4 7030 
1958 -1. 94 953 -0. 48330 -1.80999 -0.01591 l. Ol1l28 - 0 . 41895 
1959 -2.44568 - 0.52106 -1.81096 -0.01592 l. 32632 -0.59830 
1960 -3.23861 -0. 56263 -1. 81359 -0.01594 l. 78295 -0. 89303 
1961 -4 . 42262 -0. 60024 - 1.81643 -0. 0159 7 2.45079 -1.36158 
1962 -3.59941 -0. 58771 -1.81417 -0.01595 2.01941 -0.99229 
1963 -2.08644 ·-0. 53820 -l. 80967 -0.0159i 1.19697 -0. 35128 
1964 - 4 . 61366 -0.61686 -l. 81715 -0.01597 2.61208 - l. 384 71 
1965 - 6 .03120 -0.68497 -l. 81830 -0.01598 3.59836 -1.74 786 
1966 -4.83206 -0.67730 -l. 81797 -0.01598 2. 92017 - l. 23459 
1967 - 5.72716 - 0.69354 -l. 81848 -0.01598 3.45710 -l. 57651 
1968 -5.61273 -0. 73080 -1. 81886 -0.01599 3.53945 -1. 34248 
1969 -4 .18528 -0 .73500 - 1.81744 - 0.01598 2.73735 -0. 71293 
1970 -3 . 60139 - 0.74468 -l. 81704 -0.01597 2.41361 -0.44 310 
1971 - 3.67643 - 0 . 85077 -1.81881 -0.01599 2. 72460 -0.10105 
1972 -3 . 04369 -0.86974 -1. 81826 -0.01598 2.36481 0.19086 
1973 -3.81635 - 0 . 70151 -1.81766 -0.01598 2. 40594 -0 . 70890 
1974 - 5.22044 - 0 . 56046 -1.81731 -0.01597 2 . 73905 -1.92093 
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Table 53. Uncompensated cross-price elasticities for wheat in the 
Japanese market, 1954-1974. 
Year 11 12 1113 11 14 11 21 11 31 n41 
1954 -0 .08954 0.04959 0.18262 -1. 20721 0.66986 -0 .12871 
1955 -0.08691 0.07294 0. 21884 -1. 24453 0.83546 -0.12117 
1956 -0.08920 0. 06163 0. 20133 -1.23398 0. 77918 -0. 12382 
1957 -0.09066 0.05289 0.19111 -1.22875 0.72154 -0. 12050 
1958 -0.09619 0.03507 0.16963 -1.23905 0.69465 -0.11392 
1959 -0.08462 0 .09737 0 . 26894 -1.31221 1. 04778 -0.09l00 
1960 -0.06104 0.17254 0. 40131 -1.39766 1. 62800 -0. 06840 
1961 - 0.01885 0. 26049 0.57247 -1.4 7890 2.50604 -0.04801 
1962 -0.05374 0.19294 0 . 44329 -1.44026 1. 89695 -0.05277 
1963 -0.10514 0.02580 0.17449 -1.30724 0.78248 -0.07062 
1964 -0.02013 0.25880 0. 57422 -1.50424 2.65697 - 0 . 03791 
1965 0.00483 0.29756 0.67180 -1.61156 3.75186 0.00742 
1966 - 0.03937 0. 22872 0. 53310 -1.57818 2.84644 0.00726 
1967 - 0 .00830 0.27844 0. 63443 -1.61496 3.52331 0.01624 
1968 - 0 .03264 0.24233 0.57289 -1.65258 3.46415 0. 04720 
1969 -0.08571 0.14747 0.40304 - 1.61353 2. 37169 0. 06716 
1970 -0.10512 0.10241 0.33426 -1.59379 1. 91518 0.09022 
1971 -0.12705 0.06824 0.30631 -1.67712 1. 97958 0. 20684 
1972 - 0.14526 0. 00964 0 . 23080 -1.64262 1. 4813 0 0. 25612 
1973 -0 . 07989 0.15160 0.40326 -1. 56520 2.06488 0. 04423 
1974 0.03582 0.34921 0. 74570 -1. 44352 3.07848 -0.07569 
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Table 53. Continued . 
Year 11 23 11 24 11 32 11 42 11 34 11 43 
1954 -0.60065 - 0.77441 -0.30591 - 0.24965 0. 30196 -0. 30594 
1955 -0.60585 -0.80805 - 0.29128 -0.26865 0. 40801 -0. 80412 
1956 -0.60283 - 0.79343 -0.29615 -0.26148 0. 37158 -0. 30787 
1957 -0.60535 -0 .77995 -0.30352 -0.25627 0.33452 - 0.30312 
1958 -0 . 60522 -0.75896 -0. 30605 -0. 25136 0.31786 - 0.29579 
1959 -0.62549 -0.83898 - 0 . 27220 - 0.29641 0.54288 -0. 30005 
1960 - 0 . 64142 -0.93543 - 0.16899 - 0.35352 0.94084 -0. 80115 
1961 -0. 65200 -1.04255 0.05472 - 0.41875 1. 59054 -0.80140 
1962 - 0.64875 -0.96223 -0.10944 - 0.37563 1.12355 -0.29727 
1963 -0 . 62292 -0.74726 -0.30649 -0 . 26342 0.36952 -0.27950 
1964 -0.65521 -1.04463 0.09554 -0.42680 l. 68452 -0.29635 
1965 -0.66995 -l. 09802 0.43876 -0.43822 2.44085 -0.28157 
1966 -0.67002 -l. 01652 0.14097 - 0.43650 1. 74140 -0 .27675 
1967 -0. 67412 -l. 07488 0.35985 -0.47413 2. 24596 -0.27843 
1968 - 0.68131 -l. 03766 0.32991 -0.46762 2.12733 -0. 26288 
1969 -0.68222 -0 . 91805 - 0 . 00817 -0.40237 l. 32974 -0 .24708 
1970 - 0.68570 -0. 85504 - 0. 12825 - 0.37021 l. 02161 -0.23616 
1971 - 0 . 70550 -0. 80785 -0 .12429 -0 .36559 l. 00791 -0. 19079 
1972 -0. 70200 -0 . 72314 - 0.23617 -0.31823 0. 71494 - 0.16283 
1973 -0.68249 -0.91384 - 0.08481 -0.39008 1.15655 -0 .26251 
1974 - 0.63382 -1. 13823 0. 23927 - 0.44487 2.14 535 -0 .31357 
Appendix C 
Mathematical Equations fo r Calculating Losses in 
Exporting Country ?reducers Surplus Because of Tariff, and 
Gains Because of Tariff Reduction Policies of Importing Country 
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Losses to the producers of a tariff equal af is PebfPP in 
Figure 3, and can be calculated as follows; 
or 
P bfP 
e P 
L 
P dfP + dbf 
e p 
= Ll + 12 
where L = P dfP , 
E: d e p 
L = P dfP and 12 = dbf. L = df (Ql) 1 e p 1 
(~),(Ryan, 
s d 
1964) where tl, is tariff per unit. 
supply and compensated demand elasticity for import . 
1
2 
db (df) we know df and db = 6Q
1 
t.Ql 
Ql 
6P1 
p 
c 
= E 
d 
E 
d 
6Pl 
where 6P
1
- ad. t.Q1 = Q1 Ed -p- substitute fo r 6P 1 . 6P1 
E c (~), (Ryan, 1964) and multiply by df we get L as; 
s d 
L L 
1 
+ L 
2 
L 
2 
t 2E: 2q £ /P 
1 d 1 s c 
(s + E )2 
s d 
E 
Q t (--d-) + t 2E 2q E /P (E 
1 1 Es + Ed l d 1 s c s 
df = t 
and E 
s 
ad 
14 7 
] 
are 
t
1
, Ed, Es, are already defined, Q
1 
is quantity of wheat i mported at 
C. I. F. price (i .e . , P ) and can be calculat ed by dividing expenditure -
p 
t o C.I.F . prices at relevan t year from data in Appendix A, finally 
p p + t . 
c p 1 
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The grain in producers surplus G, because of tariff reduction 
can be found from Figure 4 a s follows: 
G 
or 
Q, \ + Q,2 
P bfP - PbhP ' where P bfP 
e p p e p 
PbhP' 
p 
where Q, 
Q,l 
kh 
P khP ' + kbh 
e P 
Pbhp ' , Q, P KhP' 
p 1 e p 
kh (Q3) 
E: d 
t2 (E+E) 
s d 
L 
and 9- 2 kbh 
where t 2 i s per unit tariff after tariff reduction, and Q3 
where Q2 
l\Q2 
Q2 
liP
2 
=Ed where liP2 
Pe 
kg and P 
e 
p + df 
p 
{\P2 Q2e:d p-- substitute for liP2 
e 
Therefore , liQ2 = t 2Q2e: de: 5 /Pe (e: s + E: d). Now Q, 2 
2 2 2 
Q,2 = t2 e:d Q2e: /Pe (e:s + e: d) 
G = L - Q, using the equivalent of L and Q, and simplify we get G as 
follows: 
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G 
£ 2 2 2 
(Q t Q ) ( d t1 Q1 t2 Q2 c sc d 
1 1 - 3 t2 c-+£) + (-p- - -p-) ---"---"----
8 d c e (£ + £ ) 2 
s d 
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